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Fundamental structural transformations are taking place in Chineseculture and society. The watershed in China’s recent history is widelyregarded as Deng Xiaoping’s gaige kaifang (reform and opening up)
project that began in 1979. Unlike the now almost forgotten perestroika of
Gorbachev that led to the collapse of Soviet-style socialism, gaige kaifang
has succeeded in bringing high-speed economic development and material
prosperity while managing to maintain the political status quo under the
rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The last two decades, how-
ever, witnessed not only phenomenal economic growth but also spectacu-
lar political crises and unrest (which culminated in the Tiananmen events
of 1989) and profound social, ideological, and cultural changes. These
crises and changes are fundamental and structural, first because the politi-
cal mechanism of the state and the CCP has become increasingly dysfunc-
tional in the course of the reform, and the country faces imminent danger
of disintegration. Second, the revolutionary ideology and its discourses,
which legitimated the rule of the CCP in the past and are still being used by
the post-Deng regime today, have lost their legitimating power. Changes in
political, social, and cultural spheres are taking place in spite of the ruling
power’s resistance. Even though the fate of gaige kaifang is unpredictable, it
is certain that China’s political and social life has entered a postrevolution-
ary phase, even if only in a narrow, chronological sense. Practices that ex-
isted under Mao for thirty-odd years have become irreversibly outmoded,
and there seems no possibility of returning to the past.
New political and social formations, new sets of values and beliefs, new
social identities, and new subjectivities have emerged. These emergent for-
mations, transformations, and reformations cannot be understood merely
as the result of China’s unique experiments, or “socialism with Chinese
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characteristics” as they are labeled by communist ideologues. Instead, they
must be seen within the broad context of globalization. Globalization is not
simply a new international or global conceptual framework by which
China’s changes can be understood. Rather, it is both a historical condition
in which China’s gaige kaifang has unfolded and a set of values or ideologies
by which China and the rest of the globe are judged. Only immanent
knowledge or “cognitive mapping” seems to be capable of deciphering the
intrinsic tensions and contradictions of globalization while offering alter-
native visions by way of a critique. Tremendous intellectual efforts across
the world have been made to find ways to comprehend globalization. These
inquiries and discourses invariably reflect divergent cultural and ideologi-
cal positions. Attempts to map out the variants and possible alternatives of
globalization must henceforth take the self-reflexive and immanent cri-
tique as a priority, calling into question the political and ideological agen-
das and historical baggage underlying one’s own intellectual inquiries.
Moreover, given that globalization as a historical condition refers to a sig-
nificant ascendancy of culture, especially in relation to the now dominant
production of information and symbolic commodities, assessments of cul-
tural changes are much needed.
This book analyzes cultural trends in China in the 1990s within the
context of globalization. It examines intellectual debates in China about
globalization and contemporary Chinese culture and society, and it investi-
gates popular culture, literary movements, and Internet communications.
The observations and comments offered here are by no means comprehen-
sive or conclusive. Rather, they are preliminary sketches of a few aspects of
contemporary Chinese culture that I find significant in identifying current
major trends. The book is part of an ongoing project that considers some
aspects of the historical movement in an analytical mode. As an essential
area of globalization, culture nevertheless remains peripheral in China’s de-
bates and policies, which focus primarily on economic sectors. Similarly,
China studies in the West concentrate largely on the political and economic
consequences of globalization. Cultural studies in the West in general pay
scant attention to China, leaving it to area specialists who are further frag-
mented by disciplinary divisions within the social sciences and humanities,
despite recent clamor for more interdisciplinary approaches.
This book takes a comparative, theoretical, and interdisciplinary ap-
proach, integrating literary theory and criticism, social and political theo-
ries, and historical studies. It draws on current models of cultural studies
formulated in the English-speaking world, particularly the critical para-
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digm that studies the dialectic tensions between institutional formations
and intellectual trends. Such an approach helps unravel China’s current
cultural contradictions, which arise largely from the nation’s rapid eco-
nomic modernization and increasingly obsolete ideological formations. I
ground my research on historical evidence, guarding against any theoreti-
cal and ideological foreclosure. Given that the book is part of a larger proj-
ect that aspires to parallel the historical movement from a critical perspec-
tive, the conceptual framework and analytical tools that I employ are, of
necessity, evolving and adjusting continually to changes in social reality.
Likewise, the writing of this book is an evolving process that began in the
mid-1990s and ended early in the new millennium. Several chapters were
initially written to address specific issues in contemporary China, such as
the intellectual debates about China’s modernity, postmodernity, and alter-
native modernity, as well as issues of popular culture. In the course of writ-
ing the book, however, I have insisted on a dialectical and historical ap-
proach, with an eye on critiquing the present while searching for future
alternatives. I believe that engaging in cultural critique and searching for al-
ternatives are both my intellectual obligation and my choice of social com-
mitment. My inquiry here as an academic critic into this subject is a con-
tinuation of my previous studies of modern Chinese culture from the early
twentieth century to the 1980s.1
The central thesis of this book is that globalization constitutes a funda-
mental paradox in the sphere of culture—a tension between the trend to-
ward cultural homogenization through global cultural production and dis-
tribution (media, popular culture, and entertainment industry), and the
opposite trend toward cultural diversification in terms of local, ethnic, and
national cultural projects and agendas. The paradox reveals globalization as
a new phase of capitalism that tends to penetrate and dominate every cor-
ner of the globe and all social life with unprecedented intensity and veloc-
ity. Global expansion of capital has resulted in the erosion of political sov-
ereignty of the nation-state and national economies and has brought about
dynamic cultural interactions as well as new schisms between the global
and the local, between the center and the periphery, between the developed
West and the developing world, and between the intellectual elite and the
public. Cultural changes in China, especially in the 1990s, are the result of
these interactions. Since China has abandoned its revolutionary legacy and
is recovering its traditional values, a new cultural formation is emerging as
the nation further integrates itself into the world-system of capitalism. This
new cultural formation cannot be simply defined as socialist, capitalist,
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modern, or postmodern. Instead, it should be understood as a hybrid
postrevolutionary culture that embodies the fundamental tensions and
contradictions of globalization.
Although it is debatable whether globalization will result in the ulti-
mate triumph of capitalism, the global expansion of capital has unques-
tionably become its defining feature. China’s two decades of gaige kaifang
and its ideological and cultural consequences ought to be seen as its
choices, strategies, and, indeed, struggles vis-à-vis global capitalism. With
its revolutionary legacy and with socialism still its state-sanctioned ideol-
ogy, China’s struggle is more with capitalism than with other aspects of
globalization. This struggle is, after all, between capitalism and its ideolo-
gies and cultural practices on the one hand and whatever might constitute,
or have once constituted, alternatives on the other. These alternatives and
experiments have either been completely rejected and abandoned in the
former Soviet bloc or radically altered in China.
Given that the economy of China has not become as thoroughly glob-
alized as the economies of its East Asian neighbors such as Japan and South
Korea, the impact of economic globalization on China cannot be overem-
phasized. Yet China is perhaps the most enthusiastic of all about globaliza-
tion, from its leadership to the general public. It seems to many Chinese
political, intellectual, and other powerful elites that globalization promises
to lead China out of its political and ideological impasse, to eliminate the
last vestige of revolutionary culture, and finally to allow China to embrace
capitalism without rekindling the ideological warfare of socialism versus
capitalism. My focus here is on globalization precisely because I want to
address how capitalism and its ideologies challenge China today.
Whether China’s cultural transformation will yield some constructive
solutions to the contradictions of globalization is of crucial significance not
only to China but also to the world at large. To invent new democratic
forms, institutions, and beliefs, it is necessary to reintegrate the goals of so-
cialist experiments in current historical transformations, so that the de-
structive and oppressive tendencies of global capitalism can be effectively
curbed. Yet creative cultural reinvention in China (and elsewhere) remains
only a possibility under the current conditions of existence, and to make
that a reality requires unyielding commitment and ceaseless endeavor.
At present, though, one can see more tensions and crises in China’s
cultural scene than promises of creative transformation and reconstruc-
tion. Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China abandoned Mao’s rev-
olutionary idealism and adopted an economic developmentalism in order
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to build a modern, market-oriented postsocialist nation. This postsocialist
modernization project has inevitably resulted in intellectual and cultural
diversification and pluralization in the last two decades. The “Deng
Theory,” or developmentalism, is a highly pragmatic and expedient policy,
focusing exclusively on economic sectors while willfully neglecting changes
in political, social, and cultural spheres.2 Mao’s revolutionary ideological
hegemony has been deradicalized, and its meaning and content have been
made hollow, but its discursive formations and rhetoric still provide the le-
gitimation for the post-Deng regime.3 The legitimating discourse is simply
incommensurable with the economic policies, because the discourse is
predicated on Maoist ideologies of revolution, mass democracy, and egali-
tarianism, which are diametrically opposed to the endless accumulation of
capital as the utmost aim of capitalism. Consequently, the ideological and
legitimation crisis has haunted China since the beginning of the reform.4
The crisis of ideology and legitimacy in China today reflects the para-
doxes and contradictions of globalization, which are “localized” in a con-
flicting way both within China’s revolutionary and socialist legacy and with
its present modernization project. Globalization is first and foremost the
global expansion of capitalism, and it has constituted new global structures
and systems in political, economic, social, and cultural spheres. Roland
Robertson conceives of globalization in terms of its paradoxical movement
of homogenization and diversification in a new time-space compression or
continuum. Yet the paradox, alternately referred to by Robertson as “glo-
calization,” is only a symptom of the profound contradictions of global
capitalism.5
By Immanuel Wallerstein’s account, the contemporary movements
and countermovements of the capitalist world-system faced three pressures
that created a structural crisis. Wallerstein identifies the first pressure as the
increasing demand of the working class for better wages and the resolution
of global capitalists to keep relocating production in lower-wage areas. A
second pressure comes from the capitalist strategy of “externalizing the
costs,” that is, relocating toxic wastes and environmental pollution to shed
the responsibility of corporations. A third pressure is caused by a growing
popular demand for democratization, in terms of better education, health
care, social security, and so on, which calls for reform of taxation, social
services, and civil bureaucracies. Wallerstein argues that presently social
and economic resources and options are almost exhausted and that the
capitalist world-system can no longer offer viable solutions. Thus, capital-
ism “enters its terminal crisis,” which, Wallerstein predicts in an apocalyp-
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tic tone, “may last up to fifty years.”6 Nor does he see any possible alterna-
tive in postrevolutionary regimes (including China) for “reducing world-
wide or even internal polarization to any significant degree.” Overall,
Wallerstein perceives a “monumental disillusionment with the anti-sys-
temic movements,” that is, with the various socialist experiments of the
twentieth century. A visionary critic of capitalism who has always based his
analysis on dialectic and historical reason, Wallerstein nevertheless calls on
“free will” to counter the “recklessness” of global capitalism.7
Others may not sound as pessimistic as Wallerstein, but they generally
echo his sentiment in perceiving globalization as an all-encompassing con-
quest of the world by capitalism with no systematic alternatives visible on
the horizon. Leslie Sklair, for instance, draws up a “global system theory”
with three “building blocks.” The building block in the economic sphere is
the domination of transnational corporations. In the political sphere, it is
the emergent transnational capitalist class, which tends to increasingly dis-
empower the subordinate classes and deprive them of democratic partici-
pation in political life. In the cultural sphere, the culture-ideology of con-
sumerism resorts to an all-inclusive strategy in order to co-opt and
preemptively eliminate all counterhegemonic resistance of the subordinate
classes. Although maintaining faith in social movements that may disrupt
the efficiency of the dominant forces, Sklair nonetheless concludes that “no
social movement appears even remotely likely to overthrow the three fun-
damental institutional supports of global capitalism.”8
From a philosophical and contemplative perspective, Michael Hardt
and Antonio Negri view globalization as a sprawling “Empire,” a deterrito-
rialized, decentered, ever-expanding network or apparatus of rule. They
contend that a new kind of global sovereignty, borderless and limitless in its
economic, political, juridical, and ideological reach and trespassing tradi-
tional boundaries of the nation-state and of nationalist and modernist
projects, has fully emerged and taken hold of the world. Like Sklair, Hardt
and Negri prognosticate a “counter-Empire” that may be engendered from
within the Empire and that may call for the “multitude” to “invent new
democratic forms and a new constituent power that will one day take us
through and beyond Empire.”9
In a way, Hardt and Negri parallel Wallerstein’s “free will” by resorting
to a Spinozian strategy of immanent humanism vis-à-vis the new transcen-
dental ideologies of capitalist modernity, either a Hobbesian-Rousseauian
model of contractual politics or Adam Smith’s free market liberalism. It is
telling that Hardt and Negri invest in prophetic visions for future change in
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what they perceive as a genealogy from Spinoza to Machiavelli and Marx-
Engels, and they reinvent this genealogy by weaving a close relationship be-
tween the subject (the multitude or the working people) and object (demo-
cratic life) in a “process of self-production.” Quoting Spinoza, they assert
the need to reinvent a “materialist teleology”: “the prophet produces its
own people.”10 Such an assertion reiterates a modern Marxist emphasis on
ideology and consciousness in bringing about social revolution and system-
atic transformation. There is a genealogy, proceeding from Lenin to
Lukacs, Gramsci, the Frankfurt School, and Louis Althusser, that serves as a
pivotal theoretical basis for the reflections of Hardt and Negri.
Undoubtedly, Mao Zedong’s thought figures prominently in this modern
Marxist genealogy. Mao’s notions of cultural revolution and of instituting
revolution in ideological realms to bring about “people’s democracy” and
alternative modernity are indispensable components of the revolutionary
legacy from which Hardt and Negri draw their sustenance.11
Now that some important reflections on globalization by the Western
Left have been canvassed schematically, it is instructive to return to cultural
and ideological terrain in considering China’s dilemma. China’s relation-
ship to globalization can perhaps be seen as the success or failure of China
to reconfigure its conceptual and ideological paradigms of the moderniza-
tion project, which in turn may or may not constitute a viable alternative
vision to lead the nation through and beyond globalization. For roughly
half a century (1930s–1970s), Mao drew a revolutionary blueprint for
China’s modernity or alternative modernity under the conditions of
Western pressure and China’s own historical tradition of the old empire.
Mao recognized the centrality of culture and ideology in the revolution.
Over decades of political struggles leading to the establishment of the
People’s Republic of China and, in the ensuing years, the struggles to re-
construct a modern state and society, a revolutionary ideological hege-
mony was constituted. This revolutionary hegemony served effectively as a
legitimating force for the rule of the CCP, bringing social cohesion and
consensus, often by brutal coercion and suppression of the dissent of the
intellectual elite and mostly by gaining the broad consent of the working
classes—both peasantry and urban proletariat. Even during the turbulent
years of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), when political and social
norms and structures were disrupted, the revolutionary hegemony sur-
vived, buttressed by the iconicity (often dubbed the “personality cult”) of
the Great Teacher and by revolutionary idealism. The peasants and urban
workers, who were the majority of the population, embraced the revolu-
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tionary ideal of building a strong, egalitarian, and socialist society through
collective, self-sacrificing efforts. To some extent, Mao’s revolutionary
hegemony incarnates Spinoza’s prophecy that the prophet (the Great
Teacher) produces its own people. But then the crucial question arises: can
the prophecy sustain itself? Or to put it differently, what are the material
and institutional infrastructures that guarantee that the revolutionary vi-
sion is translated into a real, sustainable, and renewable practice of democ-
racy and does not remain merely a prophetic, phantasmagoric vision?
History suggests that Mao’s prophetic vision had a limited sustainability
and encountered grave difficulties in materializing itself.
Mao’s project of alternative modernity, however, should be seen as still
enmeshed in a modernist epistemology, susceptible to a teleological, deter-
ministic logic of progress and development. For Mao believed that the
principal contradiction of modernity—that is, the contradiction between
the productive forces and the relations of production that hinders historical
development (or modernity)—can be resolved by changing the relations of
production through political and ideological revolution. Thus Mao privi-
leged “revolutionary theory” and “cultural revolution” over economic de-
velopment of productive forces. The dialectical reversal of political and ide-
ological revolution vis-à-vis economic development, however, did not give
birth to an antideterministic and dynamic conception of history that could
serve as a new epistemology for the alternative modernity. Over the years,
Mao increasingly subscribed to an ideological and cultural determinism,
from which he envisioned the Cultural Revolution as necessitated by the
Hegelian-Marxian “inevitable law of history.” Furthermore, cultural revo-
lution as a heuristic and self-productive, self-educational initiative largely
lapsed into an instrument of political manipulation and domination, espe-
cially in dealing with estranged and dissenting intellectuals.12
Post-Mao China under Deng Xiaoping’s gaige kaifang witnessed the
debunking of Mao’s cultural and ideological determination but not of the
deterministic and instrumental reason that Mao had enacted during his
reign. Only the “content” of determinism was reversed, as it were, from a
cultural ideological determinism to a resolute economic determinism.
Mao’s intrinsically modernist deterministic epistemology and its discursive
formations were inherited by Deng Xiaoping. The economic policies of
Deng’s gaige kaifang were at first the revised versions of economic recon-
struction that the Eighth Congress of the CCP (1956) put forth as China’s
modernization plan. As the CCP’s general secretary at that time, Deng
Xiaoping was a major designer and executive of that modernization plan.
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Deng’s developmentalism is also to a significant degree a continuation
of the modernization plan during Mao’s reign. Developmentalism in the
West assumes the forms of development theory as well as underdevelop-
ment and dependency theories. The Chinese modernization plan under
Mao took the form of self-reliance and autonomous development, akin to
the delinking and isolationist notions of dependency theories and underde-
velopment theories. Gaige kaifang rejects the premises of isolationist self-
reliance and adopts the hypothesis of development theories that develop-
ment in China, as in other developing countries, will follow the same
pattern of modernization as in modernized countries in terms of marketi-
zation and full integration into the world-system. On the one hand, devel-
opmentalism is only a partial rejection of Mao in that it never renounces
the modernist epistemology underlying Mao’s project. On the other hand,
Deng’s gaige kaifang is a thorough renunciation of Mao’s project by the
total abandonment of the revolutionary idealism that animated the dis-
courses and social practices of the Mao era.
The complex relationship between gaige kaifang and Mao’s legacy can
be seen in the differences and parallels of Deng’s and Mao’s strategies to-
ward capitalist globalization. Granted, it was during the Deng era that
globalization came into full swing. Yet Mao’s vision of alternative moder-
nity—which was primarily based on ideological and cultural revolution,
economic self-reliance, and a political system of one-party rule sustained
by so-called democratic centralism—can be seen as a powerful antisystem-
atic, counter-Empire movement during the formative years of globaliza-
tion. Mao’s universalist vision of global cultural revolution and global in-
surgency reverberated throughout the world in the 1960s. Moreover, his
strategic formulation of the “three world” division and Third World na-
tional liberation and guerrilla warfare (as a possible reenactment of the
Chinese revolution) on a global stage through the encirclement of devel-
oped urban centers (the First and Second Worlds) by the underdeveloped
countryside or periphery (the Third World) was inspirational. It posed a
real threat to the geopolitical hegemony of the two superpowers during the
cold war.
It is now clear that gaige kaifang rejects Mao’s counterhegemonic revo-
lutionary strategies as an alternative to capitalist globalization and fully
embraces the logic of the market and accepts the rules set forth by the dom-
inant power of global capitalism. Ironically, though, this full integration
into the capitalist world-system has ineluctably reintroduced the national-
ist agenda into China’s social discourses on the sovereignty of the nation-
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state and the nationalist project of modernization, whereas during Mao’s
relatively isolationist reign the ideology of universalism and international-
ism always preceded any nationalist or regionalist interests. Two famous
slogans during the reign of Mao reflect his revolutionary globalism. One is
“Never forget that two-thirds of the people in the world are exploited and
suffering today.” (A variant is Mao’s paraphrasing from The Communist
Manifesto: “The proletariat can liberate itself only by liberating all of hu-
manity.”) The other slogan is related to the highly centralized economy and
political life: “The whole nation is a single chessboard.” It was effectively
employed under Mao’s rule to diffuse complaints in the relatively industri-
alized and prosperous regions, such as Shanghai, which allegedly had to
sacrifice wealth and prosperity to the national interests. Moreover, an egal-
itarian idealism and collectivism served as the backbone to Mao’s project of
alternative modernity. Deng’s slogans, by contrast, are “Getting rich is glo-
rious” and “Let a part of the population get rich first.” While insisting on
widely opening China to the world, the post-Deng regime has increasingly
seen the need to assert China’s national sovereignty and interests in eco-
nomic sectors as well as in multilateral international relations. This para-
dox cannot be simply attributed to an internal change from Mao’s utopian
vision of revolutionary globalism to Deng’s nationalist agenda or an emer-
gent “China threat.” Rather, it should be construed as a result of China’s
full integration into globalization and, as such, a symptom of the funda-
mental contradictions of globalization. It should also be noted that
Maoism has a complex and contradictory legacy in that it was at once a rev-
olutionary ideal of egalitarianism and mass democracy and an ideology of a
strong, monolithic, one-party state. Mao’s legacy has been quite active and
alive, contributing further to the paradoxes of the Deng era. Although rev-
olutionary idealism has been all but abandoned, the notion of a powerful
state never loses its attraction to the power holders at the moment when
state power is being irrevocably eroded and enfeebled.
The discrediting and debunking of Mao’s revolutionary idealism and
globalism can be seen as prompted by the altered historical circumstances
of globalization that outdated Mao’s strategy of economic self-reliance and
by the delinking of cultural and ideological warfare, which was formulated
during the interlude between the two world wars and culminated at the
apex of the cold war. By the same token, the economic determinism and
developmentalism of the Deng regime, as well as its nationalist assertions,
appear as a strategic reorientation and, indeed, a structural adjustment to
the movement of the capitalist world-system. Gaige kaifang coincided with
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globalization, or the moment of historic transition as the cold war came to
an end and new structures and forms of political domination and eco-
nomic activity came into being. Along with the globalization of politics and
economy, ideological visions of capitalist globalism triumphed under the
various guises of consumerism, neoliberalism, and neoconservatism. This
ideological triumph is bolstered by the dominance of global communica-
tion and information systems, a global entertainment industry and popular
culture, and a global intellectual marketplace.
China’s integration into globalization can be seen both as a strategic
move, initiated by Deng’s gaige kaifang, and as an inevitable and irreversible
passage of history set in motion during Mao’s reign. This historical passage
actually stemmed from the revolutions, the civil wars, and the Sino-
Japanese War that occupied the entire first half of the twentieth century
and constituted a significant part of China’s struggles for modernity. In ret-
rospect, Deng’s developmentalist strategy was to integrate China into the
capitalist world-system only in the economic and technological sectors. In
political, social, and cultural spheres there was never a clearly articulated
acceptance of the norms and values of global capitalism. Integration into
globalization, therefore, was never conceived as a total submission to capi-
talism in a strategic sense. However, the last two decades have clearly shown
an inevitable trend toward full-scale integration into globalization simply
because the modernization project itself cannot be parceled out into dis-
junctive segments, and globalization, by virtue of its omnipotent sweep,
makes the fragmented, piecemeal way of reform implausible and unten-
able. To be precise, China can never remain only “partially globalized” and
must come to terms with all aspects and complexities of the consequences
of globalization.
Deng Xiaoping’s gaige kaifang is a strategy of modernization and glob-
alization without a real alternative vision. It retains only the discursive
forms of Mao’s revolutionary hegemony, but not his revolutionary global-
ism, as its ideological core. Capitalist globalization, by contrast, has both a
vision (in a variety of ideological guises) and enormous material and insti-
tutional power. Yet the neoliberal vision of the free market, the dominant
ideology of globalization, cannot rationalize and camouflage the ever-in-
creasing rifts between the wealthy and the dispossessed, between the pow-
erful and the disempowered, which are, in the final analysis, the fundamen-
tal and irreconcilable contradictions of globalization. The global/local,
universal/particular, or homogenizing/diversifying dichotomies or para-
doxes are different manifestations of this fundamental contradiction,
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which can be solved neither by a Hegelian dialectic of synthesis nor by
Mao’s handling of the “principal contradictions” by means of a univocal
and totalizing move. In an overdetermined and enormously complex situa-
tion like the present globalization, there seems to be no singular means of
resolution but rather plural and multiple movements and countermove-
ments. Such a situation begets possibilities for multiple alternatives and for
creative initiatives and experiments that can ultimately confront global-
scale injustices and inequalities and construct new forms of democracy,
equality, and justice. In Deng’s project of modernization, however, such 
alternatives and initiatives are absent.
Bereft of a real alternative vision to capitalist globalization, China’s
gaige kaifang has failed spectacularly to reconstruct a new cultural and ide-
ological counterhegemony. One may wonder whether any explicit, state-
sanctioned ideology is necessary in this post-cold-war era. However, ideol-
ogy—understood as primarily a symbolic, discursive practice by which
signs, meanings, and values are elicited to reproduce and reinforce social
and political powers—cannot be discarded in any given historical circum-
stances, regardless of the clamors of the “end of ideology” and the “end of
history,” which are nothing more than ideological statements themselves.13
Although deprioritizing the ideological and political struggle has served the
gaige kaifang policies of the Deng and post-Deng regimes, the absence of a
clear vision of social and political values and meanings of gaige kaifang in
China has only intensified its legitimation crisis. The crisis lies precisely in
the incompetence of the state in reproducing social cohesion and a broad
alliance of the general public in the face of widening social and economic
polarization.
Postrevolutionary cultural and ideological formations cannot but cele-
brate their hybridity and diversity and assume a certain postmodern multi-
positionality in tackling vastly complex issues. When China seemed to fi-
nally reach agreement after prolonged negotiations with the wealthiest and
most powerful to join the club of capitalist globalization—the World Trade
Organization (WTO)—a complacent Chinese government and state-
owned media eulogized it as a triumph of gaige kaifang, opening China ever
more widely and accepting an “international standard” (or, in a Chinese
idiom, “joining the international track”) as the only viable way of modern-
ization. By contrast, as the tension between the United States and China has
grown in recent years—with U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and the deployment
of National Missile Defense (NMD), charges against China for “human
rights violations” and for alleged “Chinese spies” among its diasporic com-
12 Introduction
munities, and NATO’s bombing of China’s embassy in Belgrade, to name
only a few issues—there have been rising nationalist sentiments to recall
the old-fashioned, protectionist principles of the nation-state. In addition,
the specter of Mao looms large, amidst ardent calls for revival of neo-
Confucianism and against crusaders of Hayek-style antitotalitarianism and
neoliberalism. But Mao seems to serve largely as an enfeebled, remote icon
of nostalgia and romantic rebellion deprived of its revolutionary core. In
the terrain of popular culture, nothing seems to be capable of supplanting a
pleasure-oriented, ego-centered consumer cultural fashion shaped by the
global information circuit and the entertainment industry, which has be-
come a central component of capitalist globalization.
Today’s Chinese discourses and debates about globalization reflect this
state of uncertainty and hybridity.14 Viewing globalization primarily from
the perspectives of economic and technological development, many in
China celebrate it as a golden opportunity for China’s modernization. This
is the mainstream view endorsed by the government, for it corresponds to
the official ideology of developmentalism. Yet the Chinese, from the stand-
point of a Third World developing country burdened by an enormous pop-
ulation and low per capita economic productivity, are also aware of the
double-edged nature of economic and technological globalization. This
awareness is heightened particularly in light of the increasing tensions and
conflicts between the United States and China, a relationship seen by most
Chinese as pivotal to China’s position in the global order. Concerns over
China’s national security and interests in globalization, legitimate as they
may be, are often asserted in and along with emotionally charged national-
istic discourses, which tend to complicate further the precarious status of
China as an emergent power within the dominant capitalist world-system.
Nationalism, contrary to its generally negative characterization as an
irrational and regressive movement that poses a threat to the world order
and hampers domestic development, is a complex ensemble of discursive
formations that serve a variety of purposes in different historical circum-
stances. What is really disquieting at present in China is not so much the
emotional outburst of nationalistic sentiment of the Chinese public but
rather the purely reactive invocation of nation-state sovereignty and other
outmoded ways and practices from the earlier phases of capitalist global ex-
pansion. In other words, it is no longer a tenable option for China to prac-
tice the ways of nationalism that belong to the capitalist modernity prior to
the current globalization. The absence of a real alternative vision can only
exacerbate the conflict of geopolitical interests in which China is inevitably
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embroiled by fully submitting itself to the world order of global capitalism.
Although ideological state apparatuses today still have to insist on some
sort of socialist position solely for their legitimation, the assertion of the
principles and advantages of socialism vis-à-vis capitalism in the age of
globalization has become largely vacuous and irrelevant.15
The multipositionality and hybridity of the cultural and ideological
scene in China stem from its complex interaction and entanglement with
globalization and its ideologies of global capitalism. Yet these new trends
and formations are not necessarily equivalent to multiple alternatives and
initiatives that can engender new democratic forms of social life. The cur-
rent formations are primarily an amalgam of responses and reactions to the
ideologies of capitalist globalization. Visions of real democratic transfor-
mation have not yet emerged. In addition, China faces the daunting task of
laying material and institutional foundations for the new social and cul-
tural formations under globalization. While tensions are mounting in
China in social and cultural spheres, particularly between the need for nor-
mative regulation of state rebuilding and the demand for democratic par-
ticipation of the people in a public sphere, no solution can remain local or
localized, nor can it be imported from purportedly “universal” models of
the West or globalized versions of social and cultural formations. By the
same token, no Chinese practice and experiment of resistance and restruc-
turing can remain within its own boundaries in this radically deterritorial-
ized globe and therefore must have far-reaching global implications.
The role of the state in China’s integration into globalization remains
contested and controversial. From the neoliberal, free market positions
that von Hayek embodies, any move to strengthen the role of the state is
reminiscent of the Stalinist-Maoist brand of “totalitarianism.” But others,
who refuse to accept neoliberalism at its face value and find themselves
greatly alarmed by the enfeeblement of the state’s role, especially in China’s
economic life, call for serious rethinking of the role of the state today, not
only in China’s national security and integrity but also in the construction
of state-managed social welfare, social security, and public education sys-
tems.16 The centrality of nationalism and the state to capitalist growth is
keenly felt in China’s modernization and globalization drive as national-
ism, and state-sanctioned nationalism in particular, seems to have steadily
risen in political and social life.17
As a Third World country with its own economic, political, social, and
cultural specificity, China may justifiably insist on its local, regional, and
national projects of modernization in globalization, but such projects must
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come to terms with an omnipresent and all-encompassing globalization on
its own immanent dialectic and logic. Resistance to the economic inequal-
ity and political injustice of the new alliance of power elites—global capi-
tal, technocrats, and neoliberal and neoconservative ideologues—ought to
confront the oppressive forces of domination both inside and outside the
national boundaries. In short, an alternative vision must be established.
But Deng Theory, or developmentalism, offers little in terms of effective
critique and resistance to new forms of domination and oppression. Nor
can the discourse of Maoist revolutionary ideology, which were used by
Deng and post-Deng regimes merely for legitimation, simply reinvent it-
self as a more viable alternative vision to developmentalism and capitalist
globalism.
The absence and disarticulation of an alternative vision at present,
however, by no means suggest a state of paralysis or dullness in China’s cul-
tural scene, nor do they signal dwindling hopes for democratic struggles.
On the contrary, the dynamic, sometimes quite chaotic currents and trends
in China at this historical conjunction abound with aspirations and clam-
ors for a more democratic public life. Initiatives, experiments, and critical
reflections are springing from all walks of life in a growing and diversified
public sphere. The young generation, seizing on Internet communication
as a new venue, is seeking extensively to articulate new visions that may
transform China’s revolutionary legacies and traditional values in innova-
tive and constructive ways.
Inevitably, any present endeavor to reinvent socialist idealism can be
scornfully discounted and brushed aside as hopelessly quixotic; down-to-
earth pragmatism and commodity fetish are the order of the day. It is
nonetheless important to state clearly what I believe are the possibilities for
China and for the world, following what Fredric Jameson calls the “ontolo-
gies of the present,” which “demand archaeologies of the future, not fore-
casts of the past.”18 I attempt in this book to engage in a symptomatic read-
ing of the cultural politics and political culture of China in the 1990s, not to
present a value judgment of what happened in the past but to argue for the
necessity of remaining hopeful and idealistic for social justice and equality
in the future, particularly for the dispossessed and the disempowered.
Throughout this book, a critical mood prevails concerning the ascendance
and seemingly inevitable dominance of global capitalism and its ideologies
in China. With respect to China’s own revolutionary legacy, my position
may at first glance seem rather ambivalent. Although I remain sharply crit-
ical of the debacles and human tragedies of the Mao era, I insist on the his-
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torical necessity of revolution and revolutionary idealism. I hope it will be-
come clear in the course of this book’s analysis that this insistence is not
simply a matter of personal indulgence or nostalgia about the revolution-
ary legacy. I want to demonstrate that the revolutionary legacy is deeply in-
grained in the everyday life of China’s populace and is still active today.
Moreover, it may remain relevant in the future, despite the formidable cur-
rents opposing it. Apart from the concrete practices of that revolutionary
tradition, I firmly believe that there is an immanent need for maintaining
at some level the utopian idealism and goals of the revolutionary culture,
not only for China’s own cultural identity as a modern country (since rev-
olution is an integral and significant component of China’s modernity) but
also for the hope of checking the excesses of global capital. At present, how-
ever, I do not see any reason to be euphoric about the future for socialist re-
vival or about China as the place for renewed socialist experiment, nor any
reason to be utterly pessimistic about the global domination of capitalism.
By the same token, rather than celebrating or lamenting the “death” of rev-
olutionary culture in a simplistic fashion, unrelenting cultural critiques
(including my own) can at least help document the historical relevance of
revolution and its complex and difficult transformations. It is perhaps in
understanding China’s revolutionary legacy that the most visible difference
between my view and others lies, yet I consider this an opportunity for
honest debate rather than for showcasing ideologically contentious and
self-righteous polemics.19
This book’s structure reflects both the chronology of events in the
1990s and my own thinking and writing during those years, but the chap-
ters are structured thematically rather than following a strict time line. The
first chapter raises the main questions that the book is concerned with and
sketches out my observations from a theoretical perspective. The central
question is whether there is any alternative vision to capitalist globaliza-
tion. I address this issue by examining Chinese intellectual debates about
“alternatives” in the first half of the 1990s, primarily in the fields of literary
theory and criticism, history, and philosophy, but also in other areas of the
humanities. The account of the Chinese debate is meant to challenge the
dominant views of globalization, modernity, and postmodernity. The
chapter focuses on nationalism, postmodernism, neohumanism, and a hy-
brid discourse on neoconservatism and radicalism. I first make some pre-
liminary comments on the discourses on nationalism that bloomed in the
1990s by situating the issue of nationalism within the historical context of
China’s searches for modernity and alternative modernity. I emphasize the
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issue of the Chinese revolution and China’s revolutionary ideological hege-
mony in the historical formation and function of nationalism, contrasting
it to nationalist discourses and practices engendered by capitalist moder-
nity. I then examine, respectively, the “localized” ideology of New Con-
fucianism and “national learning” as an attendant academic program, and
postmodernism and the related theoretical discourse of postcolonialism as
imported global intellectual discourses. The analysis is intended to demon-
strate the complex interrelationships of these indigenous (or local) and ex-
ogenous (or global) discourses with the material conditions and intellectual
fashions under globalization, unraveling the contradictory assumptions
and agendas of these discourses. Next, I comment on a politically engaged,
hybrid position that blends both neoconservative authoritarianism and
radical strains reminiscent of Maoism, as articulated in a best-selling book,
Third Eye (1994). This last strain reminds us of the powerful influence of
the revolutionary legacy and of the need to transform that legacy into a
constructive alternative, which Third Eye, representing a significant public
sentiment, and other intellectual debates all failed to deliver. The centrality
of “revolution” in today’s China, as both a historical legacy and a powerful
ideological hegemony, has to be reconsidered within the context of global-
ization. The dazzling variety and plurality of political and ideological
strands in contemporary Chinese intellectual discourses and their interpre-
tations notwithstanding, the revolutionary legacy itself cannot be elided if
one intends to find a sense of direction in the labyrinth of social life in
China today.
Chapter 2 continues the discussion of the first chapter both themati-
cally and chronologically. It addresses the growing clashes between the ide-
ologies of socialism and developmentalism and describes debates and dis-
courses in the second half of the 1990s in three segments of China’s society:
the official, the popular, and the intellectual. I investigate in some detail the
historical formation of the so-called Deng Theory, or “socialism with
Chinese characteristics,” demonstrating that the discourse from which the
Deng Theory derives ideological and political legitimation is fundamen-
tally at odds with the underlying assumptions of the gaige kaifang project;
and I examine speeches, statements, editorials, commentaries by the CCP
and the official media, and intellectual debates mainly in the fields of social
sciences—economics, political sciences, sociology, and so on.
In both popular media and academic studies in the West, scant atten-
tion has been paid to official and state discourses. These discourses, how-
ever, deserve serious scrutiny, not only because they represent the views of
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the political power elite in China today but also because they still exercise a
formidable impact upon the Chinese public through mass media, ideologi-
cal state apparatuses of schools, publishing industries, and, above all, the
indoctrination of more than sixty million members of the CCP. Official
and intellectual discourses are juxtaposed with consumer popular culture,
highlighting the ambivalent and contradictory relationships among these
three domains. Just as I emphasize the importance of understanding the of-
ficial discourses, I investigate elements of popular culture such as soap op-
eras, MTV, karaoke, and so on, because popular cultural texts have an
enormous influence over the everyday life of China’s 1.3 billion citizens. By
the same token, when I analyze the intellectual debates, I single out the
best-selling works that popularize intellectual controversies and appeal di-
rectly to the general public, primarily to examine their social impact. This is
a methodological and strategic choice: I study culture and intellectual de-
bates not as “detached” intellectual inquiries but as ways to understand and
then to effect social change. Hence I weigh the subjects of my investigations
primarily in terms of their social impact rather than in terms of their intel-
lectual depth or sophistication.
Some critics argue that the main failure of Deng’s ideological policy is
its inability to elicit the crucial support of the intelligentsia in its economic
modernization project.20 Although the intellectual elite by and large remain
skeptical about the legitimating discourse of Deng Theory, a significant
portion of them, especially in the more powerful sectors of the economic
and political domains, have endorsed developmentalism and tried to rein-
vent an ideological legitimacy by way of Hayekian neoliberalism and neo-
conservatism. The critical problem, then, lies in the growing schism be-
tween the power elite and the intellectual elite on the one hand and the
disenfranchised general public on the other. We should particularly re-
member, however, that intellectual discourses are never value neutral, as
are discourses about intellectuals themselves, and do not represent expres-
sions of the “national mood” or “conscience of society” as such authors
may claim. This aspect of intellectual discourses is discussed in detail in
chapter 2.
Chapter 3 concentrates on arguably the most dynamic of cultural
realms—popular culture—in order to probe further into the fundamental
tensions in Chinese culture. The tensions lie primarily in globalization and
consumer culture on the one hand and in the Maoist revolutionary legacy
on the other. Qunzhong wenyi (culture of the masses), a legacy from the
revolutionary past and an essential component of the revolutionary hege-
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mony, cannot be dismissed as merely residual and irrelevant today. Its aes-
thetic forms and structures are deeply ingrained in the Chinese cultural
imaginary and constitute a significant dimension in the contradiction-rid-
den cultural arena. The chapter interrogates three “global” interpretive
models: the Frankfurt School’s critique of “Culture Industry,” the
Gramscian model of hegemony, and postmodernism. The Chinese case is
presented as a problematic “local,” as opposed to “the global.” This local
may refer to the geopolitical and cultural specificity of China, and it may
also, in a narrower sense, suggest more specific and concrete social prac-
tices of particular locations and temporalities within China. The “global”
perspective necessarily is discussed in the context of the cultural practices
of everyday life. The everyday not only encompasses both the global and
the local but also may serve as a site of critique of and resistance to con-
sumer culture and a place to begin creative initiatives and innovations.
In addition to the realm of popular culture, where the conflicts of con-
sumerism and the legacies of China’s recent past and its long tradition may
have profound impact on the lifestyles and everyday practices of the public,
literature is a critical arena of ideological and aesthetic battles. Chapter 4
examines the rise of Chinese avant-garde experimental fiction at the end of
the 1980s and its rapid disappearance in the early 1990s within the histori-
cal context of the transformation of post-Mao (1976–present) and post-
Tiananmen (1989–present) China into a postrevolutionary society. The
chapter compares the Chinese avant-garde and some European avant-
garde movements in terms of their different political, ideological, and aes-
thetic views and practices and then focuses on the work of Yu Hua, perhaps
the most well known of the Chinese avant-gardists. In the late 1980s when
Yu Hua emerged as a new experimental writer, he was considered to be a
“paradigmatic symbol of avant-garde fiction.” In the 1990s, however, his
writings underwent significant stylistic change as he gave up metafiction
and adopted the mode of “plain” realism. My reading of Yu Hua’s writings
shows the paradox of the Chinese avant-gardists in that they are aestheti-
cally radical and subversive only in the realm of language and form but are
politically disengaged. Faced with the “postpolitical” reality of the 1990s,
Yu Hua and other Chinese avant-gardists found their experimentalism in-
creasingly irrelevant. Yu Hua then searched for new modes of writing for
his imaginings of a China marked by conflicts of the global market, ideolo-
gies of global capitalism, and the lifestyles of millions of farmers and mem-
bers of the urban working class.
The last chapter, written in 2001, tries to gauge the cultural and ideo-
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logical impact of the Internet in China today. Since the mid-1990s the
Internet has clearly become a dynamic force. Its role in China is insepara-
bly connected to both globalization and the transformation of Chinese cul-
ture. Internet communication as an integral component of globalization is
employed by global capitalism to spread its ideologies and values through
multimedia images, icons, and other means. While the Internet becomes a
principal way to bring China rapidly into the global economic and com-
munication system, confrontations with ideologies of capitalist globalism
intensify in the information age. Questions arise as to whether the Internet
can create a new public sphere and new opportunities for democratic life
and to what extent Internet communication will change the social fabric of
China. The chapter concentrates on three salient areas in which the
Internet seems to be most active: the news media, Internet political forums
and chat rooms, and Internet literature. In these three areas significant
changes are taking place, and it is difficult to anticipate where these changes
will lead. But the tensions between the existing ideological state appara-
tuses, the legitimating discourses, and the new cultural forms and manners
that the Internet has nurtured are reaching a new height, further intensify-
ing the ideological crisis. Conversely, Internet communication seems to
have accelerated the transformational process from which new alternatives
can be constituted. Particularly noteworthy is the emergence of a new
urban youth culture, shaped by the Internet, television, and other digitally
based global communication systems. This new urban youth culture epito-
mizes the tensions and potentials that globalization brings to China. While
ideologies of capitalist globalism are drawing China’s urban youth further
away from its “local” and national past and pushing it closer to the “global-
ized,” consumerist cultural formations and identities, the Internet has
other promises. It opens up new opportunities for nurturing a creative and
constructive literacy and social consciousness of new generations, for
transforming China’s communication and social interaction in more dem-
ocratic ways, and for generating new forms of aesthetics and politics for the
benefit of the public.
I hope this book will elicit more questions, challenges, and reflections
on the historical changes that China and the whole world are now under-
taking. The still evolving processes of globalization can be seen in a larger
context in both spatial and temporal terms; changes in China can therefore
be understood only as immanent to the movements and processes of glob-
alization. By the same token, alternatives can be sought only from within
these ongoing processes. From a long-term historical perspective, global-
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ization ought to be viewed as the latest phase of global modernity or
modernities that occur in different locations and temporalities. Specifically
in the case of China, modernity or alternative modernity is inextricably
connected to the nation’s revolutionary legacy and ideological hegemony,
which does not simply constitute a particular, “local,” antisystemic move-
ment within the global system of capitalism but rather resonates with far-
reaching “global” repercussions. In the evolving processes of globalization,
China’s experiments and movements remain inconclusive and open-ended,
pointing to a plurality of possibilities. This book ends with some critical
observations of the crises, tensions, and ruptures in the Chinese cultural
scene in the 1990s. Yet insofar as critique itself is an indispensable and inte-
gral component of historical dialectic, it partakes in the process of change
in a positive way.

As the last remaining socialist country, with perhaps the fastest eco-nomic growth in the world today, China presents a challenge to crit-ical thinking about globalization. It is imperative that the question of
alternatives and other possibilities and potentialities be raised in any at-
tempt at theorizing or conceptualizing the process of globalization.
Globalization is generally perceived as the result of the collapse of Soviet-
style socialism, as well as the unprecedented expansion of transnational
capitalism. While avowedly Eurocentric in its hegemonic formations, glob-
alization also sets up an indispensable structural context for analyzing what
happens in today’s world. Therefore globalization must be grasped as a di-
alectical process: it refers at once to an idea or an ideology—that is, capital-
ism disguised as a triumphant, universal globalism—and to a concrete his-
torical condition by which various ideas, including capitalism in its present
guise, must be measured. China’s challenge to globalization can be per-
ceived in both senses, first to global capitalism as an ideology and then to
the “new world order” or “world-system” as an accepted reality. China has
become increasingly integrated into the global economic system, yet re-
tains its ideological and political self-identity as a Third World socialist
country. Will China offer an alternative?
I do not intend to argue for such an alternative in this chapter. Rather,
I try to offer an account of the current Chinese debate over alternative
modernity in order to consider as problems the very assumptions that ani-
mate the critical discourses on globalization. In this respect, the Chinese
debate, seen as a concrete case rooted in a particular historical conjuncture,
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may serve as a critique of the discourse of globalization. I address, very
schematically, some major trends involved in the debate—including na-
tionalism, postmodernism, and neohumanism—and a “discursive hybrid-
ity” that blends neoconservatism and radicalism. From 1990 to 1994, vari-
ous forms of nationalist discourse have been on the rise, quickly creating a
new cultural dominant. Much of this chapter is devoted to this phenome-
non, for it seems to represent the locus of a constellation of crucial issues in
China’s political, ideological, and cultural arena.1 Such a cultural reconfig-
uration, centered on nationalism, ought to be understood first within the
context of the search for alternatives to the bankrupt ideological hegemony
of the state. Other trends, such as postmodernism and neohumanism, are
much weaker responses or echoes of nationalism in its multifarious guise.
Postmodernism and related theoretical discourses such as postcolonialism
seem to be largely eschewed by the intellectual mainstream as newly im-
ported Western theoretical shibboleths ill suited to Chinese situations. On
the other hand, the appearance of a politically engaged “hybridity” that
blends both neoconservative authoritarianism and radical strains reminis-
cent of Maoism highlights both intellectual disorientation and critical po-
tency in the latest struggle to construct an ideological hegemony.
My description and analysis of the Chinese debates will demonstrate
that (1) the current Chinese discourse of alternative modernity and global-
ization is by its very nature contradictory and fractured; (2) as a local
(Chinese) discourse about global meaning, it articulates both an anxiety
over the full-blown absorption of China into the global world-system and
desires of intervention and resistance; and (3) the centrality of “revolu-
tion,” not only in the discourse but also in social and political practices in
today’s China, has to be recognized and reconsidered within the context of
globalization.
How Can China’s Cultural and Geopolitical Imaginary Be Mapped?
First, let me briefly characterize the historical conjuncture of China in the
mid-1990s in its most contradictory aspects. China is experiencing a phe-
nomenal economic growth by adjusting itself to the global market, or capi-
talist world economy. This situation has given rise to a consensus, shared
by people from different ideological and political persuasions, that China
has abandoned socialism and set itself squarely on the trajectory of capital-
ism. The nation’s alleged political stalemate (the fact that it remains a
Communist society without adopting the Western capitalist political sys-
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tem), on the one hand, and its often dramatized “human rights violations,”
on the other, are usually explained away by the typical “Chineseness” of
politics or by time lag: the political system has not crumbled, simply be-
cause Deng Xiaoping and the old generation of revolutionaries have not yet
all lived out their years. Inevitably, the ensuing power struggle in the post-
Deng era (it will occur at any moment) will resolve the antinomy of a capi-
talist economy and a noncapitalist political system, either by catastrophe
(as in the former Soviet Union) or by a smoother “peaceful evolution” of
political power from the Communist Party to pro-Western capitalist
democrats.2
While the descriptions of China’s irreversible assimilation into the cap-
italist economy often sound reductionistic and overtly ideological, and the
predictions of China’s political future remain largely speculative and wish-
ful, the question of culture defies any easy characterization in these terms.
The influx of Western commercial popular culture, brought into China by
the market in its late phase of world information circuits and exported en-
tertainment, has not been opposed, as one would expect, by the
Communist Party. MTV, for example, has been quickly absorbed and
adapted into an effective propaganda channel for the party’s policies.
American MTV entered China first via Hong Kong satellite channels,
which were selectively broadcast over Chinese cable television in the north
in 1992. Then the predominant fad in popular culture was a new wave of
Mao nostalgia, exemplified by the cassette album Hong Taiyang (Red sun)
series 1 and 2, which reproduced the Cultural Revolution songs that eulo-
gized Mao the Great Helmsman, now set to a rock beat. The album sold
more than two million units. In the following year, however, China’s pop
music scene was turned over to Hong Kong and Taiwan pop stars.
Disturbed by this syndrome, the Chinese authorities in 1994 virtually
banned Hong Kong and Taiwan pop concerts on the mainland. They spon-
sored instead a number of national karaoke contests, involving singing rev-
olutionary folk songs or traditional Peking opera. In other areas such as
cinema, overseas critics are now either exuberant or furious about the ex-
otic “Orientalist” representations of China’s antiquated, folkloric, and su-
perstitious cultural past in the “festival films” of the so-called Fifth
Generation directors, like Zhang Yimou’s Raise the Red Lantern or Chen
Kaige’s Farewell My Concubine. These films echo a national revival of a by-
gone culture in China, and at the same time they grasp for and capitalize on
the taste of Western audiences (primarily global-savvy yuppies working for
transnational corporations). Academic critics both in China and abroad
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focus mainly on new cinema’s avant-garde, innovative stylistic expressions,
overlooking the mechanism of a global cultural market by which both the
new cinema and academic film criticism are commodified as profitable
cultural products.3 In architecture, along with the massive constructions of
buildings and highways across the country, constructions of theme parks
have boomed, most of them reconstructions of the ruined “traditional cul-
tural relics,” such as the Yellow Emperor Tomb in Shaanxi, as well as nu-
merous “ethnic minority villages” rebuilt as tourist attractions. These
theme parks serve the double purpose of reinforcing nationalist sentiments
and transforming local space into a global site for tourism. On the other
hand, a mushrooming of postmodern architecture has quickly trans-
formed the skyline of Beijing and Shanghai into the likes of Tokyo, Hong
Kong, and New York. Facing overwhelming cultural changes, one is bound
to ask, is China culturally already “postmodern” while economically still
“premodern”?
Characterizing China as culturally postmodern rather than mapping
out clearly its cultural and geopolitical conditions problematizes the con-
cept of postmodernism itself, which is premised on the correlation of ad-
vanced capitalist economy and culture. China does not fit into the
(Western) postmodern framework neatly. Postmodernity, understood as
the cultural logic of late, transnational capitalism, may indeed characterize
certain features of China’s economically advanced and capitalist neighbors,
such as Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. But when one is describing post-
modernity (or postcoloniality) or tracing postmodernism in China, the
most obvious (yet the most ignored or deliberately suppressed) problem is
China’s distinct revolutionary legacy and hegemony that constitute an al-
ternative modernity, if not postmodernity.4 We need a “non-Euclidean
geometry,” as Fredric Jameson puts it, to conceptualize a space where
China is situated. “A global or geographical term” is needed, Jameson con-
tinues, “for the ways in which chronological nonsynchronicity manifests it-
self in a spatial and even national form.”5 But the explanatory power of
such concepts as “uneven development” or “nonsynchronicity” is limited
in delineating China’s historical conjuncture, insofar as the globalizing the-
orization is premised on a Eurocentric and teleological narrative of moder-
nity (and postmodernity), which may ultimately exclude possibilities of
historical alternatives and/or alternative histories.
One ought to first recognize the logical and historical necessity of con-
structing not simply a Chinese but an Indian, a Russian, a Cuban, and a
Nigerian version (and a version for each and every modern nation-state) of
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modernity and/or alternative modernity, because the uniqueness and
specificities of each nation-state’s encounter with modernity constitute ir-
refutable differences and alternatives to Eurocentric, capitalist modernity.
The recognition of historical alternatives, however, cannot be equated with
a postmodern valorization of plurality and diversity that Jean-Francois
Lyotard asserts in repudiation of social and historical totality.6 A historical
and dialectical view should always recognize the indispensable totalizing
and contextualizing move, for modernity, capitalism, and more recently
globalization are as much real and historical totalities as they are totalizing
“master narratives” from which postmodern deconstruction and demysti-
fication arise.
The Chinese, of course, are concerned with the problematic of global-
ization and modernity (if not postmodernity) and, not surprisingly, with
the issue of alternatives. Revolution has been the foremost choice for mod-
ern China, and as such, it constitutes a central problematic, along with the
need of social reconstruction (in the broadest sense), of China’s modernity
or alternative modernity, vis-à-vis the modernity of European origin. Eu-
ropean modernity appears now as universal only through certain historical
processes of rationalization. Likewise, formations of alternative moder-
nity—or better still, of a plurality of modernities (such as Arab modernity,
African modernity, and East Asian modernity)—are made possible by
means of the mechanism of rationalization in the symbolic field, inex-
orably connected with economic and political practices. China’s search for
an alternative modernity is historically linked with revolution; ideological
and political struggle in China has always been explicit and dominant in
the symbolic sphere or the domains of culture.
To understand China’s modernity or alternative modernity overdeter-
mined by complex and multiple structural relations, the centrality of revo-
lution and political struggle in the field of cultural production must be ac-
knowledged. Other revolutionary societies or formerly “really existing
socialist” countries—that is, members of the former Soviet bloc—have ex-
perienced since the end of the cold war almost complete rejection of their
revolutionary culture and have invariably sought in desperation national-
ist, neoliberal, consumerist, religious, and neofascist cultural formations to
replace Marxist and socialist tradition.7 By contrast, China retains in politi-
cal and ideological terrains not only its socialist structures but also social-
ism as its basis of ideological legitimacy. In the cultural arena tensions and
contradictions are thus often most visible when its revolutionary culture
reasserts itself in the state discourses, in popular culture, and in everyday
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life. To stress the importance of revolution, therefore, is not simply to
claim China’s exclusiveness or uniqueness in its social transformation, 
nor to recall the specters of revolution that so many are eager to bury. In
the following account in this and other chapters, I hope to show that 
all too often revolutionary legacies are deliberately elided or willfully sup-
pressed in intellectual discourses and debates in China, as well as in
Western reportage and studies of China by popular media and academi-
cians alike. This concerted act of silencing the revolution, so central to
China’s struggles with modernity for more than a century, can be viewed
as symptomatic of the triumphant globalism as the dominant ideology of
the global capital that hastens to throw any social revolution into the
trash can.
China’s alternative modernity can best be grasped as an ongoing pro-
cess replete with contradictions: its revolution aiming at constructing so-
cialism in an unindustrialized Third World economy is alternative to the
Western capitalist modernity in political and economic senses, and its em-
phasis on cultural revolution is also alternative in a cultural sense. But
Chinese revolution is an integral part of modernity that is at once fragmen-
tary and unifying, heterogeneous and homogenizing. Its project of achiev-
ing modernity is as incomplete as its vision is unfulfilled.8
Current Chinese cultural imaginary is dominated by a depoliticizing
mood. But such a pervasive political lassitude, as I suggest below, is the re-
sult of the ongoing process of political struggle involving various strategies
of misrecognition, legitimation, and delegitimation. If the process of glob-
alization is a “global” structural context, then revolution constitutes a
“local” context for the Chinese debates about modernity and alternative
modernity. One should not lose sight of the complex interplay of these
contexts.
Nationalism and Revolutionary Hegemony
Nationalism seems to provide an attractive and viable option for the cul-
tural imaginary of postrevolutionary China within the context of globaliza-
tion. Nationalism here is not meant as a coherent and well-defined ideol-
ogy; nor can it be defined as an essentialist concept. Rather, it is understood
in the present context as an ensemble of discursive practices, functioning
through interaction between historically changing fields of struggle and
“habitus” of discrete dispositions, in which ideologies are legitimated and
delegitimated. It has been argued that nationalism has a Janus-faced qual-
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ity, as a modern project that reactivates and transforms traditional cultural
values into the service of a new political and ideological hegemony.
To understand precisely what kinds of political and ideological identi-
ties and hegemony that nationalist discourse serves to reinforce, one must,
however, differentiate various “modernities.” In other words, the mono-
lithic modernity to which world history seems to move has to be prob-
lematized. Benedict Anderson, for instance, is mistaken when he asserts
that nationalism is a discourse of nationhood simply as an “imagined com-
munity” invented by Western capitalist modernity, thus excluding implic-
itly other alternative modernities in which nationalism and nationhood
serve revolutionary purposes in opposition to Eurocentric modernity.
Anderson is also wrong when, using China as an example, he contends that
revolutionaries utilize “official nationalism” as a means of control only
when they seize state power.9 Although nationalist discourse in China
today under the current condition of globalization is indeed employed (but
never monopolized) by the state as an “official” discourse, throughout
Mao’s period (before and after the seizure of state power) nationalism was
always a discourse of revolution and resistance that called for worldwide
national liberation and struggle for freedom.10
The Chinese modernity, as an alternative modernity, is first and fore-
most concerned with the question of revolution, of which national libera-
tion in opposition to imperialist domination is a crucial component.
Historically, nationalism in modern China has been shaped as a response
to the threat of imperialism. It played a crucial role in establishing and le-
gitimating Chinese Marxism—that is, Maoism—as the ideological hege-
mony in the course of the Chinese revolution. Nationalism must of neces-
sity reconstruct a “national culture” as both a means of ideological
legitimation and a goal of social reconstruction. The goal of national re-
construction is echoed in other colonial countries by figures such as Frantz
Fanon, who contends that “a national culture in under-developed coun-
tries should take its place at the very heart of the struggle for freedom which
these countries are carrying on.”11 At the crucial stage of establishing his
Chinese Marxism around the period of the Sino-Japanese War
(1930s–1940s), Mao recognized the urgent need to legitimate the revolu-
tionary hegemony by incorporating nationalism, stating that “we can put
Marxism into practice only when it is integrated with the specific charac-
teristics of our nation and acquires a definite national form.”12 To establish
a new national culture, Mao called on Chinese Marxists to “sum up criti-
cally” Chinese traditional culture “from Confucius to Sun Yat-sen” from
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Marxist perspectives.13 Confucianism as the ideological hegemony of the
imperial rulers is considered to be the main obstacle for the new revolu-
tionary hegemony and the new national culture; hence in Mao’s discourse
of new nationalism it is caricatured as “feudalist junk” and plays the role of
villain in China’s political and ideological arena. Radical iconoclastic rejec-
tion of Confucianism has been an integral part of Mao’s new nationalism.
Contrary to the assertions that nationalism is a “great failure” or “anom-
aly” in Marxist theory, Mao effectively erected a Chinese Marxism inte-
grated with nationalism in his project for an alternative modernity.14 It
should be emphasized that Mao, however, was essentially a universalist or
an “internationalist” in his revolutionary utopian aspirations, whereas na-
tionalism, as a strategy in his revolutionary schema, was always subjugated
to his overall vision of the “emancipation of all mankind.” That Maoism
became in the globally radicalized, “revolutionary” decade of the 1960s an
internationally influential theory of revolution, or a version of revolution-
ary globalism, testifies to Mao’s universalist appeal.15
The integration of Marxism with nationalism that characterizes Mao’s
Marxism is conditioned by the historical task of revolution, with its radical
reinvention of a “national culture” sundered from Confucian and other
traditional values. Although this highly selective and contested “new na-
tional culture” may have served Mao’s revolutionary strategy of national
autonomy and autarky in political, social, and economic terrains in the face
of imperialist threats and containment, it did not achieve the goal of repro-
ducing and legitimating the necessary social relations and structures as cul-
tural and ideological foundations for social reconstruction or moderniza-
tion in China. Mao’s revolutionary globalism, too, remained largely an
incendiary discourse, for China’s economic and military power under
Mao’s reign could hardly provide any substantive material backing to
worldwide revolutions. Mao and his colleagues realized that modernizing
China was the only viable way to build a strong and powerful material base
for launching the revolution.
It is crucial to note that contrary to the general opinion, “moderniza-
tion” at first did not occupy a central position in Mao’s discourse. It was
developed as such only after the Eighth Congress of the CCP in 1956, which
set the development of productive forces, or economic modernization, as
its central priority.16 Mao, however, had insisted on the primacy of political
struggle in the overall project of modernity (revolution and reconstruc-
tion). As a result of complex conflicts during the post-Mao era, moderniza-
tion has crystallized into an overarching problematic, a vector through
The Debate about Modernity, Postmodernity, and Postcoloniality 31
which political and ideological struggles have been fought. The antinomy
of revolution and modernization has held sway over the cultural imaginary
in post-Mao China. As Deng Xiaoping’s reforms have prioritized modern-
ization and economic development without at the same time charting a po-
litical and ideological map, culture has repeatedly become a major battle-
ground in the volatile and precarious process of reform.
The ideological crisis after the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) was
essentially caused by the widening rift between the revolutionary hege-
mony and economic development obstructed apparently by the Cultural
Revolution itself. Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform has intensified the ide-
ological crisis. Pragmatic leadership under Deng’s aegis has virtually aban-
doned Mao’s strategy of ceaselessly reenacting, renewing, and reinforcing a
revolutionary hegemony to serve social and economic reconstruction.
Consequently, contrary to the hope that rapid economic development
would reinvigorate socialism as the core of the revolutionary hegemony,
socialist ideals and Marxism have fallen victim to economic reform. In
China’s social consciousness the ideas of modernization and modernity on
the model of the capitalist West, and lately of global capitalism, soon gained
prominence. The pro-capitalist discourse of “democracy” and “modernity”
clashed head-on with the revolutionary hegemony, which has been severely
shaken but has not yet collapsed. The conflicts culminated in the bloody
confrontations on Tiananmen Square in June 1989. Yet the crackdown on
the demonstrators only forestalled possible political disorder and did not
settle the ideological crisis. After the collapse of the Soviet bloc, socialism
and Marxism in China became further vexed and entangled with the politi-
cal conjunctures, both domestically and internationally. Wary of any possi-
ble political unrest that might result from public ideological debates, Deng
Xiaoping announced a ban “for at least three years” on any theoretical dis-
cussion of the ideological nature of reform in his new reform directives is-
sued in the spring of 1992. Ironically, questions of socialism and Marxism
have become taboo in socialist China under Deng’s decree. But China’s
legacy of revolution and its hegemony remain a central issue to be tackled
in the present modernization movement. China’s assertion of nationalism
as an ideological substitute for revolutionary hegemony cannot eclipse the
historical legacy of the nation. When its socialist vision of equality and jus-
tice is increasingly replaced by a nationalistic pride coupled with the gov-
ernment’s resolute drive to become a central international power, it seems
all the more necessary to look back at the genealogy of China’s nationalism
within the context of revolution.
32 Chapter 1
New Confucianism and “National Learning”:
New Ideological Bedfellows
In the last decade, as China’s revolutionary hegemony lost much of its
power and legitimacy, Confucianism has experienced a dramatic global re-
vival, from North American academia to the Pacific Rim and finally to its
home country, China, not without irony and vengeance. The “feudalist
junk” of Confucianism has made a comeback to fill the ideological vacuum
caused by the absence of any serious discussion of ideology itself. Lately, the
Chinese government has drummed up an endorsement of Confucianism.
As part of the celebration of the forty-fifth anniversary of the People’s
Republic, an international conference on Confucianism began in Beijing
on 5 October 1994 as an ideological joint venture of the Chinese govern-
ment and various official or semiofficial organizations from Singapore,
South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the United States, Germany, and so forth.
Jiang Zemin, the president of China and the CCP’s general secretary, held a
much publicized reception of the conference participants. Lee Kuan Yew, a
former prime minister of Singapore, was named honorary president of the
International Society of Confucianism, and Gu Mu, a former CCP
Politburo member and former Chinese vice premier, was named its presi-
dent.17 A month before this conference, the Central Committee of the CCP
issued its “Guidelines of Implementing Patriotic Education.” “Traditional
culture” became the core of the curriculum, and it is telling that in this doc-
ument of some ten thousand words there is only one sentence mentioning
Marxism: “We must strengthen the education of Marxist views of national-
ism and religion.”18
Confucianism and “traditional culture” as new symbolic capital in the
discourse of nationalism are effective insofar as the struggle for ideological
legitimacy remains silent about the Chinese revolutionary legacy and ideol-
ogy—namely, socialism and Marxism. But this silence is impossible, for it
cannot cancel out in one stroke (or by Deng’s decree) the whole revolution-
ary past. Confucianism cannot, on the other hand, serve as an indigenous
ideology legitimating a new national autonomy, because contemporary
Confucian discourse is constituted globally as an integral part of the ideol-
ogy of capitalist globalization. Of course, the more regional East Asian con-
text, which intermediates globalization by its own geocultural and geopo-
litical formations, is obvious, too.19 Now accepted and sanctioned by the
Communist leaders as a major component of the new discourse of nation-
alism, Confucianism itself has been rewritten and reconstituted by the
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power blocs of a different order. It at once articulates a new power nexus
within the context of globalizing capitalism, spawning local nationalism or
fragmentation of geopolitical imaginary, and reflects a radical metamor-
phosis of nationalism from a discourse of resistance to a discourse of dom-
ination.20 However, when Immanuel Wallerstein speaks of “nationalism as
domination,” he is primarily concerned with “those more frequent mo-
ments when nationalism operates . . . as the nervous tic of capitalism as a
world-system.”21 In the case of China, the transition from resistance to
domination is a precarious one, contingent upon the suppression of enun-
ciations of a powerful revolutionary legacy, that still legitimates the domi-
nation of that power bloc. Moreover, the current leadership by no means
surrenders itself entirely to the capitalist world-system, as shown by the
persistence of the slogan, however vacuous and self-contradictory in its
content, of “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” All this generates pro-
found uneasiness with the Confucian-oriented “official nationalism” both
within the Communist Party leadership and in the public sphere. In intel-
lectual circles a topic in vogue in the early 1990s was the so-called guo xue
(national learning), which consciously posed a distance from “official na-
tionalism” as well as from global new Confucianism.
The vogue of “national learning” can be construed as a thinly disguised
expression of the predicament of the intellectual elite. Entrenched deeply in
the post-Tiananmen political apathy, intellectuals are now suddenly over-
whelmed by waves of commercialism in cultural domains that rapidly rele-
gate them to the social periphery and irrelevance. “National learning” thus
aims to articulate new subject positions for the intellectual elite by conse-
crating pure, autonomous scholarship or learning. On the other hand, it
serves as a politically and ideologically more sophisticated (or more “inde-
terminate” and “ambivalent”) enunciation of certain ideological positions
than does the “official nationalism.”
The advocates of “national learning” are primarily a group of middle-
aged Beijing scholars who were once active in the 1980s debate about cul-
ture known as Culture Fever. The 1980s debate opened up a theoretical
space by problematizing the fundamental issues of China’s revolutionary
hegemony and modernization. But it ended prematurely as a result of the
1989 Tiananmen Incident. Those then young scholars, after a period of si-
lence, now set themselves on a course of recuperating a nonpolitical and
nationalist alternative in “national learning,” while repudiating the 1980s
debate as “totalizing” radicalism. The concept of “national learning” de-
notes first and foremost a truly national tradition of scholarship, and its
34 Chapter 1
second term xue (learning) is a no less important corollary: it signifies
scholarship as a distinct entity, autonomous from and resistant to non-
scholarly political and ideological contingencies. In other words, such a
move to essentialize scholarship in the humanities, primarily in the realms
of literature, history, and philosophy, entails radical debunking of an intel-
lectual tradition in modern China inextricably intertwined with realpoli-
tik—that is, political power struggle as the material condition of social life.
It must “rewrite history,” to borrow a catchword popular in the 1980s de-
bate, in order to resurrect an alternative national tradition of autonomous
scholarship or intellectual inquiry.
“National learning” posits itself as a neohermeneutics (or post-
hermeneutics?), reinterpreting modern Chinese intellectual history from a
conceptual framework that pits the binary oppositions of the “political-
secular/scholarly-transcendental” against that of “tradition/modernity” as
a paradigm in the 1980s debate.22 A truly modern “national learning,” ac-
cording to the current hermeneutics, is concerned not so much with imme-
diate political, secular, and pragmatic issues as with nonutilitarian, nonpo-
litical, and transcendental issues of “truth.” Zhang Taiyan (1869–1936), a
major intellectual figure once closely associated with the late Qing and
early republican revolutionary movements, is now extolled as the “self-
imposed, unique guardian-god of the Chinese culture (of national classics
or “national learning”) at the moment of national crisis; in later years he
renounced ‘secular intervention and utilitarianism’ and sought to ‘educate
scholars and safeguard the “national learning” in the last ditch.’ ”23 But
Zhang Taiyan’s “national learning” was primarily concerned with the re-
publican revolution and therefore can hardly be labeled “apolitical.” Wang
Guowei (1877–1927), who interpreted the classical Chinese novel Dream of
Red Chamber from Schopenhauerian-Nietzschean perspectives and was
thus said to inaugurate modern Chinese scholarship by integrating modern
Western thinking with Chinese classical tradition, now becomes the crown-
ing hero of “national learning.” Chen Yingque (1890–1969), a historian
who, along with a few others, is generally regarded as a faithful heir to
Wang Guowei’s intellectual legacy, is another modern sage reenshrined in
the pantheon of “national learning.” The most significant contribution of
Zhang, Wang, Chen, and their like is said to be their unyielding efforts to
overcome the political and ideological obstacles to independent, au-
tonomous scholarship.24
The overarching concern to articulate a nonpolitical scholarly auton-
omy by retrieving a “pure” scholarly tradition from within modern China
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may explain the relative distance from and silence of the “national learn-
ing” advocates toward neo-Confucianism. The revival of neo-
Confucianism started in Hong Kong and Taiwan after the triumph of the
Communist revolution on the mainland, first in effect as a “counterrevolu-
tionary” discourse against the Communist “destruction of Chinese tradi-
tional culture.” Then in the 1970s and 1980s, as has been noted, neo-
Confucianism took off as a global discourse, thanks to the promotion of
some North American academics who were former students of neo-
Confucian masters in Hong Kong and Taiwan, as well as official endorse-
ments from the governments of Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea. This
historical background is too obvious and too recent to conceal. Its political
and ideological implications, connected not only with global capitalism but
also with regional anticommunism, cannot be helpful for the establishment
of a purportedly nonpolitical discourse. Ironically, it is the Communist
regime itself that unabashedly condones an ideological alliance with the an-
ticommunist ideologues for purely utilitarian purposes.
“National learning” also favors cultural elitism in the face of the rap-
idly commercialized popular culture while maintaining its apolitical acad-
emism. It is ironic that advocates of “national learning” often find it awk-
ward that the works of professedly nonpolitical writers of the 1930s and
1940s, previously denigrated as “bourgeois liberalist,” have become widely
popular in the mass culture market in the 1990s. Consumer trends and
popular culture in the 1990s have in effect nourished the kind of antipoliti-
cal mood that the “national learning” scholars hasten to fortify. These
scholars self-consciously position themselves as the guardians of a national
cultural essence and values vis-à-vis social and cultural crisis. Their aim is
to reinscribe an ideology of bourgeois liberalism into Chinese national cul-
ture by invoking the names and reputations of the older scholars in a quasi-
Arnoldian fashion. As Raymond Williams observes of Arnold’s “culture-
and-anarchy” liberalism, with “excellence and humane values on the one
hand” and “discipline and where necessary repression on the other”: “This,
then as now, is a dangerous position: a culmination of the wrong kind of
liberalism . . . was a culmination of the most honest kind.”25
The ideological position of “national learning” becomes clearer when
it characterizes negatively a main aspect of modern Chinese intellectual
tradition as “radicalism.” The cultural enlightenment projects of the May
Fourth movement (1919) and Marxist revolutionary movements are criti-
cized mainly for their “totalistic repudiation of Chinese tradition” and
“blind Westernization,” an old accusation rehashed in an idiom common
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in poststructuralist attacks against “totalization” and Eurocentrism. But
the poststructuralist connotation is by no means what “national learning”
scholars intend to convey. On the contrary, their language is meticulously
monitored for its absence of (Western) theoretical jargon. Their discourse
is, so to speak, thoroughly “national” and indigenous (although these
scholars have all recently become prestigious “global scholars,” making fre-
quent trips across the world that are funded both by the Chinese govern-
ment and by overseas foundations such as the semiofficial Chiang Ching-
kuo Foundation of Taiwan). The all but complete absence of Western
theoretical jargon in the discourse of “national learning” is by no means a
scholarly oversight but rather a carefully maneuvered symbolic gesture.
Moreover, critique of “radicalism” by “national learning” is more ideologi-
cal and political than theoretical or scholarly. The thrust of this critique is
the rejection of revolution and social reconstruction as the central prob-
lematics of China’s modernity. The 1980s debate about culture is criticized
for its “utilitarian preoccupation with modernization,” a defect that sup-
posedly underlies intellectual radicalism as such in modern China. The de-
bate in fact focused on the tension between modernization and the cultural
imperatives of revolutionary hegemony. Now that “national learning” aims
to delegitimate the revolutionary legacy, it cannot but renounce the 1980s
debate as “radical” and “utilitarian.”26 It turns out that “radicalism” is sim-
ply a coded term for the revolutionary legacy as the real target, which in the
present circumstances can only be labeled euphemistically. Attacks by “na-
tional learning” against radicalism can hardly claim political innocence, if
they are understood within the context of the recent antirevolutionary
wave in China studies in the West.27 By the end of the 1990s the “national
learning” associates believed that their political agenda could not remain
evasive and indirect forever, but they were reluctant to stake out their po-
litical position. They clamored for “moving beyond post-scholasticism
(hou jingxue),” a euphemism for the May Fourth antitraditional enlighten-
ment thinking, without pointing clearly to any direction as to where to
“move beyond” the “post-scholasticism,” except for adopting, in a quite
unself-conscious twist, the prefix “post” then in vogue in avant-garde theo-
ries and coining a confusing and meaningless neologism.28
Nevertheless, in the context of the political culture of the 1990s in
China, the position of “national learning” is a “politically correct” one. It
is, on the one hand, in keeping with the CCP’s promotion of “traditional
and national culture.” On the other hand, to the overseas China studies es-
tablishments, it represents “nonpartisan liberal intellectuals” who can eas-
The Debate about Modernity, Postmodernity, and Postcoloniality 37
ily become strategic allies for the “peaceful evolution” that will eventually
place China in the trajectory of the “transition” of the former Soviet bloc.
Furthermore, the advocacy by “national learning” of a nonsocialist, liberal
national tradition serves as an effective interface with the ideological net-
work of global corporations, which promotes multicultural alternatives (or
fosters illusions of such alternatives) as long as they are allied with, rather
than opposed to, capitalism. The “national learning” advocates thus face a
fundamental dilemma in identifying their subject position in the current
debate. Their elitism may indeed suggest a defiant endeavor to stake out an
intellectual realm of self-realization when they are being ineluctably mar-
ginalized in China’s social life. But such defiance is hardly apolitical. By re-
nouncing the “new enlightenment” movement of the 1980s and espousing
“national learning,” they betray their professed commitment to nonpoliti-
cal, purely academic values.
In the end, “national learning” becomes complicit with both the power
bloc at home and the ideology of global capitalism abroad. In this sense,
“national learning” and global neo-Confucianism are ideological bedfel-
lows under the same roof of a nationalism that debunks the revolutionary
legacy in the service of global capitalism. There is little doubt that the “na-
tional learning” group is vehemently opposed to the invasion of Western
consumer culture from a moral and ethical standpoint; yet its high moral
ground and elitist stance must be recognized and reciprocated by the “in-
ternational” (i.e., Western) scholarly community. Beijing University–based
“national learning” scholars, such as Chen Lai, Chen Pingyuan, and Wang
Shouchang, and the journals associated with them, such as Xueren
(Scholar) and Dongfang (Orient), have been well funded by Japanese,
American, Taiwan, and overseas Chinese foundations.29
Manufacturing Diversity in a New Cultural Landscape
Although various forms of nationalism constitute a cultural dominant, na-
tionalism can hardly function as an ideological center, imposed from above
by the ideological state apparatuses as in Mao’s era. The process of ideolog-
ical decentering reached its summit in the so-called Culture Fever of the
late 1980s in the burgeoning public sphere. It was, among other things, a
carnival imbued with a festive, universalist spirit celebrating liberation, in a
Bakhtinian sense, from “the hegemony of a single unitary language.”30 The
Tiananmen Incident of 1989 disrupted the carnival but hardly dispelled the
universalist aspirations deeply embedded in the Chinese cultural imagi-
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nary. In recent years, universalism has resurfaced in a variety of forms in
the cultural arena, not so much to reclaim its disappearing place on the
mainland (which is partly due to the diaspora of intellectuals in the wake of
the Tiananmen Incident) as to manufacture a new kind of diversity in the
changing cultural landscape of the 1990s. Granted, to label the divergent
and often radically different expressions as “universalist” is arbitrary; but
the arbitrariness may well indicate the extent to which these newer articula-
tions strive to produce an arbitrary and artificial plurality of opinions. It is
arbitrary and artificial because this newfangled diversity (or Chinese-brand
“multiculturalism”) largely sidesteps the central problematics opened up
by the 1980s debate—namely, the revolutionary legacy—and denounces
the 1980s in signal of a total break with political engagement that charac-
terizes the cultural ferment of that decade.
Of all the critical discourses in the 1980s debate about culture, arguably
the most important was Li Zehou’s seminal work encompassing the fields
of philosophy, aesthetics, and intellectual and cultural history. Li Zehou’s
wide-ranging intervention, cast primarily in a mode of aesthetic-historical
critique, set in motion the process of rethinking the fundamental problem-
atic of revolutionary hegemony and modernization in China. The most im-
portant theoretical move that Li Zehou made in the 1980s was to reconceive
the relationship between Chinese Marxist discourse and Confucian dis-
course not as antithetical but as a profoundly complementary and univer-
salist discourse. Li Zehou’s own universalism stems from an aesthetic con-
ceptual framework, which has its own internal contradictions. The point is
that Li Zehou posited a constructive cultural alternative not by replacing
Marxist revolutionary hegemony with a nationalist Confucian discourse
but by attempting to unify them on the basis of aesthetic universals. Simply
put, Li’s argument is that a constructive Marxist vision of humanity can
draw upon Confucian humanism in a “transformative creation” of moder-
nity or alternative modernity.31
Chinese culture today is moving on a truly universalizing, or globaliz-
ing, course, but surely not in the direction that Li Zehou hoped it would.
Global capitalism has infiltrated China’s cultural landscape not only with
its commercial mass culture products but also with its academic, intellec-
tual products, namely, contemporary Western “theory.” It is true that im-
ported Western academic theoretical discourse already had a prominence
in the 1980s debate about culture, but its function then was radically differ-
ent from what it does now. Essentially, in China today the political and ide-
ological thrust of imported theory has been largely abandoned. Meanwhile,
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its other symbolic value—namely, its fashionable novelty, a feature already
exploited by certain academic elites in the West, especially in the United
States—has now become also useful to the self-styled “post–New Era criti-
cism.” For instance, postmodernism, an overtly politically engaged and
critical discourse when first introduced to China in the mid-1980s largely
through Fredric Jameson’s influential lectures at Beijing University, now
takes up a self-conscious position of manufacturing itself in China as the
local variant of a global fashion.32
Some postmodernist advocates have gone so far as to claim a nonpo-
litical, purely academic postmodernist discourse in order to show the com-
patibility of China with the West in the global academic marketplace.33
Such a claim is symptomatic of both a desire to become integrated into the
global intellectual community dominated by the Western hegemony and an
anxiety that Chinese intellectuals may again be deprived of the freedom to
articulate their subject positions. By using postmodernism as a new lingua
franca, Chinese intellectuals can partake of global intellectual communica-
tions without the intermediary of a powerful existing discourse of the West
about China. In this respect, Chinese postmodernism as a critical discourse
may serve a political mission in a global context by threatening to take
away some of the exclusive privileges and power of speaking about and
speaking for China that are vested in the current China studies programs in
the West. It is therefore not surprising that China experts in the West are
likely to find Chinese postmodernism offensive.34
But back home in China, postmodernist discourse cannot but betray
its confusion in terms of political agenda. To showcase a break with the
legacy of the 1980s, some postmodernist or post–New Era critics now join
the chorus of those denouncing Li Zehou and others in the debate about
culture. The critics of the 1980s are accused of blindly subscribing to the
Western enlightenment discourse of “grand narratives” about “modernity”
and “nation-state.” Concepts from postcolonial and Third World criticism
are also employed by the post–New Era critics.35 In the realm of culture,
“postcoloniality” suggests the conditions in formerly colonial societies that
are permeated by Western culture to such an extent that only a renewed
critical self-consciousness, or “politics of identity,” can expose Western
domination and thereby reconstitute their otherness.
But what the Chinese post–New Era critics discover in modern
Chinese history is that the so-called postcolonial discourse is nothing less
than the revolutionary hegemony itself. However, the problematic of revo-
lution subsumes the issues of “nation-state” and “modernization” and is
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not reducible to postcolonialist championing of “nation-building” or
“identity politics.” The attempts to substitute postcolonialist concerns for
sociopolitical struggles and revolution by means of linguistic manipulation
are thus problematical and hardly inspiring. The post–New Era critics are a
marginalized group, perhaps rightly so, not only by their contrived rhetor-
ical obscurity (after the model of U.S. postcolonialism) but also by the self-
contradictory and self-defeating rejection of the revolutionary legacy and
political struggles as their own intellectual habitus. For the imported criti-
cal vocabulary of postmodernism and postcolonialism may serve as coun-
terhegemonic voices in the current discursive struggles, dismantling the
politics and power relationships in various discursive formations and
strategies, whether they are official or “nonpolitical liberalist.” Herein lies
the real and significant political potency of the post–New Era criticism.
However, its critical edge is severely blunted by an ostensible eagerness to
partake in the global intellectual fashion. The relatively successful film crit-
icism and literary criticism of contemporary avant-garde fiction (which
usually provides the texts for film adaptations) illustrate the extent to
which post–New Era critics succeed in manufacturing a Chinese “post-
modernity” as a globally transferable commodity (together with, of course,
avant-garde fiction and films).
Some of the postmodernist and post–New Era critics such as Zhang
Yiwu were later enticed or much pressured by the increasingly market-
oriented yet ineluctably marginalized intellectual circles to try out various
neologisms and new concepts such as “from modernity to Chineseness”
(cong xiangdaixing dao zhonghuaxing) in a futile and misleading attempt to
reiterate their counterhegemonic stance.36 Such a move actually proved
more counterproductive than counterhegemonic. Critics simply blame
them for smuggling nationalism and “Sinocentrism” through the back
door into the Chinese postmodern and postcolonial discourse.37
In contrast to the relative unpopularity of recent imported Western
theory, “humanism” remains an attractive and active motif in China’s intel-
lectual life in the early 1990s. A group of Shanghai-based scholars launched
a discussion of “neohumanism” within the context of the current cultural
crisis. Like the “national learning” group in Beijing, these Shanghai schol-
ars set out to attack the legacy of the 1980s as too politically engaged and
therefore nontranscendental. But unlike the Beijing group, the neohuman-
ists speak a universalist language calling for the reawakening of “humanist
spirits” in the face of commodity fetishism, which reifies traditional culture
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and “national learning,” among other things. The discussion of “humanist
spirits” was carried on in the March to August 1994 issues of Dushu
(Reading), published in Beijing and arguably the most prestigious monthly
journal among Chinese intellectuals. While expressing a desire to resist and
to intervene in globalization, however, the political agenda of the neohu-
manists is also fractured and self-contradicting. On the one hand, some
neohumanists maintain that the subject position of intellectuals in the cur-
rent circumstances should be “a secular attitude, and [a recognition of the]
unique ways by which intellectuals interpret and intervene in the society.”38
There are certain parallels between this position and the strategies of reter-
ritorialization of the Western intellectual Left, in that both moves strive to
integrate intellectual, academic, and humanistic pursuits with contempo-
rary social conditions without sacrificing the intellectuals’ subject posi-
tion.39 On the other hand, some neohumanists, echoing the “national
learning” group, assert the “ultimate concern” of values in a metaphysical
and religious sense, which is said to be “sequestered” or “concealed”
(zhebi) by worldly, utilitarian, political, and ideological struggles.40
Although the neohumanists are generally ambiguous about the key
question of what constitutes “core universal humanist values,” some grap-
ple with a “Habermasian strategy of communicative rationality” or with
Gadamerian hermeneutics to retrieve the humanist values preserved in
Confucian tradition as well as in the Western classical canon.41 It is clear
that, without necessarily emulating the recent trends in the West (especially
the United States), what the Chinese neohumanists are calling for is in ef-
fect a return to “the Great Tradition.” The undertakings of the Chinese
neohumanists of the 1990s have some interesting similarities with what the
“cultural conservatives” in the United States, such as E. D. Hirsch Jr. and
Allan Bloom have done, except that the Chinese case is complicated not
only by China’s problematic relation to the Western canons but also by the
revolutionary legacy that has practically deconstructed the idea of “univer-
sal humanist spirits” for decades.42 The neohumanists in China are well
aware of both trends and positions of the Western Left and conservative
right, but their assumption of cultural differences often obliterates real, se-
rious political differences that cut across cultural boundaries. Vacillating
between cultural conservatism and a desire for secular intervention, the
search for the “humanist spirits” remains merely a chimerical “ghost hunt-
ing” of no avail. For it cannot rationalize its interventionist assertions by
denying from the outset the validity of any politically engaged criticism.
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“Hybridity” or Critical Alternatives?
But is a politically engaged criticism that directly confronts the ideological
deadlocks and mobilizes radical and oppositional strategies then possible?
In an environment of political apathy, the latest controversy in Chinese in-
tellectual circles has centered on a book entitled Di san zhi yanjing kan
Zhongguo (Viewing China through a third eye; hereafter Third Eye). The
book appears as written ostensibly by a German Sinologist named “Dr.
Luoyiningger,” as the “third eye,” and then translated into Chinese by a
certain Wang Shan.43 It can perhaps be better understood as a Chinese ver-
sion of “hybridity” by forging a space of “in-betweenness” through the
counterfeit “translation.” Its structural similarities to postcolonialist “hy-
bridity” can be further illustrated by its ambivalent hybridization of radical
claims and political neoauthoritarianism. (It should be noted that I am not
suggesting that the author of Third Eye is influenced by the postcolonialism
of the West. In fact, the text categorically rejects any “Western new theo-
ries.” The similarities suggested here are purely formal and structural.)
While not losing sight of the contextual differences between Third Eye and
the Anglo-American postcolonial discourse, it may be helpful to see the
common fallacy in these professedly politically engaged enunciations that
undermines their critical potential or simply renders them serviceable to
power blocs of different orders.44
Third Eye has attracted widespread attention both domestically and in-
ternationally, mainly because it once again brings the central problematic
of China’s current reform and modernity to the fore. At least three aspects
of this book merit attention. First, it forcefully breaks the pervasive political
apathy by addressing the most sensitive issues in the current situation in
explicit, unequivocally critical language. The feigned German authorship
serves either to protect the author or to ease the embarrassment of the cen-
sorship agency in allowing its publication. The book sharply criticizes the
ideological state apparatuses for their current strategies of stubbornly
clinging to an outdated, deceptive indoctrination of “communist idealism”
and refusing to open up debates about political and ideological ramifica-
tions of the reform.45
Second, the book unmasks some of the most serious and explosive so-
cial consequences that the official ideology of reform and modernization
has been covering up. Among its list of dangerous factors are the massive
immigration of peasants to cities, which threatens to disrupt the urban-
rural symmetry; the self-righteous intellectual elites who choose to ally
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themselves with international anticommunist forces; the corrupt bureau-
cracy; the rapid formation of a new exploitative class and the impoverish-
ment of the increasingly powerless working class, which may trigger serious
class confrontations; and the rise of militant nationalism as a potential
source of disorder on a global scale.
The third and most significant aspect of the book is that it proposes a
critical rethinking of the revolutionary hegemony from the perspective of
historical searches for an alternative modernity. It radically reverses the
post-Mao pro-modernization attacks on the revolutionary legacy of Mao
by tracing the positive elements in his theory and practice during his rule,
especially the Cultural Revolution. It asserts, quite rightly, that “whether or
not Mao is correctly evaluated determines the fate of [China’s] leadership
and society at large in the years to come.”46 For, the book reiterates, Mao’s
Chinese Marxism has left a significant legacy through more than forty years
of “education,” now deeply embedded in China’s social consciousness.47 It
defines Mao’s Chinese Marxism as the “key line” of China’s alternative
modernity:
Mao Zedong represents the key line [of revolution] in China. . . . When Mao’s
image is damaged, this key line is seriously shaken. In hindsight, it is perhaps
the greatest sacrifice that China has sustained in the process of turning away
from the Cultural Revolution toward the current Reform. It is because this key
line (which is a line of a continuing growth) has a different name: the unique
Chinese alternative path of development. . . . China cannot repeat the paths of
the East Asian “Little Tigers,” nor the Japanese, or European ways of modern-
ization, because it is a huge and poor country with a largely illiterate popula-
tion. Its only correct way is to follow the footsteps of Mao, in order to search
for an alternative of its own.48
Although it is certainly debatable as to what kind of alternative Mao
had in fact created, Third Eye unmistakably signals a direction toward re-
thinking China’s modernity by confronting, face to face, the most powerful
ideological hegemony that has shaped much of twentieth-century China’s
cultural imaginary and that continues to play a decisive role in China’s
present and future.
However, the book’s proposed strategies undercut its effort of rethink-
ing and reinventing the revolutionary hegemony. For one thing, it argues
for a resurrection of Mao’s icon or new icons to fill the ideological vacuum,
even by appealing to “popular superstition.”49 In the meantime it advo-
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cates the power politics of a select elite, espousing a new authoritarianism
in the hands of “the members of an outstanding social class.”50 This posi-
tion is coupled with sharp attacks on the peasantry as a potentially destruc-
tive force driven solely by a “get rich” mentality, as well as attacks on intel-
lectuals as a politically naive group who have done a greater disservice to
the project of modernity than they can ever admit, in their undiminished
zeal for democratization of social life. Such an anti-intellectual and anti-
peasant position has shocked and appalled a substantial number of Chinese
intellectuals, who have yet to recover from the psychological trauma in-
flicted by the Cultural Revolution and are usually hypersensitive to any
move reminiscent of the “great disaster.” Indeed, not only does the book’s
blatant espousal of power politics and autocracy belie its manifest goal of
seeking rational solutions to China’s position within the context of global-
ization, but its latent conservatism and elitism also render its radical strate-
gies politically dangerous. However radical and politically engaged, criti-
cism devoid of a constructive agenda is susceptible to manipulation by
radically different power blocs and ideological positions.
It is worth noting that from the mid-1990s, a New Left position in
China’s fields of social sciences has emerged, calling for critical rethinking
of the revolutionary legacy and democratizing innovation in economic and
political institutions. It has involved collaboration of some overseas
Chinese intellectuals and Western scholars on the Left.51 There have been a
host of Chinese new leftists writing in social sciences and humanities since
the mid-1990s. As chapter 2 demonstrates at some length, the New Left and
their opponents, the so-called neoliberalists, have shifted their attention in-
creasingly to political, social, and economic realms rather than focusing on
the terrains of philosophy, history, and literature, the favored sites of the
Chinese intellectual discourses in the 1980s and the early 1990s. Although
the more compelling social and economic woes in China may have drawn
critical attention to the more practical issues of social inquiries, the drastic
enfeeblement of the critical voices in the humanities in the late 1990s seems
to signal a new phase of intellectual transformation, a phase described by
many humanists as “intellectual aphasia” (zhishi shiyuzheng) or a time of
“anxiety of interpretation of China” (chanshi Zhongguo de jialu).52
By the end of the 1990s, there had been little intellectual excitement
and few serious debates or controversies in the arts and humanities. This
was by no means caused by cultural banality. On the contrary, by the turn
of the millennium China’s cultural scene was filled with spectacles of sound
and image, thanks to the rapidly growing electronic media and information
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technology: pervasive consumerism, with its values and images centered on
material and instinctual desires, naked hedonism, and philistinism; domi-
nation of the Chinese urban youth culture by Hollywood and McDonald’s;
rising resentment amid the disgruntled and dispossessed populace, coupled
with a nostalgia for Mao’s era of egalitarianism; and increasingly assertive
nationalist sentiments in the general public—to mention the most salient
features of the contemporary cultural landscape. All these urgently await
serious critical analyses. Yet no significant critique of the current cultural
trends has appeared, despite the prodigious expansion of intellectual out-
lets of journals, books, and conferences in the recent rush toward academic
professionalization, which the Chinese academe in the humanities feel is all
the more urgent. (The humanities in China today, like their counterparts
across the world, are the most vulnerable to institutional budgetary cuts
and to lack of state and public support and financial resources during the
current global economic slump.) But the anxiety or “aphasia” of the
Chinese humanists results perhaps not so much from lack of public interest
and intellectual and practical incentives as from political and ideological
disorientation and dislocation.
Ultimately, globalization itself must confront this serious issue of con-
crete political agendas. The critical discourse of globalization in the West
can be seen as a strategy to delegitimate the existing ideological hegemony
of global capitalism as well as a means of reinventing, or legitimating, con-
ceptual and real alternatives to the process of capitalist globalization.
However, so far it is much more concerned with the inevitability of capital-
ist globalization than with any possibilities of noncapitalist alternatives.
The political agenda of such a discourse, therefore, often remains ambigu-
ous and indeterminate. But as the Chinese cases discussed above demon-
strate, serious political and material consequences will follow from such
discursive practice and theoretical debate. Then the question we must ask
ourselves is, what are the political agendas of the critical discourse of glob-
alization?
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What Is “Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics”?
Issues of Culture, Politics, 
and Ideology 2
While still in their youth, Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels vowed, inGerman Ideology, “let us liberate them [men] from the chimeras,the ideas, dogmas, imaginary beings under the yoke of which they
are pining away. Let us revolt against the rule of thoughts.” After such a lib-
eration, they declared, “existing reality will collapse.”1 The “revolt against
the rule of thoughts,” which has long been the hallmark of Marxist materi-
alism, is said to turn the material and economic “base” up and the “super-
structures” of consciousness and ideas upside down. For China in the after-
math of the disastrous Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), a “revolt against
the rule of thoughts” seemed to be exactly the right move to end the im-
passe of Maoist ideological warfare and to begin the new epoch of eco-
nomic reconstruction. The “Emancipation of Mind” campaign that Deng
launched in 1979 is said to have unveiled the New Era, which is often char-
acterized as a revolt against the rule of thoughts—and Maoism in particu-
lar—and a return to material base and material production as the founda-
tion of socialism. It is also described as “socialism with Chinese
characteristics,” a catchphrase coined by the Dengist ideologues to justify
his gaige kaifang movements since 1979.
Two decades after the beginning of the Deng era and fifty years after
the victory of the Chinese communism, it is ironic now, at the end of 1999,
a year fraught with significance not otherwise related to China in particu-
lar, to reflect on the Deng legacy by invoking another famous comment by
Marx in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, made in a much more
sedate and meditative tone than that of German Ideology: “Men make their
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own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it
under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances di-
rectly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.”2 These circum-
stances, or the tradition that was transmitted, through languages and ideas
that Marx then expounded at length in the treatise, cannot be easily re-
volted against or transcended. Even the material or economic inversion so
dear to Marxist materialism cannot bypass it. The irony is that Deng
Xiaoping’s reform, which began as a “revolt against the rule of thoughts”—
that is, Maoist ideology (or hegemony)—seems to have run its course of
materialist or economic reversal and reverted to the initial problem of the
Maoist legacy that not only haunts the social consciousness like a specter of
the past but also lives in the present.
Indeed, the escalating tension or schism between the ideology—that is,
the thoughts of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—and the economic
and political conditions of China now threatens to collapse the existing re-
ality all over again. The last time calamity threatened was in 1976 after the
death of Mao, when Deng amassed the support of the Chinese population,
who were bereft of material and spiritual belongings. This time, however,
the circumstances are more complex. The economic impoverishment is
gone, for the last two decades have brought China a persistent, near
double-digit economic growth rate and fundamentally transformed the
lifestyles of the nation’s 1.2 billion people. This is the legacy of Deng that
the current leadership under Jiang Zemin can boast of at the fiftieth an-
niversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). But
oddly, the euphoria and zeal that prevailed during the thirty-fifth anniver-
sary gala of 1984—symbolized by Beijing University students’ spontaneous
display of a banner to greet Deng, reading “How are you, Xiaoping”—were
barely evident this time, despite the orchestrated fanfares and grandiose
celebrations at Tiananmen on 1 October 1999.
On the surface, the festive mood was probably marred by a series of
events unfavorable to China: NATO’s May 1999 bombing of the Chinese
Embassy in Belgrade and the Kosovo conflict brought low the U.S.-China
relationship; Taiwan’s Lee Teng-hui challenged the PRC’s sovereignty claim
by declaring a “state-to-state” doctrine for the Taiwan-PRC relationship; a
new round of demonization of China by the Western media and the U.S.
Congress focused on the “China threat”; the Falun Gong sect staged mas-
sive demonstrations in front of Zhongnanhai, the central government com-
pound in Beijing; and the government’s massive suppression of the Falun
Gong sect drew sharp criticism from the West. All these events have initi-
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ated shock waves across the whole country. Of course, the leadership and
the intellectual elite are well aware that these events are only the indices of
how deep China’s woes and troubles lie. Nevertheless, the accusations from
the Western media and some political sectors against China’s human rights
violations and its recalcitrance to political democratization uncover some
truth about China now, even though the human rights conditions are ar-
guably at their best and the political processes of democratization are under
way at the grass-roots level.
The truth is that something has been fundamentally shaken in China.
Granted, everybody in China (and every China observer in the world)
could say that, but it is perhaps equally true about the rest of the world at
the threshold of a new millennium. However, the corollary of this truth is
hardly noticed by the populace. A deep sense of crisis resides in our com-
prehension of things and events, a crisis of knowledge and value systems by
which we make sense of things and evaluate them. This is a question not of
postmodernism but of current conditions of knowledge. The discourses on
globalization, on post-cold-war “new world order,” on “new economy,”
and on the “Third Way” that appear on television and in newspapers seem
to indicate how inadequate and insufficient our vocabulary is in expressing
(and comprehending) the fundamental and structural changes that occur
daily across the globe. The question of how to understand changes in China,
as in other parts of the world, is therefore a part of a larger set of questions
of “cognitive mapping,” or systems of values and knowledge—the episte-
mological and ideological realms that constitute indispensable parts of the
present, the living reality, and the past, too, the tradition that Marx rumi-
nated about in The Eighteenth Brumaire. In other words, the “chimeras, the
ideas, dogmas, imaginary beings”—the ideologies by which we not only
make sense of things (that is, deduce meanings and evaluate them) but also
legitimate our own activities—are in a state of unstoppable flux.
Under these circumstances, any understanding of the contemporary
world is tentative and subject to intense debate. This is true for the debates
in China in the 1990s. In this chapter, I address contemporary Chinese dis-
courses in three sectors—the official, the popular, and the intellectual—
concentrating on the intrinsic contradictions within China’s moderniza-
tion process, particularly in the realms of ideology and culture. The
cultural and ideological realms have always been a focal site of contention
in which the fundamental contradiction in China’s modernity or alterna-
tive modernity—between the revolutionary hegemony of Mao Zedong and
the economic reform of Deng Xiaoping—is unraveled. “Deng Theory,” or
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“socialism with Chinese characteristics,” legitimates a project of modernity
fundamentally at odds with the revolutionary hegemony, from which Deng
Theory derives ideological and political legitimation. In other words, the
discursive and ideological formation of Deng Theory is still enmeshed in
Mao’s hegemonic discourse, which Deng’s “reform” of the last two decades
has tried to dismantle.
To reiterate the methodological choice for the subjects of inquiry in
this book, this study pays a great deal of attention to the discourses and cul-
tural texts that have had significant social impact by reaching out to hun-
dreds of thousands of the general public. Although academic studies in the
West normally ignore the official discourses, and the Western popular
media usually dismiss them as mere “communist propaganda,” I empha-
size their central importance in China’s social life. These discourses, despite
their vacuity and dullness, still command a formidable influence through
the powerful media and ideological state apparatuses. By the same token, I
assess the popular cultural products and intellectual debates not by their
depths and complexities but by their social impact. Such an assessment is
not based on certain populist convictions of insurgency and mass revolt. In
the era of information revolution and globalization, the social impact of
discursive practices deserves rigorous scrutiny.
Paradoxes of Deng Theory
Mao’s revolutionary hegemony and Deng Theory differ fundamentally on
the questions of revolution and socialism. Both Mao and Deng were vet-
eran Red Army leaders who fought their ways to victory in the communist
revolution. But Mao was a revolutionary throughout his life, committed to
the “continuous revolution” at all fronts even long after the establishment
of the People’s Republic. By contrast, after 1949, Deng became a pragmatic
politician whose primary concern was national reconstruction by way of
economic development. As Arif Dirlik cogently argues, creating a new lan-
guage of revolution, or hegemony in a Gramscian sense, is a fundamental
feature of Chinese socialism.3 But this socialism is not without a basic con-
tradiction, Dirlik continues, since it can mean both an ideology of revolu-
tion (to Mao and his faithfuls) and an ideology of modernization (to Deng
and other pragmatists).4 I have argued elsewhere that the Chinese revolu-
tion was an attempt at an alternative modernity, a modernity that tran-
scends capitalist modernity and its Eurocentric assumptions of historical
teleology and economic determinism.5
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An essential feature of Chinese alternative modernity is revolutionary
hegemony, or the primacy of culture and ideology, not just in legitimating
the modern nation-state but also in constituting the basic and core compo-
nents of the new socialist country. Mao successfully established a revolu-
tionary hegemony during the pre-PRC period, gaining broad mass consent
by means of a nationalist, popular language of insurgency and liberation,
and coercing the diverse social groups (especially the urban bourgeoisie
and intellectuals) by wartime disciplines and injunctions of national salva-
tion. The late China scholar Tang Tso referred to Mao’s revolutionary strat-
egy as an epistemology of “everyday pragmatism.”6 Or, to use Mao’s termi-
nology, it is a theory of contradiction that wins by capturing and resolving
the principal contradiction amid a plethora of contradictions and imbal-
ances. The subjectivity of the agent in determining and resolving the pri-
mary contradiction is of critical importance, but this subjectivity is im-
mersed entirely in everyday practical and pragmatic tactics and strategies
rather than based on metaphysical presumptions.
Ideology therefore featured decisively in the Chinese revolution. Mao
insisted: “The creation and advocacy of revolutionary theory plays the
principal and decisive role in those times of which Lenin said, ‘without rev-
olutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement.’ . . . When the
super structure (politics, culture, etc.) obstructs the development of the
economic base, political and cultural changes become principal and deci-
sive.”7 In other words, an ideology of revolution or revolutionary con-
sciousness was needed in the first place in order to create a revolutionary
army, or to instill revolutionary class consciousness into the largely unself-
conscious peasant masses, in a country where a well-organized modern
proletariat was nearly nonexistent. Contrary to the myth created by the
CCP historians that the Chinese revolution was the inevitable outcome of
objective socioeconomic conditions and the only viable route toward mod-
ernization, the revolution was to a large extent created by those armed with
revolutionary ideologies. Hence, the Cultural Revolution, seen in the light
of Mao’s continued emphasis on culture and ideology as a constitutive
component of revolution and socialism, can be construed as an intrinsic
movement within the revolutionary hegemony to consolidate the central
position of revolutionary ideology itself. Paradoxically, when revolution
was reduced to nothing more than ideology, or “the chimeras, the ideas,
dogmas, imaginary beings,” then a revolution against revolution, or a “re-
volt against the rule of thoughts”—the thoughts or ideology of revolution
itself—was in order.
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From 1979, Deng Xiaoping set out to reverse ideological dominance
and to embark on economic development as the goal of modernization.
Unlike Gorbachev of the former Soviet Union and other Eastern European
reformers, Deng never abandoned the ideals of socialism, and he insisted
on reforming, instead of jettisoning, the political structures and ideological
state apparatuses established during Mao’s time. Deng’s project of modern-
ization was therefore both a partial continuation of Mao’s alternative
modernity and a partial rejection of it. For one thing, Deng preferred eco-
nomic development to ideological revolution, which altered a crucial com-
ponent of Mao’s alternative modernity. But Deng’s determination to simul-
taneously modernize China and build socialism was in keeping with Mao’s
ideals. Deng was neither an “unrepentant capitalist roader,” as Mao sus-
pected, nor a guru of an Asian kind of capitalism who favored free market
economy and authoritarian political rule, as he was portrayed by Western
media.
In 1999, two years after Deng’s death and two decades after his reform,
the current leadership tried to erect and then solidify Deng’s legacy. The
CCP under Jiang Zemin has unquestionably left behind Mao’s revolution-
ary idealism and radicalism and become a ruling body with all the charac-
teristics of a political power holder in a one-party state. The CCP is also the
most powerful economic decision maker and manager of the massive state-
owned enterprises. Although in the economic sectors the CCP not only
continues Deng’s policies but also takes much bolder steps at privatizing
state-owned enterprises, promoting a free market, and further opening up
China’s economy to multinational capitalism, in political sectors the ut-
most concern for the leadership is to maintain the status quo and defer po-
litical democratization and reform at higher levels indefinitely. It is fair to
say that the current leadership has become a conservative ruling body with
hardly any vision of political reform. At the turn of the millennium,
China’s economy is in a slump and its society is again in a state of unrest,
despite all the positive achievements of Deng’s modernization project over
the years. The CCP leadership now desperately needs an effective ideology
to legitimate its rule and to bring about public cohesion and consent. It also
now must find something of its own in terms of political strategies, princi-
ples, and plans—in short, an ideology as its own legacy.
It is often asserted that an explicit state ideology is unnecessary, partic-
ularly in capitalist countries where social values and ideas are transmitted
and disseminated through non-state media and other institutions such as
schools and churches, which are purportedly “free” from state interfer-
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ences. No society, however, can function properly without systems of val-
ues and ideas, which are defined as ideologies, ideological state appara-
tuses, and cultural hegemony in modern capitalist societies. For China at
this moment of fundamental transformations, ideological struggle haunts
every step of its gaige kaifang, even though the state and society have stren-
uously de-emphasized its role. Under the rule of CCP, the explicit state ide-
ological system and propaganda machinery in China are the norm, and the
leadership cannot but grapple with them. This is especially compelling now
at the beginning of the millennium, given that Jiang Zemin and his col-
leagues of the “third generation” of CCP leadership are all in their mid-
seventies and face succession of power immediately.
Deng Theory thus appears in the ideological state apparatuses (ISAs)
as the ruling ideology. Marx’s remarks on the political function of “tradi-
tion” and its discourse in The Eighteenth Brumaire are again an apt assess-
ment: “The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on
the brains of the living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutioniz-
ing themselves and things, in creating something that has never yet existed,
precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up
the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle
cries and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in
this time-honored disguise and this borrowed language. . . . In like manner
a beginner who has learnt a new language always translates it back into his
mother tongue, but he has assimilated the spirit of the new language and
can freely express himself in it only when he finds his way in it without re-
calling the old and forgets his native tongue in the use of the new.”8
The so-called Deng Theory that the ISAs have produced is a language
in transition, neither entirely new nor old, somewhat like a hybrid and in-
termediary discourse of a foreign language that the beginner has yet to
master. Deng Theory is probably a misnomer to begin with, for, unlike
Mao, Deng himself was no theorist and had little interest in theoretical
thinking and writing. He was a pragmatist whose “contribution” to theory
can at best be summarized as the “Principle of Cat” and the “Principle of
Fumble,” articulated in the vivid, straightforward vernacular of the com-
mon folk. The first aphorism derives from the famous aphorism Deng
stated in the 1960s: “As long as a cat can catch a mouse, it is a good cat
whether it is black or white.” The second, from the 1980s, reflects upon the
spontaneous act of the peasants to privatize the collective commune that
provided the momentum for the reform: “[In launching the reform and
opening up,] we’ve fumbled our way to cross the water.”9 Contrary to
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Mao’s insistence that without revolutionary theory there would not be a
revolution, Deng in effect pronounced the demise of theoretical dogma and
guidance. The phrase “fumble our way” is at once an acknowledgment of
the passivity of the CCP leadership in the economic reform from the begin-
ning and a declaration of down-to-earth pragmatism.
In 1992, when economic reform was at low ebb, Deng toured Southern
China, giving a series of talks that are touted as another hallmark of Deng
Theory. Surprisingly, the central concern of these “Southern Tour Talks” is
ideology, and Deng in his characteristically pithy and often blunt style reit-
erated his “Cat Principle”: “Now the key issue is whether it [the reform] is
named ‘capitalism’ or ‘socialism.’ ” And as for those who waged the “battle
of naming,” Deng dismissed them as “having no common sense.”10 The
“common sense,” or “the criteria for judging [the success or failure of re-
form],” Deng continued, “lie mainly in whether it [the reform] benefits the
productivity of socialist society, and whether it promotes the synthetic
power of the state, and whether it raises the living standard of the people.”11
In plain and pedestrian language, Deng dismissed ideological “naming” at
one stroke.
But Deng the pragmatist knew very well the pragmatics of ideological
discourse. In the “four fundamental principles” that constitute a crucial di-
mension of his ideological legacy, Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought
played no small role.12 Deng, however, made it clear on numerous occa-
sions that ideology (Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought) was the guaran-
tee of the socialist state, without which China’s political structure would fall
apart. And on numerous occasions—including the ruthless tackling of the
Tiananmen Incidents of 1989 and the recent social unrest caused by the
crackdown on the Falun Gong sect—both Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin
resorted to the discourse of political and ideological “struggles” to safe-
guard the stability of the “socialist state.” It is very clear that in the hands of
both Deng and his successor, Jiang, ideology is indispensable for legitimat-
ing the political rule.
But what is this ideology? What is this “socialism with Chinese charac-
teristics”? In the discourses of Deng Theory and of the current ideological
state apparatuses, definitions and discussions of ideology itself are singu-
larly wanting. A working explanation of the concept of ideology, however
tentative, is therefore necessary. Simply put, it is safe to define ideology, in
the present context, as a system of meaning and values that help to legiti-
mate a dominant political power. Furthermore, ideology is a system of pro-
ducing meaning and values (hence it is more accurately a process in mo-
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tion, rather than a static system) primarily through discourse or lan-
guage.13 An important way of testing the effectiveness of ideology and then
analyzing it is to see how it works as a discourse in historical contexts. It is
in this sense that Deng’s ideology can be seen as a language in transition, a
hybrid and intermediary discourse.
As a system or process of producing meanings and values, ideology
tends to universalize and naturalize the beliefs and values that are histori-
cally constituted and specific to certain social groups and that are politically
and socially motivated. Ideologies, in other words, tend to camouflage their
ideological nature by representing themselves as universal truth and truth-
ful representation of reality. These, of course, are the characteristics of ide-
ology in general, especially in modern capitalism, in which ideology’s legit-
imating function is intrinsic to the modern electorate democracy, for
universality and universal representation are central notions to modern po-
litical practices of the West.14 By contrast, revolutionary ideologies often as-
sert their demystifying, deconstructive strategies outright, by unraveling the
political nature of bourgeois ideologies disguised as universal truth or by
denouncing ideology in capitalist society as “false consciousness.”15 But
when revolutionary parties seize power, ideology often replicates the func-
tion it has in capitalist states; that is, it serves as no more than a representa-
tion of a universal truth, except that it is the reverse of the humanist, liberal
“truths” of freedom and democracy in capitalism. In the parlance of Louis
Althusser, ideology becomes an instrument of ideological state apparatuses,
whether in Western capitalist countries or in the Stalinist Soviet Union.16
Instrumentalization of ideologies to serve the political purposes of the
state is intrinsic to modernity or modern nation building, for in modern
nations ideology and ideological state apparatuses are needed to legitimate
the existence of nations in the absence of a religious sanctity and the man-
date of a sacred “tradition.”17 In other words, ideologies are always second-
ary, though indispensable and instrumental to a modern nation-state in
which economic growth and political power hold predominant positions.
Neither Marxism nor postmodernism is needed here to see this simplest
fact of economic determinism in modernity. Ironically, Mao’s alternative
modernity needs to be apprehended through a dialectical deconstruction
of Marxist economic determinism, for Mao’s alternative modernity tries to
elevate ideology and culture to the status of economy and thereby reverse
the order of things in modernity.
Deng’s dilemma was that, as an unflinching veteran communist, he
could give up neither his socialist ideals nor the legacy of revolution that he
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had built with Mao, while as a pragmatist determined to pursue economic
development as the primary objective of modernization, he must reject
Mao’s radical revolutionary goals and ideological and cultural determin-
ism. Deng’s solution was to stage the drama of economic reform while
carefully preserving and continuing to rely on the hegemony of Mao in po-
litical and ideological realms. In the aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident
and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the ensuing total collapse of the
Soviet blocs assured the CCP leadership, then still under the aegis of the re-
tired Deng, that to abandon Mao’s legacy was nothing less than political
suicide.
Of all the paradoxes in Deng Theory, the most glaring is the matter of
ideology. Ideology for Mao was more than an instrument of political legit-
imation; it was the core of his alternative modernity in which revolution
reigned supreme. It was during the years of constant revolution after the
PRC was established, particularly during the Cultural Revolution, that Mao
conflated ideology with revolution to the extent that the two became virtu-
ally indistinguishable. Deng irrevocably abandoned Mao’s course of revo-
lution and restored the “appropriate” function of ideology, as it were, to
political legitimation.18 Deng and his reform-minded associates, to quote
Marx again, proceeded to “conjure up the spirits of the past to their service
and borrow from them names, battle cries and costumes in order to present
the new scene of world history,”19 although in this case Mao’s language was
not borrowed but inherited. In short, Deng retained the discursive forma-
tions, the formal and rhetorical features, of Mao’s ideology while decisively
renouncing its revolutionary core. It is thus an ideology against ideology
and a revolution against revolution within the peculiar historical context of
post-Mao China.
In the post-Deng period of the late 1990s, the inherent paradoxes and
contradictions of Deng’s ideological strategies must be legitimated in order
to present those strategies as Deng Theory and ultimately to provide ideo-
logical legitimation for the political power. Granted, it is a cyclical and tau-
tological process of self-legitimation (all modern ideological discourses are
to some extent tautologically self-legitimating), and the production of
Deng Theory harks back to Mao’s discourse, just as Deng himself drew on
Mao’s language of Chinese Marxism in formulating “socialism with
Chinese characteristics.”
A cursory glimpse at the statements made by state ideological appara-
tuses concerning Deng Theory will show how indissolubly the discourse is
immersed in hegemonic language during Mao’s reign. The style, rhetorical
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and metaphorical features, syntactic and specific utterances, as well as per-
formative and affective aspects of language are all reminiscent of the hege-
monic discourse of Mao’s age. The discourse is distinctive in style—very
solemn, often hyperbolic, with many aphorisms, parallel sentences, and su-
perlatives. It is often “digital”—not in the high-tech sense but in terms of
encapsulating polices in terse, telegraphic, “digitized” syntax. One example
is the slogan “two focuses, one central point.” “Two focuses” refers to “re-
form” and “opening up,” and “one central point” means “economic devel-
opment.” In popular culture, this slogan is often satirized as a “bikini
triad,” juxtaposing serious political statements with the sensuous image of
a young model in a bikini bathing suit. This unlikely concept offers a
glimpse of the current cultural ambience, in which images of sexy young
bikini-clad models in advertisements and television commercials all over
China signal the extent to which China is truly “opened up” and “econom-
ically developed.” Another example is the commemorative paper on the
theoretical achievements of the CCP, written by the Office of Archives and
Research of the CCP Central Committee and entitled “Great Banner,
Glorious Theories.” The title unmistakably reminds the reader of the hy-
perbole of Mao’s time. The bulk of the article is dedicated primarily to ex-
plicating Deng Theory, even though it purports to inventory all the
achievements of the PRC over its fifty years. The article’s second section,
“The Immensely Significant Breakthroughs and Achievements of the Fifty
Years’ Theoretical Exploration,” begins: “What is socialism? How to build
socialism? These are the fundamental issues of Deng Xiaoping Theory.”
The article then enumerates at length Deng’s “immensely significant break-
throughs” as the “theories about the essence of socialism,” the “theories
about reform and opening-up,” the “theories about socialist market econ-
omy,” and so forth. The most fundamental of all—namely, the “essence of
socialism,” is, as quoted in Deng’s own words, “to liberate productivity and
develop productivity, to eliminate exploitation and reduce social di-
chotomies, and finally to achieve prosperity for all.”20 The article includes
other quotations from Deng, such as “development is the hard-boiled ra-
tionale [for reform]” and “the key to resolve all the questions in China is its
own development.”21
Taken out of its immediate context, Deng’s hard-boiled economism
and developmentalism are hardly impressive in the late phase of capitalist
modernity (or postmodernity). Even in China, such a commonplace dis-
course has few reverberations among the Chinese population, except in the
mandatory public speeches of bureaucrats and the front-page editorials
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and headline news of the state-owned media. One significant implication,
though, lies outside the discourse of Deng Theory itself: it is not what the
Deng Theory says but how is it received by the audience—the public’s re-
ceptions and responses—that makes a difference.
And a big difference it is indeed. It is fair to say that the discourse of
Deng Theory produced by the ISAs has lost its real audience. It no longer
commands the attention of the Chinese populace, for political demystifica-
tion and economic decentralization have drastically reduced the authority
of the CCP leadership, including Deng himself; there is no comparison be-
tween Mao and Deng in terms of the authority and weight wielded by their
discourses. What is even more remarkable is that within the discourse of
Deng Theory in China today there is a true state of Bakhtinian heteroglos-
sia.22 Deng Theory is reduced to nothing more than political rhetoric in an
increasingly pluralistic society, even though the media and other ISAs—
schools, major cultural institutions, and entertainment industries—are still
firmly controlled by the CCP’s propaganda departments.
Insofar as the names of Deng Xiaoping or Jiang Zemin or the Chinese
Communist Party are not publicly attacked, discourses of all sorts are toler-
ated, and the booming and profitable publishing business (and the more
prosperous pirated publishing business, euphemistically called the “second
channel”) in recent years testifies to the plurality and diversity of opinions
and ideas that are produced, reproduced, and circulated in China today.
Discourses of the intellectual elite, often couched in obscure, abstract, and
specialized rhetoric, now range from ultra-right anticommunism to
ethnic-religious manifestations analogous to Islamic fundamentalism. The
ostensible positions of the front pages and headlines in the media, and the
sheer quantity of “official discourses” on Deng Theory are deceptive only
to the outside world, to those who have not lived in Deng’s China. The
media, whether domestic or Western, know very well the simple and plain
truth that the discourse of Deng Theory is no more than a vacuous and cer-
emonial rhetoric with little substance and that the public in fact pays little
attention to it. This is not to suggest that everyone is still in a state of lies
and silences. On the contrary, now in a state of heteroglossia, government
officials, intellectuals, and the general public all speak in lively and diver-
gent discourses, leaving Deng Theory only to the front pages of newspa-
pers, with no more function than bulletin boards in government offices.
Careful readers may feel amazed that from the second page on, even in the
People’s Daily, the CCP Central Committee’s mouthpiece, the language of
news reports is markedly different from that of the front page, precisely be-
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cause the distinct style of Deng Theory, with its political hyperbole, su-
perlatives, and grammar, no longer appears in discourses about news
events that focus extensively on economy and business.
A serious question arises, then: can Deng Theory still effectively func-
tion as a dominant ideology? Or, to put it differently, can it still legitimate
the present regime and its policies? When confronted with this compelling
question, Liu Ji, former vice president of the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences and an active member of Jiang Zemin’s think tanks, retorted to an
inquiring Singaporean journalist that the notion of legitimation “only
comes from the West.” Liu Ji offered his own version of political legitima-
tion by referring to “the support of the people”: “Insofar as a regime serves
the interests of the people and wins the support of the people, it is legiti-
mate. . . . The present government . . . led the people out of starvation and
toward moderate affluence (xiaokang), thus gaining the strong support of
the people. This is the meaning of legitimacy.”23 The phrases “support of
the people” and “serving the interests of the people” unmistakably belong
to the discourse of Maoist revolutionary hegemony and to Deng Theory.
Liu Ji cannot refute the “erroneous Western notion of legitimacy” on its
own ground, nor can he offer an alternative by reinventing Mao’s or Deng’s
discourse. He cannot but reiterate the vague notion of the “interests of the
people” as a justification or legitimation of the notion of legitimacy itself.
Liu Ji’s remarks are indicative of the ideological problems facing the current
CPC leadership.
The lack of new ideological orientation now amounts to a serious cri-
sis. Yang Fan, a young economist in Beijing, describes the situation as a
conflict between “capitalization of political power and socialist ideology.”24
Yang Fan refers to the “capitalization of political power” as a “new alliance
of capital and bureaucracy.” Government bureaucrats have quickly trans-
formed public assets and capital into private ones in the process of privati-
zation and marketization of state-owned enterprises, particularly in recent
years. They have acquired capital and wealth from overseas multinational
corporations and domestic private sectors by trading political power,
showing favoritism to those capitalist “friends” in an underdeveloped mar-
ket in which competition and accumulation of wealth and capital reveal vo-
racity and ruthlessness. Much has been said about “capitalism with Chinese
characteristics” in the realms of economy, business, and finance; and more
virulent attacks from “neoliberals,” a code name for ultra-right-wing intel-
lectuals, are waged against the remnant “communist dictatorship” and
Marxism. In recent years, an emergent group of New Left intellectuals has
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broached socialist, neo-Marxist critiques of the political, economic, social,
and ideological crises in China. As expected, the ISAs have remained silent
on those issues, largely because they are incapable of offering any defense
or criticism by drawing on the resources of Deng Theory. The ISAs’ inabil-
ity to confront the real problems and to engage in a meaningful debate with
right-wing and left-wing intellectuals indicates the extent to which the cur-
rent CCP leadership has deeply entrenched itself. Its naked pragmatism
lacks long-term vision, and its power politics lack any vestige of revolution-
ary idealism and moralism.
Although Deng Theory and official discourses have lost their aura of
sacredness, as it were, and have become indistinguishable amid a plethora
of competing discourses in a state of heteroglossia, one should not lose
sight of another aspect of the ideological movements of this period of in-
formation revolution. As plurality and diversity of discourses are cele-
brated, one should raise the questions of who has the most powerful media
and information resources, and of what end dominant discourses serve. In
China today, the official discourses and the ISAs, however vacuous and
inept, are not only firmly holding on to media domination but also amass-
ing more resources to further strengthen their media and information
domination in a market economy. Hence, having said that the official dis-
courses in China today are all but meaningless “floating signifiers,” a di-
alectical rethinking or second thought is needed before any conclusion of
their true demise can be reached. Insofar as the official discourses and ISAs
retain their dominance over resources of both economic and cultural capi-
tals (it is highly unlikely that the state will relinquish its control over media
and other ISAs in the near future), we should always treat the official dis-
courses seriously and pay close attention to their social impact. In the realm
of popular culture and popular media, the official discourses have managed
to assume new hegemonic positions in a changing social ambience.
Consent and Complicity
Ideologies and ISAs in contemporary capitalist societies are hegemonic in
their widespread complicity in reproducing popular consent between po-
litical powers (which are democratically elected) and business sectors
(which finance both the reproduction of ideological, “spiritual” consensus
and democratic elections). China cannot yet be described as a capitalist
state, at least in political and ideological realms. Ideologies in today’s China
function hegemonically, too, although its hegemonic formations and insti-
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tutions, derived from its own tradition, differ greatly from those in capital-
ist North American and western European countries. Ideological hege-
mony in a Gramscian sense refers to political legitimation by way of con-
sent and coercion, or by establishing moral, political, and intellectual
leadership in the public.25 If the dominant ideological hegemony still serves
to legitimate political power in China today, how effective is it, and does it
still have moral, political, and intellectual leadership? Will the ideological
crisis, as so many have observed, ultimately undermine its own foundation
of legitimacy?
Because apocalyptic predictions may not serve our purposes of rational
analysis and critique, it would be wise to situate the current events and
trends in China within the historical contexts of the nation’s passage to
modernity since Mao’s time. At the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of
the People’s Republic, Mao’s legacy is visible not only in the symbols and
images of the revolutionary past but in the powerful presence of the politi-
cal and ideological institutions and discourses of Mao’s time. These institu-
tions and discourses are deeply embedded in the social consciousness as
well as the unconscious realms and are now entwined with ideas, fashions,
styles, cultural forms, and discourses in a state of heteroglossia and con-
stant movement of transformation, renewal, mutilation, and death. Clearly,
repressive and terrorist “class struggles” in Mao’s time vanished, and the
Leftist old guards associated with the radical practices of the Cultural
Revolution have lost all credibility. One would be hard-pressed to argue
that the “nightmare” of the Cultural Revolution is still haunting the psyche
of the populace, except perhaps the older generation of intellectuals. And it
would be preposterous to anticipate a revival of the radicalism of the noto-
rious “Gang of Four,” whose names and deeds are relegated to the horrors
of the Nazis and Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge. The booming religious and semi-
religious cult practices of various Qigong therapies and exercises, including
those of the Falun Gong sect banned by the government in the summer of
1999, have aroused suspicion of the rising popular radicalism. None of
these practices has so far invoked the specter of Maoism, although in popu-
lar resentment against the rampant corruption, nostalgia about the moral
puritanism and egalitarianism of the Mao era often surfaces.
Mao’s hegemony lies elsewhere, primarily in the discourses of popular
culture manufactured by a joint venture of the ISAs and commercial enter-
tainment industries and media. During the lengthy period of revolutionary
wars, Mao established distinct national and popular cultural forms that
Mao described as “refreshing, lively Chinese styles and airs that are palat-
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able to the tastes and ears of the common folks of China.”26 Over the years,
a highly effective and systematic revolutionary “culture of the masses”
(qunzhong wenyi) was established among the millions of Chinese “com-
mon folk” or “the people.”27 Those popular forms—including, among oth-
ers, massive singing contests, rallies, and art festivals for celebrating revolu-
tionary and social events; collective folk songs and dances known as “rice
sprout songs” (yangge); folk arts of storytelling, puppet theater, and local
operas; big posters and banners; and so on—helped create a self-conscious
collectivity and an identity of “the people” (renmin) in the masses by mobi-
lizing mass participation in those events.
Deng rejected the radical and revolutionary content of those popular
cultural forms, but he inherited their discourse, styles, and forms as a major
legacy of Mao’s hegemony. Unlike Mao, Deng showed no artistic talent or
cultivation in cultural and aesthetic tastes. But his own language—numer-
ous speeches and conversations made mostly on practical issues—displays
a vividness and forcefulness that can be matched only by Mao himself. The
Principle of Cat and the Principle of Fumble, which are widely circulated in
the popular culture (though not officially propagated by the ISAs), indicate
the effectiveness of Deng’s utterances. Notably, both Mao’s and Deng’s
speeches and writings display a highly personalized and formidable style,
often in striking contrast to the stereotyped, pompous, and dogmatic dis-
courses of Maoism and Deng Theory reproduced by the CCP’s ISAs.
Granted, their “personal” styles are integral parts of the charisma they pro-
jected in times of monolithic political structures and ideologies, which in
turn reinforced the “uniqueness of style” of the “master narratives,” or pro-
nouncements of Mao and Deng as true “masters” or “leaders of the peo-
ple.” An ideological-political chain was built over the decades of hard-won
battles.
This chain is all but broken now, as the autocratic personal charisma
and authoritarian and monolithic utterances of a “great master” quickly
gave way to a pluralistic, heterogeneous social life at the end of the 1990s.
The broken chain is visible by in the discourse of the self-styled “third-
generation leader” Jiang Zemin. Jiang is now widely known for being a per-
son who “prefers froth to substance” in his discourse.28 In recent years,
Jiang’s public speeches and conversations have been prolific, but almost all
his utterances are repetitions of the ready-made official discourses of Deng
Theory, and no personal style can be detected from his discourses. Of
course, there is nothing lamentable about the disappearance of the “charis-
matic style” of autocrats. But in China at present, even though Jiang is
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aware of the irreversible change of social and political conditions that may
relegate political autocracy to history once and for all, he cannot but draw
on Mao’s and Deng’s ideological resources for his own legitimacy.
For the time being, Jiang, the “third leader,” can still rely on an ideo-
logical hegemony from Mao and Deng (mostly from Deng now), thanks
primarily to the ambiguities, the ambivalence, and the balance strategies
that Deng devised in his ideological discourse. Deng’s ideological strategy
was dialectical: on the one hand, he rode on the high popular expectations
for material wealth and for a modernized way of life as well as on the strong
popular aversion to political and ideological campaigns. As a master politi-
cian, he used the prevailing depoliticizing mood of the populace to his po-
litical end—to push forward economic modernization while preserving the
CCP’s rule and status quo. On the other hand, Deng effectively trans-
formed the collective enthusiasm of the populace and their collective iden-
tity to a nationalist (patriotic) pride and affection for the “great mother-
land” and its glory of past, by resorting to the national and popular forms
invented and disseminated among the populace from Mao’s time.
Furthermore, Deng tolerated and even encouraged the imported (and often
smuggled) commercial popular culture, from MTV, karaoke, Hollywood
movies, and television soap operas to fashions, amusement parks, and
tourism.
The ambiguities, ambivalence, and balance strategies of Deng’s ideo-
logical discourse are best illustrated by two phrases that he coined—“xiao-
kang” (moderate affluence) and “minzu hun” (national spirit). Xiaokang is
the bedrock of Deng’s reform or, as Liu Ji suggests, that which gives legiti-
macy to the reform. It is Deng’s promise to provide the populace with a
material well-being and a lifestyle of modern conveniences. Deng boldly
declared that “getting rich is glorious” and advised the people to “let a part
of the population get rich first” as a strategy to propel economic develop-
ment. In effect, this strategy justified capitalist exploitation and unequal
competition in China as the legitimate ways to modernize China, a justifi-
cation that flies in the face of socialist principles of social and economic
equality and justice. It also flatly contradicts Deng’s own words that the
essence of socialism is “to eliminate exploitation and reduce social di-
chotomies, and finally to achieve prosperity for all.” Deng remained
ambivalent about these contradictions, and the ISAs simply eclipse the
gripping tension between social equality and justice and economic devel-
opment. While intellectuals are increasingly critical of this ambivalence
and its consequences, the domains of popular culture seem to have become
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the best defenders and crusaders of the materialist and developmentalist
principles of Deng and Jiang.
As Jiang Zemin approached the end of his current tenure as the CCP
general secretary at the end of 2002 and, as China’s president by 2003, must
face power transition, he stepped up propaganda campaigns to construct a
Jiang legacy. Jiang’s “collective leadership” consists essentially of tech-
nocrats who favor a Singaporean model of market economy ruled by a
powerful state bureaucracy, with hardly any ideological bond to China’s
revolutionary past. China’s gaige kaifang under Jiang’s leadership has un-
doubtedly gone much further into the capitalist world-system, or global
capitalism. Under these circumstances, a Jiang ideological legacy must
grapple with the unresolved paradoxes and dilemma that gaige kaifang has
faced all along, and such a legacy must draw up a new ideological blueprint
that not only justifies the economic privatization and political bureaucrati-
zation but also provides further ideological legitimation to China’s integra-
tion into capitalist world-system. The new official discourse has been
coined by Jiang and his ideologues as the Theory of Three Represents, de-
livered by Jiang Zemin at a series of CCP meetings. The theory refers to
“representing the advanced productive forces, the advanced culture, and
the interests of the majority of the Chinese population.” Its explication cul-
minated in Jiang’s speech at the meeting celebrating the eightieth anniver-
sary of the founding of CCP, delivered in July 2001 at the Great Hall of the
People, Beijing.29
Although the substance of the Theory of Three Represents deserves
close analysis, suffice it here to point out that only the last provision—
namely, representing “the interests of the majority of the Chinese popula-
tion”—retains, at least rhetorically, some vague notion of “the vanguard of
the working class,” while the references to “advanced productive forces”
and “advanced culture” are nothing more than a thinly veiled endorsement
of “free market” and “civil society” in advanced capitalist societies. Jiang’s
Theory of Three Represents, hailed by the ISAs as a foundation for a funda-
mental political and ideological change, may signal the CCP’s decision to
transform itself from a revolutionary party to a political power holder in a
bureaucratic, one-party state. The bulk of Jiang’s discourse on the Theory
of Three Represents revolves around the issue of effective political gover-
nance, “rule of law,” and management of massive bureaucracies. Ironically,
as Jiang elaborates on the last “represent,” (that is, “the interests of the ma-
jority of the Chinese population”) the ideological paradox of gaige kaifang
is exposed at its fullest.
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What Jiang intends as a validation of the legitimacy of CCP as a care-
taker of the “interests of the people” turns out to be a justification to allow
capitalist entrepreneurs to become CCP members. Jiang declares that
China’s gaige kaifang has changed class stratification, with emergence of
“entrepreneurs and technical personnel employed by . . . non-public sec-
tors . . . and self-employed, private entrepreneurs,” and that these new
“private entrepreneurs . . . have contributed to the development of pro-
ductive forces and other undertakings in a socialist society through honest
labor.” Hence, Jiang continues, “it is necessary to accept those outstanding
elements from other sectors of society [apart from workers, farmers, intel-
lectuals, servicemen, and cadres].”30 While the Chinese state-owned media
played down this significant move, Western media immediately seized the
opportunity to speculate on its repercussions. The New York Times an-
nounced that “China’s Leader Urges Opening Communist Party to
Capitalists,” while the Washington Post declared a “New Deal for China’s
Capitalists.”31 A comparative, semantic analysis of the Chinese official dis-
courses in the pages of People’s Daily and Western media reports in the New
York Times or Reuters and Associated Press news stories will expose the
glaring contrast not so much in the meaning (explicit or implicit) of Jiang’s
green light to the Chinese capitalists as in the ways in which the move has
been articulated and interpreted—in the discursive practices that represent
different power relationships and ideological assumptions. It is, after all, a
question of representation. The Washington Post journalist may actually
have hit the target by asserting that “[Jiang’s move] marked another ideo-
logical shift for an organization desperately trying to remain relevant in a
country buffeted by economic and social changes” (italics mine).32 A party
that has all but lost its social relevance tries to salvage its popular man-
date—this is an interpretation of a leading Western newspaper, which well
encapsulates the Western “public opinion” on China, primarily produced
by Western media representation or image making of China. The type of
“relevance” or “ideological shift” is based on the assumptions of commer-
cial popular culture, which manufactures popular sentiments, popular
mandates, popularity, “public opinion,” and so forth.
Commercial popular culture is by nature a materialist space of sensu-
ality, wealth, and material and bodily desires, with all the images and styles
reproduced and circulated for consumption by the populace and for creat-
ing the desires for such consumption. It produces both a commodity and a
representation of commodified desires (desires for commodity) in capital-
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ist society. In China today commercial popular culture and consumerism
are condoned by the CCP as part of the “construction of spiritual civiliza-
tion”—an awkward expression for cultural and ideological production.
Because consumerism is in keeping with the goal of “moderate affluence,”
the ISAs have restrained harsh criticism of its negative consequences—
prevalent moral degeneration, hedonism, and egotism in society. Insofar as
commercial popular culture boosts the thriving cultural markets and deliv-
ers “moderate affluence” through flashy and sexy images, it constitutes a
dynamic aspect of social life that is conducive to ideological legitimation.
And there is no lack of “Chinese characteristics” in the popular culture
scene. Aside from thousands of years of ancient history rich in mythologies,
legends, cultural relics, and artistic heritage that form the inexhaustible re-
sources for cultural productions, entertainment, and tourist industries,
Mao’s revolutionary tradition of the recent past is quickly tapped by cul-
tural industries in their service. “Revolution” thus becomes commodified
as a symbol of style and originality. Mao fashion, observed Vivienne Tam, a
New York–based fashion designer, may convey a sense “of shared identity,
of innocence and vital experimentation.” Tam, herself a Guangzhou
(Canton) native, now declares Mao as the “style guru” in Newsweek and
unabashedly promotes her own design of Mao T-shirts, showing Mao “in
pigtails and a checkerboard dress” as a “little sign of rebellion.”33
China in the 1990s has become a gigantic stadium where incessant per-
formances, art festivals, exhibitions, fashion shows, art contests, concerts,
and production of CDs (and VCDs, an intermediary product between
videocassette tapes and DVDs that has become hugely popular in China in
recent years) create a spectacle of ceaseless festivity. These events, usually
sponsored jointly by the ISAs and private or overseas entertainment and
show businesses, promote the themes of happiness, prosperity, beauty,
youthfulness, love, and romance to the bulk of its audience—the youth in
China. For the general public, there are also the significant themes of nos-
talgia and national pride.
MTV and karaoke are among the most popular forms of entertain-
ment, and VCDs reproduce all kinds of songs and lyrics available anywhere
and anytime, mostly in pirated copies. Karaoke performances can take
place virtually anywhere—in restaurants, in bars, on streets, in the private
living rooms of individual apartments, in classrooms and student dormito-
ries, and so on. There is a genuine, shared sense of merriment among the
participants. Thus, in both public and private spaces, people find a shared
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outlet for releasing their pressures. The ISAs are quick to instill a modicum
of didacticism into the jolly performances, while they are cautious not to
distract from the prevailing mood of lightheartedness.
CCTV (China Central Television), the monopoly central television
network with eleven channels in China, has a channel dedicated to art per-
formances analogous to those on MTV in the United States. CCTV’s music
video program on 22 July 1997 (an ordinary day without any special
events), for example, first began with a duet by two young singers entitled
“Love You and Remember You.” The lyrics go as follows (in English transla-
tion): “Love you / Remember you / The world is the happiest for our love /
We don’t fear the height of mountains / We don’t fear the wilderness of
earth / Love you / Remember you / We’re the happiest in the world.”34 The
digitized images change in seconds as the lyrics unfold, displaying a bright
modern office where the charming girl in love makes a call to her beloved,
and a handsome, yuppie-like young man dressed in a chic suit is sipping
coffee in his office, while checking a faxed message from his girlfriend on
the other end—”Kiss You Darling” (in English translation), the message
reads. The mini-narrative embedded in the music video presents a “yuppi-
fied” lifestyle in a “postmodern” high-tech environment for romance and
love, making an interesting contrast with the music video that followed it, a
revolutionary song entitled “Oh, Dear Party, Please Accept Our Salute!”
The second music video shows the image of the Communist red banner,
and as the performer, dressed in army uniform, sings in a solemn operatic
voice, the images change from colored happy faces of mothers and their
young babies posing in blooming flower gardens to black-and-white
footage of past documentaries of the Communist revolutions.35
To unfamiliar eyes, these images might create a hilarious montage ef-
fect of “postmodern communism” or “communism in a digital age.” But
for young Chinese viewers the red banner of hammer and hatchet may
mean little more than a cultural icon devoid of any historical depth, and to
the middle-aged audience the documentary footage most likely would in-
voke a nostalgic feeling of their own youth, which was not spent, of course,
in the revolutionary years, but in Mao’s time, when those revolutionary
icons and myths constituted a substantive part of their everyday life. This
nostalgia for postrevolutionary cultural reproductions and symbols, how-
ever, may reinforce a perception of the revolutionary past as merely sym-
bolic and imaginary, rather than as real and factual events, thereby further
severing the historical ties of the revolutionary past with the present. There
is an ostensible complicity between the commercial cultural industry and
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the ISAs in producing those popular cultural icons and images for both
commercial profits and political legitimation, but the consent it draws
from the populace can only be provisional and vulnerable to events and
currents beyond the control of the current regime and ISAs.
The revolutionary icons and myths often serve another crucial func-
tion: to reinforce the nationalist sentiment, or minzu hun (national spirit).
“National spirit” is the strategy to balance the centrifugal forces of individ-
ualism and materialism unleashed by the pursuit of “moderate affluence.”
Furthermore, in the face of a rapidly changing international environment,
it can ward off infiltration of anti-China forces by arousing public resent-
ment against “hegemonism,” while continuing to integrate China into the
capitalist world-system or globalization. It has been effective in forging a
popular sentiment in important events such as the unprecedented natural
disaster of flooding in the summer of 1998, the NATO bombing of the
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo conflict in May 1999, and
the escalating tension between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait in the
summer of 1999 as Taiwan’s Lee Teng-hui declared a “state-to-state rela-
tionship” between Taiwan and the PRC.
Nationalism, however, is always a double-edged sword, and it is an ex-
tremely sensitive and explosive issue in China today, as it is in the world at
large. The post-cold-war world witnessed mounting ethnic and nationalist
tensions and conflicts in the 1990s, which vindicate to some degree Samuel
Huntington’s prediction of “clashes of civilizations” as a general trend in
the world today. Nationalism is a focal point of contention not only in in-
ternational relations but also in domestic, national, and regional affairs,
which can easily expand into international conflicts, as shown by the
NATO interference in the Kosovo crisis in 1999. To discuss nationalism in
China is doubly complex, especially when the context of such discussion is
taken into account. That is, nowadays in the West—and in the United
States in particular—a major theme of China bashing in the U.S. media
and U.S. Congress (and among certain academic China specialists) is the
purported “China threat” and “Chinese nationalism” as the ideological ex-
pression of a new version of the Yellow Peril. The Right, the liberals, and the
Left in the West are all appalled by this “Chinese nationalism” reported by
the Western media in its coverage of current events, including, among oth-
ers, the massive anti-American demonstrations after the NATO bombing
of the Chinese Embassy.
Nationalism involves a multitude of problems. Just to mention the
most compelling ones, there are the history and reality of imperialism and
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China’s past humiliations; nationalism as a liberational and oppositional
force in the “Third World” and in former colonies; nationalism and social-
ist revolutions (particularly the Chinese Revolution, in which Mao success-
fully integrated national liberation with socialist revolution); nationalism
as an “official” discourse of ideological legitimation (which is widely em-
ployed in modern nation-states); and the hegemonic discourse of “anti-
nationalist” nationalism in the guise of globalism or universal human
rights and freedom. Essentially nationalism is a problem of ideology, man-
ifested in languages and discourses of and about it, by those who endorse
and reproduce it and by those who are opposed to it.
Concerning the “Chinese nationalism,” suffice it here to present two
examples as illustrations of the complexity of the issue. One is taken from
an editorial in USA Today on 11 May 1999, a few days after the embassy
bombing and the Chinese student demonstrations in Beijing. The editorial,
entitled “China Stokes Anti-U.S. Fires, Recalling Blunders of the Past,” be-
gins in a sensationalist journalistic style: “Portentously, this century is end-
ing as it began, with crowds of angry young Chinese sacking American
buildings, condemning U.S. influence, calling for Americans’ extermina-
tion and doing so at the prompting of their government.” It ends by arro-
gantly declaring, “If Beijing can’t think clearly about the future before un-
leashing it, Washington will have to think for both sides.”
The second example, written in English and for a primarily American
academic readership, is taken from an article that I wrote in 1997. To quote
my own work here is not altogether unashamed and vain, for I may justify
it by suggesting that I myself am often singled out as an unabashed
“Chinese nationalist” since the publication of Demonization of China, a
book I coauthored in 1996 that gained widespread publicity—or notori-
ety.36 In the article I wrote for a conference at Duke University in 1996
(which also appears, after much revision, as chapter 1 of this book), I de-
scribe nationalism as “an ensemble of discursive practices, functioning
through interaction between historically changing fields of struggle and
‘habitus’ of discrete dispositions, in which ideologies are legitimated and
delegitimated.”37 Drawing on the Foucauldian notion of “discursive prac-
tice,” I try to situate nationalism in complex and changing historical con-
texts. My language is obviously abstract, but I do not think it necessarily
represents a “self-enclosed dogma” that “corrodes one’s sense of reality,”
as Peter Berger charges.38 However, there is indeed a problem of represen-
tation and analysis, as the languages of the USA Today editorial and my
essay may indicate. The editorial displays an unself-conscious sense of self-
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righteousness and prejudice, whereas my academic vocabulary constitutes
an excessive self-reflexivity that may impair effective conveyance of mean-
ing. Given the complexity and urgency of the issue of nationalism, the
dilemma of representation is reinscribed into its discussions and manifes-
tations. Yet self-consciousness is preferable to self-righteousness on the
issue of nationalism, irrespective of what “nationalist standpoint” anchors
one’s perception.
As an ideological discourse of legitimation, “national spirit” and its
ISA promoters have little self-reflexivity regarding its own pitfalls. Without
a perception of nationalism or “national spirit” as an ideological discourse
constituted by specific historical necessity rather than as a “universal
truth,” nationalist discourse can only perpetuate an ideological “national
myth” at the service of power holders. Domestically, such an ideological
myth serves to conceal and even cancel out social injustices and stratifica-
tion, as well as to promote ethnocentrism of the dominant ethnicity at the
expense of multiethnic coexistence and harmony. Internationally, it may
provide an excuse for China bashers to attack “Chinese xenophobia” and
the “China threat.” In the long run, “national spirit” and its ideological
companion, “moderate affluence,” cannot sustain the equilibrium between
unbridled egotistic drives unleashed by the “Getting rich is glorious” tenet
and a collective identity based on facile assertions of a national “ethos” or
“Zeitgeist.”
Beyond Socialism and Capitalism?
The ISAs and commercial popular culture have found a “strategic partner-
ship” in manufacturing and disseminating materialist and nationalist ide-
ology, while Chinese intellectuals, by contrast, are in a state of painful con-
tention and realignment. Intellectuals are in general critics of the state
politics. And recently in China the intellectuals have much more freedom
and space to voice their critique about society and politics, within the stated
and tacit perimeters of censorship: denouncement of the CCP and advo-
cacy of multiparty politics to replace the CCP’s rule cannot be aired pub-
licly for “security reasons.” Beyond that, intellectuals can talk about all
sorts of issues from the rationale of Isaiah Berlin’s notion of “negative free-
dom” to F. A. Hayek’s attacks on “totalitarianism.” The latest intellectual
fashion in China is what is usually perceived as hard-core conservative ide-
ologies in the West—the works of F. A. Hayek, Edmund Burke, and so on,
the mainstream “liberalism” of a Reaganomics or a Thatcherism or the
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likes—whereas the free market economy is perceived as the panacea, and so
forth. This kind of rather conservative politics and economics finds a great
deal of enthusiasm in China’s intellectual elite. There are intellectuals,
mainly in the fields of literature and arts and humanities, who feel deeply
disturbed by the widening gap between rich and poor and by social stratifi-
cation and endemic social injustice and corruption, and they harshly criti-
cize the free-market-cure-all philosophy, hapless individualism, ruthless
pursuit of material wealth, and deterioration of public morality and ethics.
Now these groups of intellectuals are labeled by the other camp as “New
Left” or “populists.”
In the 1980s, debates and controversies were mainly carried out in the
humanities—philosophy, history, and literature—and were focused on
China’s tradition and modernity in highly eclectic ways that mixed meta-
physical reflections on humanism, subjectivity, alienation, and enlighten-
ment with rancorous attacks against political figures and policies. The de-
bates were feverish and filled with rhetorical hyperbole, earning rightly the
name “Culture Fever.” The fever was suppressed momentarily in the after-
math of the Tiananmen Incident of 1989, but the silence did not last long.
Since 1993 the debates about the “humanist spirit,” “national learning,”
and postmodernism and postcolonialism surfaced again among academics
in the humanities and among writers and critics in literary and artistic cir-
cles. However, in the second half of the 1990s a significant shift occurred.
The “hard-core” social sciences entered the stage and soon the discussions
of economists, political scientists, and sociologists dominated the scene.
But a noticeable interpenetration or hybridization of disciplines and fields
occurred. Many humanists, that is, literary scholars and critics, now move
into the sociological and political-economic realms, engaging in the de-
bates about China’s economy and social and political reform. Meanwhile,
many economists and social scientists focus on the issues of ethics, moral-
ity, and social justice as the key to China’s economic problems.
The shift of discursive realms or a certain reterritorialization of intel-
lectuals from humanities to social sciences may indicate a change of mode
from abstract and ideological reflections to much more pragmatic and con-
crete social analysis, for the intellectuals are now faced with the compelling
socioeconomic situations of high unemployment, widening disparities be-
tween rich and poor, a slowdown of economic growth, endemic corrup-
tion, and a pervasive consumerism and nihilism in cultural and ideological
spheres. This shift may also imply a deep epistemological and ideological
crisis that surfaces in the discourses of the official lines or the ISAs, the dis-
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courses of the popular culture and public sentiments, and the discourses of
the intellectual elite.
Chinese intellectuals enjoyed the limelight on the political stage in
much of the twentieth century, from the May Fourth movement (1919)
that marked the modern enlightenment to the Culture Fever of the 1980s.
The social transformation of the last two decades has fundamentally
changed the structural relationship of intellectuals in Chinese society. In
the 1990s, Chinese intellectuals have by and large lost their status as “social
conscience” and become marginalized in both economic and political
terms. Unlike the debates during the Culture Fever of the 1980s, the intel-
lectual debates now are primarily confined to academic circles, and their
impact on the public has significantly diminished. In other words, both the
ISAs and popular culture now pay scant attention to the heated academic
debates among neoliberals, new leftists, and conservatives and traditional-
ists (such as neo-Confucianists). Some intellectuals seem to prefer more
“professional” and specialized academic discourse to popularization, espe-
cially among the New Left and the Chinese postmodernists, who show little
interest in popularizing their ideas and prefer often esoteric academic jar-
gon (thus it is a misnomer to label them “populists.”)
Yet there are those who take pains to reach beyond academic enclaves
to popularize their views, particularly in economics and social thought. In
these areas, some best-sellers are produced by journalists and academics-
turned-journalists. In economics, the most heated debates now focus on
the issue of equality versus efficiency. One 1998 best-seller, Pitfalls of
Modernization, deals precisely with China’s economic woes. Written by He
Qinglian, a newspaper editor trained as an economist, the book drew wide-
spread attention both in China and abroad for its sharp critique of social
injustice and economic inequality in China. First published in Hong Kong
as China’s Pitfall, it then appeared in a series entitled China’s Problems
under the auspices of Liu Ji, then an adviser to Jiang Zemin. Inevitably, the
book was endorsed by the ISAs, even though the issues raised by the
middle-aged female editor are politically quite sensitive. Soon the New York
Review of Books ran a lengthy review article coauthored by Liu Binyan, a
well-known Chinese political dissident in exile, and Perry Link, a China
specialist at Princeton University who became a media celebrity as a promi-
nent China basher after the 1989 Tiananmen Incident. The review article
hailed He Qinglian’s book as “the first systematic study of the social conse-
quences of China’s economic boom.”39 Thanks to the review, He became
instantly famous internationally as a new outspoken critic of the wrongs of
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Deng’s politics. “The extraordinary response [the large quantity of sales of
the book],” Liu and Link stated, “comes from the author’s untiring demon-
stration of a repressed truth: that the strategy of Deng’s years—fast eco-
nomic change and political change—was a huge and terrible mistake. The
symptoms of the mistake surface in the economy, but the root problem is
political.”40
The review by Liu and Link accurately summarizes the book’s argu-
ments. The book is an astoundingly candid exposure of the economic and
social injustices and corruption during the process of economic reform, a
process the author describes as a massive “plunder” by bureaucrats of pub-
lic and state property and capital accumulated during decades of planned
economy. The author’s description of the “marketization of power” is a
devastating indictment against the Chinese “free market” economic strate-
gies. The diagnosis of China’s economic ills, however, can be interpreted in
different ways, and the therapies and prescriptions are accordingly subject
to widely differing frameworks of treatment. Stopping short of publicly de-
nouncing the political structure of the PRC (which is the stated objective of
anticommunist political dissidents like Liu and anti-China crusaders like
Link), He Qinglian nevertheless offers a moral and ethical prescription,
drawing on “the great economics master of liberalism, F. A. Hayek, who
was filled with humanistic spirits.”41
Instead of probing into the historical causes and roots of capitalism
and its developments in China specifically and into the process of global
modernity in general, Pitfalls of Modernization surprisingly does not really
target “pitfalls of modernization,” as the title of the PRC edition suggests,
but instead charges that “the pitfall” (in singular form) truly lies in China
only (as the title of the Hong Kong edition, Pitfalls of China, suggests), in
the nation’s lack of humanism and liberalism as its bedrock of modernity.
The condemnation of the alleged lack of true liberalism and humanism in
China and the simultaneous valorization of universal humanism and liber-
alism have become the hallmark of Chinese neoliberalism, as the author of
Pitfalls of Modernization reveals. Zhu Xueqin, a fierce advocate of neoliber-
alism, lashed at the May Fourth legacy of enlightenment upon its fiftieth
anniversary, accusing the May Fourth intellectuals of falling prey to “two
causes of mental sickness,” namely, populism and nationalism. Zhu’s accu-
sation lies mainly in the inability of the May Fourth intellectuals to “defend
the space of free-market economy and constitutional democracy” and their
“radical, revolutionary stances to uproot ‘evil Western capitalism.’ ”42
Zhu’s ideological diatribes against “radical revolutionaries” are nothing
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new. What is interesting is the ways by which the Zhus and the Hes, or the
neoliberals, are trying to resurrect the anticommunist rhetoric of F. A.
Hayek and other “great masters of liberalism” in analyzing and criticizing
China’s social problems and in creating an ideological discourse for capital-
ist economic, political, and social order in China.
In the realms of politics, law, and sociology, neoliberals never broach
the issue of unbridled capitalist exploitation and pervasive consumerist and
materialist mentality, or the coalition between the bureaucracy and multi-
national and domestic capitalism, in their analyses of China’s widening
economic gaps and social injustices. Instead, socialist ideals of equality and
justice and the political system of the CCP are blamed for the corruption
and unlawful, personal, and dictatorial rules of the officials. Liu Junning,
another staunch crusader of Western-style free market economy and par-
liamentary democracy, declares that only “a limited, democratically elected
government” can guarantee “the inevitable, irreversible trend toward free-
market economy.”43 He asserts that “free-market economy is the economic
system that best suits human nature”;44 that “the most effective way to
achieve prosperity for the nation is the protection of private properties”;
and that “economic freedom is the guarantee of freedom of all kinds.”45 In
a manifesto-like style, Liu Junning announces that “the key to whether the
market economy can be established in China lies in the realization of a so-
ciety of free election, a free social order based on consensus of free individ-
uals, and an era of limited government.”46 This is not the election cam-
paign rhetoric of a Pat Buchanan; this is a scholarly treatise written by a
research fellow at the Institute of Political Sciences, Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences (CASS)—one of China’s most authoritative ISAs.
The irony, however, lies not so much in what the Chinese neoliberals
can say within the limits of state censorship about the limited government,
as in the ambivalence of the ISAs and their higher authorities—namely, the
CCP Central Committee’s Propaganda Department—concerning the ne-
oliberalist assertions and manifestations that advocate a thorough embrace
of capitalism in China. Insofar as the neoliberals refrain from publicly call-
ing for the CCP and its regime to give up its power by free, multiparty elec-
tions, their voices are not only tolerated but often promoted by the ISAs—
unless, of course, the sensitive line of political status quo and power
symmetry is likely to be crossed if the ideologues of neoliberalism press the
issues too hard and too straightforwardly. Ma Licheng and Ling Zhijun,
two journalists from the People’s Daily, the CCP’s mouthpiece, produced a
best-seller entitled Jiaofeng (The battles) in 1997 to delineate the ideologi-
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cal battles since the reform and opening up two decades ago. The book de-
scribes three decisive battles of the “emancipation of minds”: the 1978 con-
tention between Deng and Mao’s handpicked successor Hua Guofeng over
the issue of whether to continue Mao’s ideological class struggle or to aban-
don it; the 1992 Southern Tour in which Deng silenced the ideological de-
bates about socialism versus capitalism; and the 1997 controversy over pub-
lic or private ownership, in which Deng’s successor, Jiang Zemin, opted for
the latter as the direction for furthering China’s reform. Like Pitfalls of
Modernization, Ma and Ling’s book enjoyed instant success. A year later,
the same two authors produced yet another nonfiction best-seller, Huhan
(Outcry). In this book, they summarize “five main voices in China today”
as “the voice of the mainstream” (ISAs), “the voice of dogmatism” (the left-
ist old guard), “the voice of nationalism,” “the voice of feudalism,” and
“the voice of democracy.”47 The book glorifies the neoliberalist ideological
outcries for free market and free election as China’s only future, adroitly
quoting Jiang Zemin’s political report at the CCP’s Fifteenth Congress in
support of the neoliberal assertions. However, this was going a bit too far,
and a reportedly nervous Jiang Zemin called for a “halt to sensationalism in
media,” referring to the publication of Outcry.48
Western watchers of China always view such fluctuations between tol-
erance and censorship of ideological discussion as signs of internal strife
between the liberal and conservative factions, but such an explanation
helps little in understanding how deeply the CCP has been entrenched in
the ideological dilemma. The neoliberals offer an ideological option for le-
gitimating the process of marketization and China’s integration into global
capitalism, self-consciously representing the interests of a newly formed
power elite—the bureaucrats-turned-capitalists. But to allow the neoliber-
als to become a dominant voice threatens to collapse “socialism” as an ide-
ological icon, ultimately undermining the legitimacy of the CCP. The rela-
tionship between the ISAs and the neoliberals is by necessity an ambivalent
one, and if there is any complicity, it is much more complex and subtle
than that between the ISAs and commercial popular culture.
It should be noted here that Chinese neoliberals seem to have em-
barked on a self-imposed mission of negative critique of the New Left, the
nationalists, and the radicals. A cursory survey of the writings of a few
major neoliberals—such as Zhu Xueqin, Liu Junning, Xu Youyu—reveals
that their writings are almost all polemics against the Chinese New Left,
nationalists, postmodernists and postcolonialists, and radicals, who are
often labeled as such by neoliberal critics to begin with. In the Chinese in-
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tellectual scene from the mid- to late 1990s, a series of debates occurred in
which neoliberals took the center stage with a strong sense of self-righ-
teousness and high moralism. The 2000 book series Qianyan wenhua lun-
zheng beiwanglu (Notes on debates at cultural forefronts) is a collection of
articles published in the 1990s under the heading of the radical versus con-
servative debate, the debate over nationalism, and the neoliberal versus
New Left debate.49 Compared with another collection of polemical essays
published in Hong Kong, Jiushin niandai de “houxue” lunzheng (Debates
over “postism” in the 1990s)—which includes an equal distribution of es-
says by authors both for and against postmodernism as a key issue in
Chinese culture50—the Notes on Debates series ostensibly highlights the
positions of the neoliberals as though they are the most significant intel-
lectual voices in China today. Of course that is largely the editor’s own
opinion, which nonetheless is echoed by a considerable number of college
faculties of social sciences and humanities departments, editors and jour-
nalists in popular media, and freelance writers. It is fair to say that, despite
the obscurity and inaccessibility of their discourses, the Chinese neoliber-
als have in recent years gradually built up their intellectual and social basis
by appealing especially to the rising capitalist entrepreneurs and urban
middle class, who desperately need cultural and ideological identification
and self-legitimation.
The New Left, by contrast, remains as fragmented and marginalized as
it ever has been, even though the neoliberals always accuse the New Left of
complicity with the dominant political power.51 It will be wise here to de-
fend or even describe the vastly varied positions of those lumped together
under the name of “New Left,” for under the current circumstances gener-
ally adverse to socialist and leftist movements across the world, searches for
new identities and ideological realignments by the Left should begin before
any self-defense or self-denial can be made. Yet it does not follow that the
critical analysis of social ills from leftist, socialist, and Marxist perspectives
is futile and unnecessary. In this respect, the works of certain Chinese aca-
demics, including some overseas scholars, promise to break the ideological
impasse by self-critically interrogating the historical and political assump-
tions underlying the universalizing assertions of the ISAs and the neo-
liberals.
Some relentlessly question the Eurocentric assumptions and the his-
torical formations of the universalizing ideologies of liberalism and neolib-
eralist assertions, as well as those of the New Left in the West. In the mean-
time, they try to find ways for attaining structural transformations in
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China in political, economic, and ideological realms without falling victim
to the false issues of “Western theory” and “Chinese practice” that have
obliterated investigations of problems of modernity affecting the whole
world. Cui Zhiyuan, a Chinese native and an MIT political scientist, for ex-
ample, discusses the question of how to transcend both Eurocentrism and
cultural relativism in non-European, Third World countries, while contin-
uing to search for structural and systematic reinvention by drawing on ex-
periences across temporal and spatial specificities.52 Another example is
Huang Ping, a Chinese sociologist at CASS, who has recently reflected on
Anthony Giddens’ ideas about the “Third Way” as an alternative for going
beyond socialism and capitalism and about globalization, modernity, and
so forth. Huang’s rethinking of Giddens’ ideas painstakingly grapples with
the epistemological and methodological questions involved. He finds faults
not simply with the Eurocentric prejudices deeply embedded in Giddens’
views but also the fundamental question of the social impact of the knowl-
edge of social sciences on social change, which Giddens acknowledges on
some occasions and bypasses on others, particularly on the question of his
Third Way as a policy that he advises be applied to Tony Blair’s politics.
Huang points out that the academic discourse on “civil society” in the for-
merly socialist eastern European countries is indissolubly linked to both
the more immediate context of the collapse of socialism and the socialist
past. To erase the past experience of the Western model of “civil society,”
according to Huang, merely reflects “the most important socio-political
and psychological conditions in which neo-liberalism bloomed and be-
came predominant,” but the post-cold-war reality in eastern European
countries and in the world at large hardly vindicates the “universal triumph
of free-market liberalism.”53 Huang’s critique of the conceptual frame-
works governing “civil society,” the “free market,” and assumptions of so-
cial sciences in general points to an important area of exploration for the
Left across the world—that is, the epistemological formation of modern
social sciences beyond the dichotomies of socialism and capitalism, and
Eurocentrism and anti-Eurocentrism. As Immanuel Wallerstein puts it,
there is an intrinsically Eurocentric logic and “ideological argument” in as-
serting that “modernity (or capitalism) is miraculous and wonderful.”54
Debates about socialism and capitalism in China cannot eclipse these issues
of knowledge and epistemology, and the self-reflexivity of postmodernism
in this regard cannot be dismissed.
A historical and dialectical perspective must always be taken in the
analysis and critique of China’s cultural scene today; for without this his-
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torical dialectic, the complex twists and turns of China’s revolutionary
legacy, the popular sentiments, dilemmas, and paradoxes of the official dis-
courses and intellectual debates, and so on will not only become incompre-
hensible but will also result in some conceptual flip-flops that verge on
schizophrenia. Although analysis of the postmodern condition of schizo-
phrenia in the capitalist West, elucidated by Gilles Deleuze and Felix
Guattari, may shed some light on the social consciousness of China now,55
it should be noted that critics of contemporary China cannot justify a
schizophrenic state of mind by invoking the high theories of postmod-
ernism or psychoanalysis. Analysis of China ought to be solidly based on
specific, historical circumstances and contexts. Given that the revolution-
ary legacy is deeply ingrained in China’s social consciousness and is still
being tapped by the official discourses and by popular culture for different
purposes, and given that Chinese culture and society have irreversibly
abandoned the socialist alternative and embraced global capitalism, a
somber and rational critique is needed to unravel the profound cultural
contradictions and tensions in China today. If socialism can be rejuvenated
in China, it should indeed begin with a rigorous self-critique that interro-
gates the ideological positions and assertions of the ideological state appa-
ratuses, the commercial popular culture, and the intellectual elite.
Popular culture is perhaps the best place to test the assertion that “(cap-italist) globalization is now an accepted reality,” as the world space ofcultural production and representation is now mostly inhabited by
images and goods pertaining to the everyday life of the world population, im-
ages and goods that are manufactured by multinational corporations and cir-
culated in a global market. China, the emergent economic giant of the 1990s,
has caught on to the latest global cultural production and market trend at an
astonishing pace. For example, “Get online!” is the most kitsch slogan among
the mushrooming numbers of Internet whiz kids amid the millions of
China’s youth. Such a rapid move defies the imagination not only of Western
analysts but also of die-hard native ideologues of Western-style moderniza-
tion and liberal democracy, who were exiled overseas in the aftermath of the
1989 Tiananmen event and whose goals were purportedly nothing less than a
prosperous, market-oriented economy and social plurality. But journalists,
the proper “postmodern culture workers,” on the other hand, have no time
to ponder over the probability of China’s transformation. The following two
excerpts, taken from both Western and Chinese media, may illustrate the ex-
tent to which China is now “assimilated into” the global popular culture
market, as well as China’s native and local peculiarities and legacies.
The first excerpt is from a Reuters news report on 14 December 1996,
entitled “Wind of Christmas Sweeping Shanghai: Money Oriented”:
Holiday commercial promotions in Shanghai department stores started ear-
lier than ever this year, expecting a major kick-off with Christmas shopping
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season. The stores, especially joint-venture ones, are working hard to promote
the idea of Christmas as a gift-sharing holiday among young people in their
20s. Christmas decorations, trees, and cards can be seen everywhere in the
stores. Some stores give out a ten per cent gift certificate for every 500 yuan
spent in the store, to encourage spending. One young salesman told the re-
porter that he planned to spend 500 yuan on Christmas gifts and cards for
friends. According to him, “we young people in Shanghai like to copy Western
habits.” The traditional holiday shopping season in China is during January
and February before the Chinese New Year, which is still the case to most old
people in Shanghai. Some stores reported a drastic rise in sales, ranging from
50–100% in December as compared with sales volume in November, with
Christmas as the contributing factor. However, as one salesman said, “There is
no religious feeling. It is just commercial.”1
Except for the reference to the Chinese New Year, which adds a local
flavor, the news report echoes almost verbatim what U.S. News and World
Report says of the 1996 Christmas in America. “Imagine a purer, less com-
mercial, more spiritual Christmas,” we are told, “but don’t call it history.”
Such a Christmas is “more a product of our cultural imagination than of
historical fact.”2 Although many Americans now complain that Christmas
has become too commercial (about 48 percent polled by U.S. News and
World Report said that gift giving detracts from the religious celebration),
the holiday is still in essence “a grand festival of consumption.”3
Amid the commercial blitz raging across China, there is not a much
different story to tell, but the ways in which stories are told vary consider-
ably. Our second text is taken from a Chinese reportage, a nonfiction genre
popular in China since the 1930s that is known for its poignant exposure of
social ills and its penchant for inciting political sentiments. The text,
“ ‘Armchairs’ of the Summer Palace,” tells the story of the construction of
Nan Daihe, a new beach resort in the 1990s. The location is next to Bei
Daihe, a well-known beach resort near Beijing that has served as the virtual
summer palace for China’s top political leaders since Mao’s days, a place
where many historically significant meetings that changed China’s course
were held. The new beach can now capitalize on the political fame of its
neighbor in a rush to get on the bandwagon of the “third industry,” mean-
ing services, sales, entertainment, and tourism. For the authors of the re-
port, and perhaps for the builders of the new beach as well, the construc-
tion of the tourist resort is as much a noble political task as a great
commercial adventure, and hence we are led to see the scene as imbued
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with a passion and zeal matched only by the “revolutionary wars” of Mao’s
era, in which military metaphors dominated Chinese discourse and cul-
tural imaginary on every subject, from reaping crops in rice paddies to giv-
ing birth to babies in delivery rooms:
The Fu’ning County Party Committee assigned Vice Party Secretary Hou, Vice
County Governor Chen, and Director of the County Tourism Bureau Nie to be
in charge of the construction project. Because of the authority and popularity
of Secretary Hou throughout the county, he coordinated efforts and ironed out
troubles, making way for the smooth daily progress of the construction. Thus
a collectivity of passionate fighting spirit was formed. Confronting all kinds of
interferences, they resolutely fought on, day and night, at the construction site.
Yes, it’s a battle; the determination and will, the pathos, the rhythm and tempo,
and the dedication and adventurousness—all that was nothing but the fiercest
fighting on the battleground.4
The above two texts are news reports about real events, and yet their
discourse has a certain quality of unreality, a sense of displacement or dis-
juncture, caused not so much by the events reported as by the reporting
discourse itself. Reading the first report, one has the feeling that Shanghai
on Christmas Eve in 1996 was no different from New York City, ablaze with
the same desires and anxieties as a shopping spree. In its decontextualized
composition, the postmodern “leveling off” of differences has no small ef-
fect. The second text, in its overall seriousness, cannot be construed as a
parody-travesty of the bygone revolutionary discourse but must be grasped
instead as something radically other than itself: the collective “fighting
spirit” of Mao’s era is now transposed into an altogether unfamiliar locus
whereby global capital celebrates its success hand in hand with
revolutionary-soldiers-turned-managers.
If you call it “postmodern,” you probably will not miss the mark by
much. It seems certain that in China’s popular culture arena the infiltration
of “global cultural production” (read: Western capitalist commercial cul-
ture) is accelerated by historical reappropriations and displacements of
older structures in the service of qualitatively very different situations.
However, the hybridity of those reappropriated, displaced, and heteroge-
neous segments that constitutes the popular culture scene in China raises
serious questions about the critical concepts and interpretive strategies
available to us now. In this chapter, I intend to address the correlations and
contradictions in the practices and theories of commercial popular culture
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and revolutionary culture of the masses. I begin by underscoring the politi-
cal nature of popular culture and its interpretation. This is not simply to
“state the obvious” once again; I want to argue that the very meaning of
politics has undergone significant metamorphoses in this case. It is the
practical and theoretical legacy of the qunzhong wenyi (culture of the
masses) that needs be reexamined as the radical other of China’s popular
culture itself. Qunzhong wenyi, a legacy from the revolutionary past and an
essential component of the revolutionary hegemony, cannot be dismissed
as merely residual and irrelevant today. Its aesthetic forms and structures
are deeply ingrained in the Chinese cultural imaginary, constituting a sig-
nificant dimension in the contradiction-ridden cultural arena. To under-
stand this vibrant legacy in today’s China, one may view it against a com-
plex set of historical practices and conceptual codes that address issues of
both revolution and culture. I refer specifically to two critical models—
namely, the Frankfurt School’s theory of mass culture and Gramsci’s con-
cept of hegemony. Furthermore, as the world-system of capitalism or glob-
alization has inevitably shaped the reality of the world, at least in the
popular culture domain, postmodernity as a style of culture seems to have
a universal appeal. Yet to describe China’s culture as postmodern tells only
a half-truth, for the radical other of the postmodern global imaginary—
namely, the local—cannot be left unacknowledged. The “local,” as opposed
to the global in the present context, may first refer to the geopolitical and
cultural specificities of China, but it then may have to narrow down to the
more specific, more concrete social practices of particular locations and
temporalities within China. Ultimately, the global “postmodern” rubrics
must return to the most fundamental question of the everyday. The every-
day is not only both global and local (in the sense that it must encompass
different temporalities, subjectivities, spaces, and public spheres); it may
also serve as a site that unravels and critiques the contradictions and falla-
cies of the age. The following account of contradictions in China’s popular
cultural domain is by no means comprehensive; it only suggests the com-
plexities of the overall contradictions of China’s modernization process in
recent decades.
Politics of Popular Culture in China Today
There are at least three contexts for talking about politics in the present
context: first, the classical perspective of political economy; second, the po-
litical and ideological struggles in the cultural arena as integral to Chinese
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tradition; and third, a new configuration to be worked out, a “postpolitics”
of some sort, that may address China’s changing political functions and
structures. Politics in the first two senses, however, is not at all straightfor-
ward. In an article entitled “China’s Challenge to the United States and to
the Earth,” Lester Brown and Christopher Flavin assert that “as [China’s]
population of 1.2 billion people moves into modern houses, buys cars, re-
frigerators and televisions, and shifts to a meat-based diet, the entire world
will feel the effects.”5 The rapid marketization of economy, bolstered by
enormous absorption of foreign investment and linking with the capitalist
world-system (or, in the Chinese idiom yu guoji jiegui, “joining the interna-
tional track”), has significantly transformed China’s social life. Its effect can
be felt most visibly at the level of everyday life, for Western consumer cul-
ture, or popular culture, has now found its largest marketplace in the
world’s most populous country.
The effect of marketization on China’s politics cannot be underesti-
mated, especially at the grassroots level of everyday life. However, China’s
politics, as portrayed by mainstream Western media in the headline news,
has always assumed the familiar scenario of age-old ideological and politi-
cal dissent and suppression. Such cold war horror stories of communist
persecution and violations of human rights are validated and substantiated
by academic China specialists and native informants/dissidents and are
then circulated and finally regurgitated at the negotiation table between the
officials from the U.S. State Department or the U.S. Department of
Commerce and their Chinese counterparts, where the value of using the
tales as bargaining chips for issues such as “(de)linking trade with China
and human rights issues” is fully realized. It becomes clear that those tales
of China’s political repression and terror have more to do with the political,
ideological, and commercial objectives of the Western media (with their
national interests lurking behind them) than with what really happens in
China today. Yet, notwithstanding the very real political repression and
human rights violations that occur in China daily and that affect its cul-
tural arena and intellectuals, politics now assumes a different function and
meaning, which China studies and the media in the West fail to compre-
hend.
A different model is needed to analyze the political mechanisms of ma-
nipulation, negotiation, diversion, and reconciliation. Chinese society is
now replete with tensions and contradictions as a result of its moderniza-
tion and marketization programs. It is well known that “socialism with
Chinese characteristics” designates China’s peculiar situation of the coexis-
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tence of incommensurable forces, between a market-oriented economy
and a bureaucracy founded on the past command economy and Maoist
ideology. The policy of the post-Mao leadership, headed by Deng Xiaoping,
was simply to ban any public debate about issues of political ideology and
revolutionary legacy. But silence can hardly dispel the specters of the past,
which are still very much alive, insofar as the bureaucratic institutions, or
ideological state apparatuses, still hold their power. Consequently, post-
Mao Chinese leadership has been entrenched in ideological crises ever
since it launched “reform and opening up” campaigns.6
In the mid-1990s, however, with the political transition from the post-
Mao to the post-Deng era well under way, the “third-generation” post-
Deng leaders, headed by Jiang Zemin, have gradually shifted their strate-
gies in the ideological and cultural arena. By allowing and encouraging
China’s indigenous popular culture products—such as state-sponsored
MTV and karaoke concerts, television soap operas, and kung fu fiction—to
prosper and compete with Western commercial popular culture, the gov-
ernment has effectively ameliorated tensions and conflicts between an in-
creasing mass demand and ideological control. The other powerful strategy
is to invoke nationalism. This is achieved either by a revival of Confucian
values and ethics, which are said to be beneficial to an East Asian model of
modernization, or through a renewed call for “patriotism,” when the
Western powers, alarmed by China’s rapid economic growth and its in-
creased assertiveness in international affairs, began to clamor for a new
containment strategy in the face of the “Chinese threat.” Although in offi-
cial announcements and at official ceremonies, such as the “CCP Central
Committee’s Resolution on Strengthening the Construction of Socialist
Spiritual Civilization” or the celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of the
Long March, ideological slogans about Marxism and socialism still
appear,7 the political agenda in cultural spheres has shifted its priority de-
cidedly from idealistic propaganda to pragmatic objectives of maintaining
“order and stability,” that is, the status quo. With the death of Deng
Xiaoping, the early days of his rule, during which the ideological state ap-
paratuses still held the political spotlight with the power of sanctifying all
the pragmatic measures of reform in economic quarters, have quickly be-
come a memory of the past.
A kind of “postpolitics,” with its ideological and idealistic core virtu-
ally discarded, is in order now. Chen Xiaoming, a Chinese postmodern
critic, defines the “postpolitics” in contemporary Chinese film as a condi-
tion where “everything is political, and nothing is political at one and the
The Rise of Commercial Popular Culture 83
same time; politics is everywhere and yet it subverts itself at any moment.”8
It is not a coincidence that Jiang Zemin, the CCP general secretary, when
addressing the Fifth/Sixth National Congress of Writers and Artists, made a
comment on politics that is remarkably similar to Chen Xiaoming’s:
“Although we no longer hold that arts is subjected to politics, . . . as
Comrade Deng Xiaoping says, ‘We of course do not mean to say that poli-
tics and arts are separable. Arts and literature cannot be separated from
politics.’ Politics exists in concrete social life and in the minds and feelings
of our culture-workers.”9
The similarity lies primarily in the ambiguity and slippage of the con-
cept of “politics” itself. Chen Xiaoming sees “postpolitics” as a “symbolic
act” of largely subversive parody-travesty of the old revolutionary dis-
course, by ambiguously displacing political and aesthetic images. Jiang
Zemin, on the other hand, while acknowledging the wisdom of relinquish-
ing the political subjugation and policing of all cultural activities, is less
ambiguous about the function of cultural politics under the current condi-
tions of “the Western economic and technological pressures and ideologi-
cal penetrations.”10 But in fact Jiang worries little about bourgeois liberal-
ism and humanism, which were widely espoused by intellectuals in the
1980s. Western-style liberal humanism, being an old foe of the “anti–spiri-
tual pollution” campaigns of 1983 and again in the immediate aftermath of
the 1989 Tiananmen events, has now largely lost its political relevance as an
oppositional rallying cry. The rise of commercial popular culture and the
government’s decree banning political and ideological discussions have
doubly undermined the status and credibility of the intellectual elite who
self-consciously served as China’s “social conscience” and as representa-
tives of political reform in the heyday of the 1980s “Great Culture Debates.”
Of course, consumerism itself is discreetly tolerated, if not publicly encour-
aged, by the authorities to distract the public from political debates. In the
1990s it was no longer a curious phenomenon that the “oppositional” in-
tellectual elite joined hands with the government in denouncing the “vul-
garization” of culture and “pollution and corruption of the young mind” in
popular culture products. In the meantime, the “liberal” elite and the gov-
ernment are courting, in their different ways, multinational capitalism’s
“high” values of global cultural imaginary, either new Confucianism or
new versions of liberal humanism.11
Popular culture has now become a new battleground, bombarded by
heavy artillery. But the battles are fought largely as “symbolic acts” or “in
the minds and feelings,” seeking maximum theatrical effects. Wang Shuo,
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arguably the most popular writer of fiction, film, and television soap operas
in China today, has staged commercial and political controversies about his
works and about himself both inside and outside of China. “The mocking
tone and racy themes of ‘hooligan literature’ author Wang Shuo have
pushed the censor’s limits and made him hugely popular,” an Associated
Press reporter wrote after the 1996 controversy concerning Wang’s eco-
nomic dealings and new television play scripts.12 The Chinese liberal elite,
invoking either the Frankfurt School notion of reification or Confucian
moral didacticism, deplore Wang Shuo’s lack of idealism and of ethics, too.
The only writers and critics who show signs of sympathy toward Wang
Shuo and the popular culture trends in general are labeled as “amoral op-
portunists.” Some such critics, including Zhang Yiwu and Chen Xiaoming,
have alluded to postmodern and postcolonial theories in their writings and
are therefore sharply rebuffed, together with the imported theories of post-
modernism, by the guardians of high cultural values and idealism.13 Yet,
however intensely dramatic, the politics in China’s popular culture arena
does seem to bear certain postmodern features of “decenteredness” and
“indeterminacy,” as various political and ideological forces and persuasions
engage in a multidirectional “war of positions” with no ultimate authorities
or repercussions (the fact that Wang Shuo’s fame has increased as a result
of his “offense” to the government attests to the altered rules of the political
game). “It all boils down to power struggles,” declared one Chinese critic,
“a power struggle for obtaining symbolic capital.”14 In other words, the de-
bates and controversies are now translated into naked “fights for the own-
ership of discourse” (in Chinese, zhengduo huayu quan) in the cultural and
intellectual market. “Postpolitics” in the present context, according to
Chinese critics, is a power struggle without revolutionary ideology as the
central locus. It resembles a politics in the Foucauldian sense of multiple
and plural technologies of domination and control that exist in advanced
capitalist societies.
But it would be a gross overstatement to say that China has now fully
merged within the world-system and thus its cultural arena has become
predominantly “postmodern.” What is left out in such sweepingly global
and globalizing statements is nothing less than China’s own traditions and
legacies. In popular culture domains, the revolutionary practice and theory
of the “culture of the masses” have by no means disappeared. This indige-
nous tradition was the “cultural dominant” for nearly half a century, to
borrow Raymond Williams’ distinction of cultural layers. It is still alive and
vivacious in terms of its forms, structures, and functions, let alone its insti-
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tutions, which remain largely in place. It is true that, on the one hand, the
ideological core of revolution has ineluctably lost its grip on the Chinese
population and become inexorably “residual.”15 But on the other hand,
revolutionary hegemony, deeply embedded in the Chinese political uncon-
scious, still plays a significant role in the overdetermined structural rela-
tionships, particularly at discursive and symbolic levels, by which the pros
and cons of the revolutionary tradition have wrestled to articulate their po-
sitions vis-à-vis the revolutionary hegemony. Yet the crucial question re-
mains: how can these complex layers and modes of cultural productions
and reproductions, filled with tensions and contradictions, be interpreted?
Culture of the Masses: Revolutionary Legacy and Its New Forms
In China today, hardly anyone, except perhaps a few literary historians, is
interested in the “culture of the masses.” Such an interest is politically in-
correct: smacking of Maoist radicalism, an invocation of qunzhong wenyi
(culture of the masses) looks suspiciously like recalling (if not exorcising)
the specters of the Cultural Revolution. But the “masses,” or China’s vast
populace, have simply ignored the academic high fashion of political cor-
rectness, by creatively embracing and transforming the revolutionary tradi-
tion and its national and nativist forms and structures. Here I am not only
referring to the popularity of Mao as a new folk icon in today’s popular
myths and superstitions among Chinese rural populations (and middle-
aged or older lower-class urban residents). Insofar as popular culture is
predominantly an urban and youth cultural phenomenon, it is more in-
structive to see the creativity and imagination that emanate from the old
collective forms and structures in the contemporary popular culture scene.
It should be noted, however, that class and generational differences are
an important factor here. To focus exclusively on urban youth–oriented,
highly commercialized popular cultural production, despite its domina-
tion in China’s popular culture arena, misses the vastly diverse and differ-
entiated cultural markets and audiences of China. The kinds of collective
forms and practices still alive today in everyday life and popular culture can
largely be found in the middle-aged and elderly population born at least in
the 1960s and earlier, and particularly in the urban low-income “blue-
collar” working class and the vast majority of peasants. Given that the peas-
ants and the urban working class constitute about 80 percent of China’s
population, any research on Chinese popular culture must pay close atten-
tion to the interests and activities of these social classes. Studies of televi-
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sion as the most influential form of popular media and popular culture in
China, for instance, use the data of the working class and peasant audience
ratings and viewing patterns as the main indexes of television production
and market trends.16
Karaoke and dance parties, for example, are the two main imported
modern forms of popular entertainment, the former being imported from
Japan, and the latter from Europe—western Europe as well as Soviet
Russia—to Shanghai in the 1920s and spreading to Yan’an in the 1940s.
Karaoke, or a “sing-along” in public, is a collective form of entertainment
that has become widespread in China. Its collectivity has quickly assumed a
social function of crisscrossing the boundaries of “official (guanfang)/unof-
ficial (minjian)” and “public/private.” Not only teenagers, young lovers,
and business partners entertain themselves at karaoke bars in a private
fashion. It is customary nowadays for local Communist Party committees
(which are still the most important power brokers in China’s social organi-
zations), trade unions, women’s unions, Communist Youth Leagues, and so
on to organize official or semiofficial karaoke contests and concerts as cele-
brations of holidays or special occasions.
Dance is another major activity that merits more analysis than can be
adequately made here. Ballroom dancing originated with the European
aristocracy and became popular in bourgeois salons, in all its elegant styles
and formalities. In today’s China, it has become perhaps the favorite leisure
activity of ordinary citizens and serves various purposes. To the middle-
aged and retired, who usually form the morning groups numbering from
tens to hundreds, dancing at public parks, playgrounds, and other sports
facilities is good exercise, rivaled only by the classical martial arts form of
taijiquan (tai chi). At government-sponsored events such as local and na-
tional holiday ceremonies, school commencements, and the like, a ball-
room dance party following an employees banquet may promote comrade-
ship, good relations, and equality, as well as provide lighthearted exercise
helpful for digestion and fitness. The gratification of sensual pleasure and
romance is thus shared as a communal and collective experience. (The
drastic increase in extramarital affairs, divorce rate, and sex scandals is not
unrelated to dance parties.)
The history of ballroom dance in China is ambiguous. It can be traced
way back to the Yan’an years of revolution in the 1940s. The Communists,
including Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, were avid Soviet-style ballroom
dancers in Yan’an. After the victory of the revolution, they continued this
tradition in the cities and made it popular among the masses, mostly young
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factory workers and college students. The large dance parties organized by
Communist Youth Leagues in the 1950s and early 1960s always emphasized
the collective spirit of the revolutionary years. During the Cultural
Revolution, however, ballroom dances were replaced by massive group
dances displaying loyalty to the Great Leader, while European and Soviet
music that had accompanied the previous dance parties disappeared alto-
gether. These “loyalty dances” then took the form of the Yan’an folk dance
of yangge (rice sprout songs), played by peasants to celebrate the end of
hard labor and the harvest. In addition to revolutionary tradition, there is,
of course, another side of the story of dance parties. In dimly lit European-
style pubs in Shanghai, accompanied by live jazz, well-dressed but now
gray-haired couples, long-retired employees of the Western firms of the
1940s, indulged in the nostalgia of the bygone days of Shanghai’s colonial
glory and decadence. Granted, Shanghai is the “authentic origin” of
China’s Western-style cultural life, and even Yan’an revolutionaries like
Mao himself succumbed to the alluring temptations of this style as embod-
ied by his mistress-turned-wife, Jiang Qing, who was once a third-rate star
of Shanghai’s commercial films of the 1930s. Upon arriving in Yan’an, the
holy land of revolution, Jiang Qing and her like quickly discovered that
Western bourgeois styles and art forms such as ballroom dance could be
readily modified and incorporated into the revolutionary culture in the
name of internationalism, following the Soviet models.
Revolution had transformed Western bourgeois and aristocratic cul-
ture into popular forms, without casting off all its historical ambiguities
and contradictions. These forms were reinvigorated in the 1990s in collec-
tive and public entertainment such as karaoke and dance parties. Although
new experience is generally devoid of any revolutionary spirit and is largely
nurtured in the cultural ambience of consumerism, collectivity, at least as a
formal feature, still inculcates cohesiveness to the population. In order to
understand the persistence of the “collective spirit” not merely as a residual
force but as something dynamic in China today, notwithstanding all the
contradictions it entails, it is necessary to go back to the historical forma-
tion of the practice and theory of culture of the masses.
Culture has been a central arena in the Chinese revolution. The Chinese
revolution started in urban centers such as Shanghai and Beijing. Rather
than being called forth by a powerful proletariat prompted by capitalist eco-
nomic crises, as prescribed by classical Marxist theory of revolution, the
Chinese revolution was first promulgated by the radical intelligentsia of the
May Fourth period (circa 1919–1927) who were inspired by Western ideas
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and by Marxism in particular. The failure of communist urban insurgencies
then necessitated a decisive strategic shift from the cities to the rural areas as
the site of revolution and resistance, and the key issue confronting the revo-
lution, as Arif Dirlik points out, was how to translate Marxism, an urban-
centered and Eurocentric theory of revolution, into native and vernacular
strategies of everyday practice.17 Drawing on Dirlik’s indispensable insights
into Mao’s Sinification or vernacularization of Marxism, I have further ob-
served that central to Mao’s project is an aesthetic concept of “national
form”: Mao’s solution was to endow urban, cosmopolitan, and foreign
thought—that is, classical Marxism—with a “national form” that had pri-
marily aesthetic and artistic features.18 In Mao’s view, the “Sinification of
Marxism” entails a replacement of “foreign stereotypes,” “vacuous and ab-
stract tunes,” and “dogmatism” with “the refreshing, lively Chinese styles
and tunes that are palatable to the tastes and ears of the common folk of
China.”19 Mao’s rhetoric of arts is not merely metaphorical. It can be argued
that cultural, aesthetic forms and their transformations lie at the heart of
Mao Zedong’s revolutionary vision, in which the establishment of revolu-
tionary hegemony has had the highest priority. In other words, the question
of cultural and aesthetic formation (“national form”) was elevated to the
center of revolutionary strategies for creating a Chinese Marxism in a native
form and style, in order to instill revolutionary consciousness into the peas-
ants and to mobilize them in the revolutionary struggles.
The concept of qunzhong wenyi (culture of the masses) was first con-
ceived by Qu Qiubai, the CCP’s early leader and China’s leading Marxist lit-
erary theorist. Qu Qiubai, himself a major figure in the May Fourth urban
new cultural movement that paved the way for the Chinese communist rev-
olution, sharply critiqued the Europeanizing and bourgeois tendencies of
the May Fourth movement. In the wake of the failed urban proletarian in-
surrections for which Qu was directly responsible, he reflected that the
most urgent need was to bring together the urban Marxist intellectuals and
the peasantry as the two revolutionary forces. To do so, Qu proposed to
wage a “mass cultural revolution” (dazhong wenhua geming) as “the con-
crete task of seeking the leadership in cultural revolution.”20 After being
ousted from the CCP leadership in 1931 as a result of the debacle of the
urban communist uprisings, Qu Qiubai devoted his energy in Shanghai
first to theoretical studies of Marxism and to the urban proletarian literary
movement, together with his closest friend, Lu Xun, China’s modern liter-
ary giant. From 1933 to 1934, Qu Qiubai relocated in Jiangxi, the impover-
ished, backward rural revolutionary base area where he launched the fa-
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mous rural cultural revolution and education movement. The main objec-
tive of this movement was to create a national popular and vernacular lan-
guage, drawing on traditional aesthetic forms and literary discourses from
the folk arts of storytelling, puppet theater, folklore, local operas, and so
forth that had been precluded from the cannons of national cultural tradi-
tion by the ruling classes and aristocratic elite.21
During the Yan’an years of the 1940s, Mao finally set up the culture of
the masses as an integral component of Chinese revolution and Chinese
Marxism. “Revolutionary culture is a powerful revolutionary weapon for
the broad masses of the people,” Mao proclaimed. “It prepares the ground
ideologically before the revolution comes and is an important, indeed es-
sential, fighting front in the general revolutionary front during the revolu-
tion.”22 “Revolutionary culture,” or the “culture of the masses,” was fur-
ther codified in Mao’s Talks at the Yan’an Conference on Literature and Art
(1943). This canonical text defined the audience as essentially the peasant
population and the subject matters of cultural representation as those of
the peasantry, while the urban intellectuals and their pioneering work in
the revolutionary hegemony were downgraded and even harshly deni-
grated. Consequently, the legacy of urban cultural revolution, an essential
constituent of Chinese revolution, became a negative element in Mao’s new
versions of the culture of the masses, grounded on dichotomies between the
rural masses and the urban “bourgeois” or “petit-bourgeois” intellectuals.
The latter were subjected to endless “thought reform” and “remolding”
after the publication of the Yan’an Talks. After the seizure of state power,
urban and cosmopolitan social reconstruction became the central task of
the revolution. However, contrary to Mao’s numerous promises and strate-
gic blueprints for building a “new democratic culture” whereby a pluralis-
tic amalgamation of diverse cultural forms would constitute a new social
space or hegemony, Mao reasserted and increasingly intensified an instru-
mentalist and manipulative cultural policy that stifled, rather than encour-
aged, cultural diversity and plurality. Under these circumstances, the crude
peasant and native folk cultural forms were valorized and elevated to the
apex of “revolutionary romanticism and revolutionary realism,” and
urban, cosmopolitan literary and aesthetic discourses, forms, and struc-
tures were subjected to incessant assaults as “bourgeois,” “imperialist,” and
“colonialist” cultural remnants.
The Great Cultural Revolution (circa 1966–1976) was a paradoxical
culmination of the Maoist populist “mass democracy” or “culture of the
masses” movement and massive political repression and terrorism. One
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witnessed, on the one hand, a collective carnivalesque festivity of singing
and dancing. The spectacle of hundreds of millions of people of all ages
dancing zhongzi wu (loyalty dance to the Great Leader) in the public
squares as a daily routine during the Cultural Revolution can now be curi-
ously recaptured by a glimpse of the present-day ballroom dancing in pub-
lic parks and streets and gala karaoke parties and contests. But in the “seri-
ous” representations of the era, this festive mood all but disappeared,
except in absolutely negative terms. Take, for example, the film Blue Kite
(1993, directed by Chen Kaige, a Fifth Generation director of international
festival films such as Farewell My Concubine). Its dominant metaphor is a
solitary blue kite flying languidly against a gloomy sky, portraying symbol-
ically the sullen banality and horror of everyday life as viewed and narrated
by a child protagonist. Even the more upbeat and sardonically hilarious
film Yangguang canlan de rizi (adapted from Wang Shuo’s novel and di-
rected by Jiang Wen, a much younger filmmaker) had to underscore its
negative tone in order to win awards at Taiwan’s film festival.23 The movie
recaptures the libidinous impulses and merrymaking of adolescents and
“juvenile delinquents” during the Cultural Revolution in a generally joyous
and boisterous mood. But rather than giving a more literal translation of
the Chinese title as Bright Sunny Days, which would be faithful to the tex-
ture of the film, the producers deliberately gave its English title as In the
Heat of the Sun, alluding obviously to the Oscar-winning Russian film
Burnt by the Sun, which denounced Stalin’s reign of terror as seen through
the eyes of a schoolboy (it is no coincidence that a similar narrative per-
spective of an innocent, docile child is deployed by the director of Blue
Kite). Again, the upbeat and joyous experiences of the teenage protagonists
of Jiang Wen’s film become subtly transfigured in the English title into
inferno-like torments under the blazing heat of the sun.
Yet the darker, horrific side of the era went on also through endless
spectacles of parades, mass rallies, and aesthetic representations of the
“eight revolutionary model plays,” masterminded by Jiang Qing, the “great
banner holder of literary revolution.” These experimental plays, blending
styles and structures such as the traditional Peking Opera and European
high cultural forms of ballet and symphony orchestra, were at once bur-
lesquely avant-garde and anachronistically neoclassical. The recent restag-
ing of these plays in both China and overseas has well demonstrated these
contradictory features. A 1996 North American commercial tour of the
China Central Ballet always performed the Red Detachment of Women as
the grand finale of its repertoire. This performance would certainly cause
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its “postmodern” audience in Los Angeles or New York to marvel at its in-
novative multipositionality and hybridity, in which revolutionary ideolo-
gies, nativist and exotic music and dances of the li ethnic minorities of
Hainan Island, and high European styles and modalities all coalesce in a
neo-Wagnerian Gesamtkunstwerk. But the political references, embodied
by the rigidly designated and stylized neoclassical types, typicalities, or
“typical characters of heroes and villains,” once deeply ingrained in the so-
cial consciousness and practice of everyday life in the polarized and mono-
lithic society of “class struggle,” have become almost completely displaced
and rarefied in today’s commercial restaging of these plays. However, their
political rancor and deconstructive predilection can hardly be concealed or
exonerated, even though the present entertainment industry may indeed be
able to recustomize them, as it were, to serve today’s voracious market de-
mand for “cultural diversity.” Above all, the contradictions shown in
today’s commercial popular culture have already been embedded in the
earlier forms of the culture of the masses, only to become more intensified
at the present time.
At the turn of the millennium China witnessed a series of events with
different historical significance: its final entry into the World Trade Orga-
nization (WTO) in 2000 inaugurated a new phase of China’s integration
into the capitalist world-system; the winning of its bid for the 2008
Olympic Games in 2001 boosted its nationalist morale; and the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) celebrated its eightieth anniversary in 2001 amid
mounting resentment and protests of the general public against the en-
demic corruption and inefficiency of the bureaucracy of the state. In popu-
lar culture domains, while the urban, youth-oriented consumer popular
culture of the entertainment industries of Hollywood, Tokyo, Hong Kong,
and Taiwan and China’s domestic entertainment industries began another
race for new markets, revolutionary culture—the culture of the masses—
experienced a new resurgence that gained widespread popularity.
Reinvented revolutionary cultural products and television soap operas,
with their themes of anticorruption, anticrime, heroism, and idealism in
the pre-PRC and pre-reform revolutionary periods, account for about 45
percent of the television drama production in the 1999–2001 period. These
products have had a consistent high viewing rate, for their audience is the
large population of low-income urban working class and peasants.24
Ideological state apparatuses have been instrumental in promoting the
zhu xuanlu (keynote) cultural production, which includes revolutionary
literature and arts, or the hongse jingdian (Red classics)—that is, works
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about the Chinese revolution that were produced roughly from 1949 to
1980, the end of the revolutionary era. Yet the reinvention and restaging of
the revolutionary Red classics that began by the late 1990s in popular cul-
tural forms, such as lengthy television serial dramas or soap operas, is as
much a state-mandated propaganda campaign as a market-oriented com-
mercial operation, executed and underwritten by both the state and China’s
domestic entertainment industries and transnational corporations. TV
drama adaptations of the Red classics, or revolutionary stories, such as
Hongyan (Red cliffs; CCTV Television Drama Studio, 2000, based on the
Chinese novel of the 1960s), Gangtie shi zenyang lianchengde (How the steel
was tempered; CCTV Television Drama Studio, 1999 an adaptation of the
Soviet revolutionary classic of the 1930s authored by Nikolai Ostrovsky),
and Changzheng (Long march; CCTV Television Drama Studio, 2001, a
new production) were popular and commercial successes.
I have observed elsewhere that the ideological meanings, values, and
idealism, or the “signified,” of the revolutionary culture today have been
largely made hollow, as the revolutionary ideology and current social, eco-
nomic, and cultural life are simply incommensurable.25 But the revolution-
ary culture hardly loses its relevance and appeal, for its recent reinvention
and reproduction have successfully elicited emotional reactions from the
Chinese audience, particularly among the middle-aged and low-income
population. The complex raison d’être of the state ideological apparatuses
and commercial popular culture industries for the promotion of the Red
classics cannot be fully discussed here; suffice it to suggest that the endur-
ing appeal of the revolutionary culture lies in the lived and felt experience
of the Chinese public that still bears the influence of the Mao era. Such an
experience of the elderly and middle-aged population is historically shaped
by the revolutionary hegemony and is deeply ingrained in the social con-
sciousness or even the unconscious. Particularly vibrant is the emotional,
affective dimension of this lived experience, which may be understood as
“structures of feeling,” initially proposed by Raymond Williams as a cul-
tural hypothesis that describes the formative processes of aesthetic experi-
ence as evident in semantic figures of artwork.26
In the first half of 2002, a twenty-two-episode television soap opera se-
rial, entitled Jiqing ranshao de suiyue (The years of burning passion; Xi’an
Film and TV Studio, 2001), became a hit show across China. Its premier on
the Beijing channel in September 2001 had a record 14 percent viewing rate
(the average soap opera premier viewing rate is about 6 percent), and it has
been rerun five times since then. It also premiered and was rerun numerous
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times on most of China’s regional television channels, including those of
Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Shengyang, and
Nanjing, among others. The serial is a melodrama of family life, set against
the fifty year history of the People’s Republic. The protagonists, Shi
Guangrong and his wife, Chu Qin, are army officers, and so are their son
and daughter. Shi Guangrong is a medal-winning war hero who fought
during the Civil War and the Korean War. His marriage to Chu Qin, then a
singer in the army’s performing arts troop, was not an outcome of free
choice of love but a forced arrangement, not uncommon during the war-
ring periods. The drama begins with their first encounter and wedding in
1950 and unfolds around the incessant conflicts among Shi Guangrong, the
peasant-son-turned-general; his petit-bourgeois wife; and their children,
who always stand on their mother’s side against the man’s “bad manner,”
even though Shi is wholeheartedly devoted to his family as much as to the
revolutionary cause. In the end, the couple becomes inseparably attached
to each other by years of trials and tribulations, with passions burning and
glowing as the man dies. The “years of burning passion” span from the
1950s to the 1980s, covering the bulk of the PRC history.
An overtly sentimental melodrama based on outmoded themes of rev-
olutionary idealism and heroism, combined with the “love conquers all”
type of romance and melodramatic household feuds and misunderstand-
ings (although not a comedy of errors or contemporary sitcom), The Years
of Burning Passion seems to offer little novelty even to the most addicted of
soap opera lovers. Yet surprisingly it has garnered a significantly high view-
ing rating. The viewers’ responses unanimously point to the “true emo-
tions and passions” that the protagonists show in the drama of the revolu-
tionary era. The nostalgic indulgence and sentimentalism of the audience
and popular media are indicative of a deep-seated popular sentiment for
the revolutionary past, however fictional and imaginary, accompanied by
an equally sentimental sense of loss of sincerity and innocence.27 To what
ideological end such kinds of public sentiment serve to reinforce or to un-
dermine and to what extent the revolutionary nostalgia is manipulated by
different power blocs and interests groups are issues that deserve serious
analysis.28
Culture Industry and Hegemony: Critical Models Revisited
To account for transformations as well as persistence of the revolutionary
legacy of the culture of the masses, some methodological and epistemolog-
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ical difficulties must first be confronted. Granted, the critical models of the
Frankfurt School theory of culture industry and the Gramscian hegemony
remain powerful despite the general tendency to discredit Marxism
throughout the world. As capitalist globalization in the post-cold-war era
claims the “end of history” with self-complacency and self-assurance, the
assumptions that Adorno made about the durability of modern capitalism
seem more relevant than ever. The secret of self-regeneration of capitalism,
according to the Frankfurt School, rests upon affluence and consumerism,
as well as effective forms of social control, empowered by the combined
forces of state and civil society. The Gramscian notion of hegemony, on the
other hand, now offers a broader spectrum of spices and a more refined as-
sortment of ingredients in the intellectual (and popular) kitchens of cul-
tural diversity and multiculturalism. But the strategies of nonsystematic,
nontotalizing “post-Marxism,” “micropolitics,” “identity politics,” or
“politics of difference” are viable only by way of a double displacement of
Gramsci’s fundamental principles. First, Gramsci’s tactic of socialist revo-
lution, the core of his theoretical undertaking, is displaced by issues related
primarily to language and sexuality in much of the contemporary cultural
studies, which are obsessed with discourses on gender, race, and ethnicity.
Second, Gramsci’s notion of interregnum is now taken for granted, not as a
transitional historical interlude but as a condition of existence with no
foreseeable future of fundamental transformation, thus deferring or post-
poning indefinitely the agenda of social change.
However, it would be specious to presume that popular culture in
China falls seamlessly under the hegemony of global capitalism’s cultural
imaginary. As I have tried to demonstrate in this chapter, in the popular
culture domains the revolutionary legacy of the culture of the masses, in
addition to China’s own folk traditions and customs, constitutes a distinc-
tively different site and space, whose position in the global geopolitical
order or world-system has yet to be fully worked out. The dilemma of crit-
ical models of popular culture within the Western context is further com-
plicated by China’s legacies.
In view of China’s rapid movement toward a society of affluence and
commercialism, all manifested by the consumer popular cultural produc-
tions, Adorno’s observation about the mechanism of capitalism at work in
mass culture tells probably the closest truth: “The real secret of success . . .
is the mere reflection of what one pays in the market for the product. The
consumer is really worshipping the money that he himself has paid for the
ticket to the Toscanini concert.”29 This classical concept of reification or
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commodity fetishism needs little qualification when used to describe what
happens in China’s popular culture market, and, indeed, in the social con-
sciousness of the country today, where money and capital were once de-
nounced and nearly abolished during the height of the Cultural Revolution.
One could argue, too, that reification occurs precisely in the formation of
the dominant ideology as “false consciousness,” which, in China’s case, is
nothing less than Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic “socialism with Chinese
characteristics.” “To get rich is glorious,” Deng declared. In the wake of his
death, his predecessors have been wrestling with the quite unpleasant but
compelling problems of Deng’s legacy: the mounting tensions and contra-
dictions between the more affluent coastal urban areas and the still impov-
erished vast rural hinterland; the widening economic and social disparities
among the working class, the poor peasants, and the newly rich; and the ris-
ing gender and ethnic inequalities and contentions.
Keeping in mind the historical dialectic of contemporary China in
terms of both its rapid modernization and its social problems, one may
better understand the curious twists and turns in the ideological formations
at issue here. Although Adorno sees the deceptive individuality manufac-
tured by the standardized process of production as the ideological hallmark
of culture industry, what the Chinese ideology valorizes is the collective,
rather than the individual, as the locus of material affluence and prosperity.
If, following Adorno’s logic of argument but modifying his cultural elitism,
there is a utopian moment to be recuperated in the reified capitalist mass
culture, it would be, as Fredric Jameson puts it, a cultural production that
“can draw on the collective experience of marginal pockets of the social life
of the world-system, black literature and blues, British working-class rock,
women’s literature, . . . the literature of the Third World.”30 But Jameson
immediately qualifies such a utopian cultural production by dictating that
it “is possible only to the degree to which these forms of collective life or
collective solidarity have not yet been fully penetrated by the market and by
the commodity system.”31 However, as Jameson has repeatedly argued
about the postmodern late capitalism and globalization that colonizes the
last uncontaminated cultural experiences of the Third World, as well as the
realms of the unconscious and the aesthetic, such a utopian possibility be-
comes exceedingly remote.
But what if the collective experience itself, as the Chinese case indicates,
is now fully consistent with the logic of capitalism? What would happen if a
collective, or indeed a national, will set itself squarely on a trajectory toward
the capitalist market and commodity system? One possible way of exploring
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this idea is to see the collectivity itself, promoted by the authorities as an ide-
ology of “market socialism,” which, despite all its contradictoriness and in-
consistencies, manages to legitimate the current moves of the regime. But
such an ideological legitimation cannot guarantee any coherence between
“market” and “socialism”; rather, it only reveals the deep-seated problems
inherent in China’s course of revolution and modernity.
One would have to trace back to Mao’s legacy, which was inherited and
at the same time metamorphosed by Deng. The promises and failures of
Mao, however, cannot be adequately comprehended without looking at his
complex historical endeavor of creating an alternative modernity through
political, ideological, and cultural revolutions. In this respect, the
Gramscian model of hegemony can be very useful. I have discussed else-
where the correlation of hegemony and cultural revolution by comparing
Gramsci and the Chinese Marxists, from Qu Qiubai to Mao and Hu Feng.32
Suffice it to say that the Chinese revolution bears a great deal of resem-
blance to Gramsci’s vision, especially in terms of constructing a socialist
hegemony or leadership in cultural spheres. The Chinese experience in
both revolutionary and postrevolutionary periods, on the other hand,
problematizes hegemony and cultural revolution as strategies to oppose
capitalist modernity or globalization.
An important lesson to learn in the present context of popular culture
is how to rethink a cultural space in the postrevolutionary society, charac-
terized by plurality and diversity of forms, structures, and institutions,
rather than by monolithic state control and manipulation. What Gramsci
envisioned in the fascist prison is not the bourgeois civil society in the ad-
vanced capitalist West as such, but a visionary and, indeed, utopian future
of socialism whereby the democratic “civil society” and “state” interpene-
trate and are interdependent. Gramsci remained ambivalent and often
contradictory on the actual formation of such a future state, where the re-
lationship between civil society and the revolutionary party and state is of
central importance.
But in Mao’s valorization of the rural, nativist, and national popular
culture of the masses, the urban culture was viewed as exclusively bour-
geois and was to be completely rejected and transcended by incessant cul-
tural revolutions. Mao adopted the hegemonic strategies that combined the
exercising of coercion and manipulation by the state and gaining the
broadest consent of the masses by ideological self-study and thought re-
form. Mao’s hegemony proved to be enormously effective during most of
his reign, even though coercive, manipulative, and instrumentalizing mea-
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sures increasingly dominated China’s cultural arena, and during the
Cultural Revolution period the broad consensus and support of the masses
were largely manipulated by Mao and his radical cohorts and degenerated
into a virtual mob reign of terror.
During the Cultural Revolution, the “subaltern classes,” or “the work-
ers and poor peasants” in Mao’s parlance, were mobilized precisely by the
tactics and strategies that Gramsci and Mao envisioned. There were, for in-
stance, ample examples of the flexible “war of positions,” such as the Red
Guard’s spontaneous and fragmented assaults on the state cultural institu-
tions and establishments. There was no lack of subversive “multipositional-
ities” either, such as the “worker-peasant-soldier” college students who
switched roles with professors and university administrators in implement-
ing the tasks of “educating, administering, and transforming the bourgeois
educational institutions.” In literary discourse and arts, “discursive hy-
bridities” were glorified as the best accomplishments of the “subaltern”
classes who became the masters, such as the experimental plays, poetry,
dance, and painting that blended native and ethnic arts; rural folklore; Eu-
ropean high art forms of ballet, symphony, piano concerto, and oil paint-
ing; and Stalinist neoclassical styles of pomposity and pretentiousness.
Again, those concrete, historical practices were built into the structures
of the culture of the masses, all with incompatible functions and orienta-
tions. Mao’s hegemony of the culture of the masses, however, always val-
orized culture and cultural revolution in his vision of an alternative moder-
nity. When Mao’s repressive hand was in firm control, these contradictions
were overshadowed by the overarching theme of “class struggle.” But dur-
ing Deng’s era of reform, a Pandora’s box was opened up. Deng’s “socialism
with Chinese characteristics” bears all the contradictions of Mao’s vision of
alternative modernity except for Mao’s emphasis on class struggle and cul-
ture revolution. Hence, contradictions inherent in Mao’s hegemony of the
culture of the masses exploded and at the same time sank into the newly
risen commercial popular culture in Deng’s market-driven economic re-
form and modernization campaigns. The question then becomes, what
happens when the revolutionary hegemony is replaced by capitalist hege-
mony—namely, the consumer popular culture of today?33
The Issues of Everyday: A Site of Critique and Reconstruction
Ultimately, we must return to the most basic and fundamental level of the
everyday life to search for answers to those questions conceived primarily
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under the rubrics of meta-narratives such as “revolution,” “capitalism,”
and “hegemony.” The everyday is of critical significance insofar as popular
culture, or the culture of the masses, deals with precisely the issues of every-
day life of the populace, not only in terms of their leisure activities, after-
work entertainment, or cultural life but also in terms of the most elemen-
tal, the most minute routines of life, namely, eating, drinking, sleeping,
traveling, working, resting, and so on.
The everyday, on the other hand, is crucially related to the larger issue
of cultural and social criticism, particularly the global/local correlation, in
contemporary capitalist cultural production. As Henri Lefebvre defines it,
“The everyday is a product, the most general of products in an era where
production engenders consumption, and where consumption is manipu-
lated by producers. . . . The everyday is therefore the most universal and the
most unique condition, the most social and the most individuated, the
most obvious and the best hidden.”34 What Lefebvre conceives of is of
course a condition of existence in the capitalist society, or, in his own
words, “the everyday is covered by a surface: modernity.”35 I want to add
that the everyday not only is both global and local (in the sense that it must
encompass different temporalities, subjectivities, spaces, and public
spheres) but may also serve as a site that critiques the contradictions and
fallacies of the present and provides a space for imagining and practicing
cultural transformation and reconstruction.
The everyday being thus conceived, it may first of all unravel the prom-
ises and failures of Mao’s culture of the masses. Mao’s national forms and
the culture of the masses were conceived primarily at the everyday level,
too, precisely as counterhegemonic formations against the Western bour-
geois, the imperialist and colonialist hegemony. Mao’s strategy was pre-
cisely to emphasize the concrete, material, and even bodily functions, the
forms and structures of the everyday, rooted in the textures, temporalities,
and rhythms of Chinese peasant life, or national forms: “the refreshing,
lively Chinese styles and tunes that are palatable to the tastes and ears of the
common folk of China.”
The utopian vision and promises of Mao’s culture of the masses are
concrete, material ones, appealing to the sensuous wish fulfillment and de-
sires of the populace. In its simplest and crudest form, it is a promise of
land to the peasants. Such a “land to the owners” ideology, however, is not
merely a reproduction of the idyllic harmony of the precapitalist, agrarian
mode of productions. On the contrary, it was formulated precisely as a
more advanced, progressive stage that transcends not only the agrarian,
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“feudalist” mode but also modern capitalist modes of production.
Granted, such a utopianism is still deeply ingrained in the teleological
thinking of modernization and modernity epitomized by Marxism. But the
secret lies in Mao’s ability to translate the teleological concepts of history
and a utopian future into concrete scenes and images of the everyday36 (the
graphic images of happy life on a Soviet collective farm portrayed by the
Russian media contributed in no small way to such a utopian vision for the
Chinese peasant populations).
But where Mao succeeded is precisely where his vision blundered. That
does not mean that Mao failed to deliver his promises after the revolution
won. The peasants did get their share of land, and the millions of Chinese
people were enthused by Mao’s plan of social and economic reconstruction
and were dedicated to the course of transforming China into a materially
and economically prosperous and affluent society with justice, equality,
and democracy.
However, after the city rather than the countryside again became the
locus of social life following the establishment of the revolutionary regime,
the vision of the everyday in Mao’s culture of the masses failed to provide a
stabilizing and enduring point of referent of “everydayness,” that is, the
tangible, concrete, and countless individual routine activities such as eat-
ing, dressing, sleeping, working, lovemaking, and so on in vastly compli-
cated and diverse urban environments. Instead, the everyday was con-
stantly transformed into the spectacles of the non-everyday: violence,
death, and catastrophe, and stories of revolutionary martyrs and counter-
revolutionary villains and enemies. In other words, the ideological state ap-
paratuses projected—or interpellated, in Althusserian parlance—subjec-
tivities of the average and ordinary citizens by way of non-everyday
political and social events, in the aesthetic forms and styles of the politically
sublime. The everyday was deprived of its everydayness, so to speak. In
sum, the failure of the culture of the masses lies in its political instrumen-
talization and manipulation, which impose from above social meanings,
normality, and conformity upon the populace. But these cultural products
hardly meet the needs and pleasures derived from the satisfactions of every-
day life.
In contrast to Mao’s culture of the masses, the contemporary culture
industry, or commercial popular culture, succeeds precisely in producing a
social relevance to the everyday life, despite its overt objectives of making
profits or commodity fetishism. Commercial popular culture today is by
and large a “joint venture” between the products of the culture industries
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and those of everyday life. According to Michel de Certeau, popular culture
is the art of making do with what the system provides.37 The “system”
refers to the social space in contemporary capitalist societies in which the
populace has certain room and abilities to maneuver the cultural products
creatively in order to satisfy their everyday needs and pleasures.
It seems that in contemporary Chinese culture the everyday has be-
come increasingly a site of dialogical contention of a diverse variety of
forces, among which the culture industry, or the commercial popular cul-
ture, and China’s local and national forms and styles, including the revolu-
tionary legacy of the culture of the masses, intersect and interpenetrate.
The sudden mushrooming of glamorous shopping malls, the giant com-
mercial posters of multinational corporations such as Sony and Nike, along
with karaoke, MTV, ballroom dance parties, and imported (or pirated)
Hollywood big-budget action movies and CDs, all seem to validate de
Certeau’s overoptimistic and populist hypothesis of “making do” with di-
verse cultural products within the system. However, living everyday life
under such circumstances may expose the degree to which the human psy-
che can bear all the irrationality and contradictions of the crazed “gold
rush” with “Chinese characteristics” in the age of global capitalism. The
specificities of the Chinese everyday and its “systems,” particularly the ten-
sions and contradictions inherent in China’s popular culture domains,
have to be fully tackled in order to begin a much needed project of cultural
reconstruction.
Such a project of reconstruction cannot, however, build upon the fan-
tastic spectacle provided by the global cultural imaginary of transnational
capitalism, for the libidinous wish fulfillment and the pleasure principle
underlying such a spectacle function as displacements of the genuine satis-
factions of the everyday with the glamorous but illusory vision of fortune
making, or facai. As the global cultural imaginary and its local and nativist
incarnations of the “Asia-Pacific age of fortunes” sweep across Asia, East
Asia, China, and the whole world, popular culture and the everyday must
bring the dual function of critique and reconstruction to bear upon their
material practices as well as theoretical inquiries. The historical dialectics
and contradictions in the Chinese legacy of the culture of the masses will
not lose all their relevance in a foreseeable future. What remains to be seen
is whether the dialectics of history can turn these cultural contradictions
into creativity or further reification.
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The Short-Lived Avant-Garde
Literary Movement and Its
Transformation
The Case of Yu Hua 4
The avant-garde literary movement is now seen as an internationalphenomenon, no longer confined to Euro-American societies. It isoften associated with aesthetic self-reflexivity and subversiveness,
with strong political and ideological contentions in modernist move-
ments.1 As Harold Rosenburg wrote in 1968, “The avant-gardes have
brought into art the dynamics of radical politics. . . . Historically, the pri-
mary antagonist of the avant-garde is the middle class. From the start,
avant-garde art movements have paralleled advanced political move-
ments.”2 But there are multiple histories of the avant-garde, in western Eu-
rope and in the former Soviet Union and countries of the socialist bloc,
where the political antagonist is not the bourgeoisie but the repressive offi-
cial culture under Stalinism.
The Chinese avant-garde movement in the late 1980s offers yet another
story. Its emergence was marked by a critical self-consciousness in a social
milieu of “post-everythingness.” It consists of a generation of writers who
grew up in the post–Cultural Revolution, or post-Mao, era; the naming of
the avant-garde came in the post-Tiananmen (1989) era, after the high po-
litical drama had gone awry; and the theoretical underpinning for the self-
styled avant-garde critics and writers was postmodernism imported from
the West. As a literary movement, the Chinese avant-garde had a short life
span. In 1987 its appearance drew a good deal of critical attention and high
expectations. But in less than a decade, Chinese avant-gardists ceased to be
cultural front-runners and dissolved into discrete voices and professions.
Chen Xiaoming, one of the major avant-garde critics, proclaimed the
The Short-Lived Avant-Garde Literary Movement 103
“boundless challenge” that the avant-garde launched against the literary
and cultural establishments in its early years, but soon the “challenge” had
lapsed into a “residual imagination,” as Chen’s second book on the Chinese
avant-garde observes.3
Perhaps no one exemplifies the swift rise and fall of the avant-garde
movement in China more clearly than Yu Hua (1960–), a native of the
prosperous southeast province of Zhejiang and arguably one of the most
radical avant-gardists. His short stories, mostly written in the late 1980s,
have been touted as a “paradigmatic symbol of avant-garde fiction,”4 yet
his novels and stories of the 1990s have largely effaced the elaborate formal
devices of metafiction and have become best-sellers in the unmistakable
mode of “plain” and down-to-earth realism. When Yu Hua began to write
fiction in 1986, he set himself the task of scandalizing conventional expec-
tations and, ultimately, subverting the values and rationales that inhabit the
Chinese language. In only five years, however, he had given up avant-garde
experimentalism. He wrote his two popular best-sellers, To Live (1992) and
Xu Sanguan Selling His Blood (1996), in a basically realist mode.5 While
other avant-garde writers, such as Su Tong and Ge Fei, opted to write imag-
inary or nostalgic historical stories or simply abandoned writing fiction, Yu
Hua’s fame as a popular realist accentuated the absence and silence of the
once clamorous avant-garde.
Yu Hua’s writings provide a focal point for a critical evaluation of the
Chinese avant-garde. The movement, which appeared during China’s
transformation from a revolutionary society to a postsocialist state, bore
the imprint of “global” (Western) cultural fashions and trends from high
modernism to postmodernism and in fact is often labeled as “Chinese
postmodernism.” It arose as a radical literary movement to challenge the
established literary conventions and institutions, but the rapid sociopoliti-
cal changes disoriented the new movement before it had taken firm hold.
The Chinese avant-garde was paradoxically both radical and apolitical. The
writers were radical and subversive only in their aesthetic experiments with
form and language; they largely avoided political engagement and inter-
vention. In the late 1990s, as China has entered a “postpolitical” phase in
which economic development and marketization began to dominate poli-
tics, aesthetic radicalism became susceptible to this trend. Yu Hua and
other Chinese avant-gardists realized that the postsocialist, postpolitical re-
ality made the imaginary world of their experimental fiction increasingly
irrelevant. Consequently, they lost their audience. Yu Hua then searched
for alternative modes of writing to bridge the gap between his imagination
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and reality and to bring back his audience. His efforts paid off; he has be-
come enormously popular.
One nonetheless wonders if Yu Hua has given up avant-garde ideas al-
together. Indeed, it can be argued that his transition from a radical avant-
gardist to a popular realist reveals the intrinsic contradictions between aes-
thetic radicalism and political nonactivism that he attempted to resolve by
reinventing a plain realist mode, which inevitably retains certain experi-
mental features in spite of his principal concern with writing and reality.
The transformation of Yu Hua’s writings ought not to be construed as a
sign of the avant-garde’s failure in China. Rather, it can be seen as a reflec-
tion of his effort to grapple with aesthetic expressions and the experiences
of ever-changing reality without succumbing to any particular literary
trend or mode. Neither can one interpret Yu Hua’s reinvention of realism
as a return to the “grand tradition” of revolutionary realism of the Mao era.
While writers such as Liang Xiaosheng, Wang Anyi, Zhang Chengzhi, Lu
Tianming, and Liu Xinglong continue to write in the tradition of critical
realism since the May Fourth cultural enlightenment movement (1919), Yu
Hua is definitely not a member of that group. His relationship to the revo-
lutionary legacy is also more complex than simple rejection or “rehabilita-
tion.” The Chinese avant-gardists could not eclipse the revolutionary cul-
ture in their experiment with aesthetic modes and forms, for all post-Mao
intellectuals must come to grips with Mao’s legacy and find a way to move
beyond it. It is debatable whether the Chinese avant-garde resolved the
dilemma, and one can hardly conclude that Yu Hua’s “return” to realism is
a recognition of or concession to the powerful revolutionary legacy.
Comparing Western European and Chinese Avant-gardes:
A Question of Interpretation
Western European avant-gardists often employ aesthetic means to critique
social norms of bourgeois society and to express their radical political
views. For aesthetics to stand against coercive politics, and for aesthetics to
become politicized in centralized and “authoritarian” societies, is not un-
usual.6 Chinese avant-garde writers resorted to aesthetic means in express-
ing their aversion to politicization of culture during Mao’s reign. Their aes-
thetic and formal experimentation distinguishes them from earlier “scar
literature” writers, such as Liu Xinwu, Zhang Xianliang, and Cong Weixi,
who exposed the evils and “scars” of the Cultural Revolution and used lit-
erature as a means to propagate political change. Instead of social and po-
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litical protest, for the Chinese avant-gardists writing, reality, and imagina-
tion are the primary concerns. In the 1999 preface to his collected short
stories, Yu Hua describes his “journey of writing from 1986 to 1998” as a
remembrance of things past:
Such is the way of life: experience is always more vivid and powerful than
memory. Memory appears when the past disappears, like a straw floating
above the water for the drowning person. Self-salvation is merely
symbolic. . . . My experience is that writing continuously awakens memories. I
believe that such memories not only belong to myself, but are images of an
era, or imprints of the world in the depth of one’s mind—indelible scars. My
writing awakens in the memory numerous desires that appeared in my past
life or that never appeared, that were fulfilled or never fulfilled. My writing
puts them together and makes them legitimate in imaginary reality. Ten years
later I have discovered that my writing has taken on a life of its own.
Simultaneously, my writing and my real life move forward. Sometimes they
crisscross each other, and sometimes they are wide apart. Hence I tend to be-
lieve that writing is beneficial to the health of one’s mind and body, because I
feel that my life is gradually becoming complete. Writing allows me to possess
two lives, one real and the other imaginary. Their relationship resembles
health and sickness. When one becomes stronger the other inevitably deterio-
rates. Consequently, as my real life becomes more and more impoverished, my
imaginary life becomes extraordinarily rich.7
At first glance, these remarks may seem rather banal, even sentimental.
But they illustrate the complex relationship of the avant-garde experimen-
tation in China to other literary and nonliterary issues. No longer a dedi-
cated avant-gardist when he wrote these remarks, Yu Hua still defends his
early experimental writing, in a mildly sarcastic tone, as a way to legitimate
his memories of real or imaginary desires. Writing offers an imaginary al-
ternative that is superior to “impoverished” real life. Paradoxically, Yu Hua
also calls imaginary life a “sickness” that grows stronger in him. Hailed as a
popular realist after the publication of the best-selling novels To Live and
Xu Sanguan Selling His Blood, Yu Hua still feels ambivalent about the real-
ity and real life that his recent writings describe in great detail, and he en-
joys the double lives that writing purportedly makes possible. He displays
in his recent statements few traces of the rebelliousness and defiance that
mark his early avant-garde short stories. However closely he remains at-
tached to the imaginary, alternative life of writing, he argues that real expe-
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riences are far more vigorous than memory and imagination and that writ-
ing as “self-salvation” remains merely a symbolic gesture.
Two themes emerge from Yu Hua’s reflection on writing: first, writing
and life, and second, real and imaginary lives as they appear in writing.
These dichotomous pairs are closely related. Yu Hua is motivated in the
first place by the need to record memories of past experiences and desires
as the images of an era. This is an unmistakably realist impulse. It can be
offset only by an even stronger impulse to reinvent memories in an imagi-
nary fashion. Eventually, the imaginary not only substitutes for the real in
fictional writing but also replaces the real life as a stronger alternative life.
The boundaries of realism, modernism, and postmodernism seem to be
freely trespassed and ignored.
In a recent interview by a chic popular magazine, Love (Nü You in
Chinese, which means “female friends”), Yu Hua talks about his intention
to write again:
I always write for the inner needs of my mind. For many years my writings
emanated from the tension between inner mind and reality. I always looked at
the world with hostility. As time passed, the inner anger subsided, and I began
to realize that the mission of the writer is not simply to condemn and to ex-
pose but to look at the world with sympathy after understanding
everything. . . . I wrote the novel To Live in order to describe the forbearance
of human beings in the face of suffering, their optimistic attitude toward the
world. Writing novels makes me understand that human beings live for the
sake of living, not for things other than living.8
Coming after Yu Hua’s once belligerent accusations of the horrors of
life, depicted in his early stories, which were couched in fragmented narra-
tive sequences, twisted syntax, and grotesque images and metaphors, the
apparently simple theme “to live” may appear deceptive and pose difficult
questions for interpretation. The avant-garde as a collective movement ul-
timately has to confront the questions of reality, writing, and life. It has
consistently subverted the norms of representing reality and life, despite
vast differences among the actual writings and artistic practices of various
avant-gardists around the world. The French avant-gardists, for instance,
often engage issues from radical ideological and political positions.
Philippe Sollers, the editor of Tel Quel, commented in the late 1960s on
the motivation of writing and on language in a highly politically charged,
yet hilariously hybrid and parodic tone:
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Love art in yourselves, they say, meaning assured capital fame. Theory of germs,
double nature. Human essence heaven-fallen innate without application the
same for everybody, bull. . . . It’s of advantage to the writer who’s dying of bore-
dom to repeat his little performances till night-night. At the end of his ten-
thousandth sentence on despair vague sensation dream clothespins and sex-
purring amid widespread yawns, he sees clearly the phantasm impasse.9
Switching to a more incendiary mode that echoes Mao Zedong’s Talks
at the Yan’an Conference on Literature and Art, Sollers continued:
Too many of our comrades currently involved in propaganda haven’t learned
the language. So their propaganda is boring and not many people enjoy read-
ing their articles or hearing their speeches. Put an end to empty and endless
orations. Intimidating isn’t persuading. The saying about playing a lute for an
ox implies scorn for the audience. But look at it the other way and the scorn
hits the player. Don’t force yourself to speak or write, if you haven’t got any-
thing to say. . . . Your style should be more alive, fresher. More vivid, more
popular. Don’t just say proletariat! Proletariat! Ask yourself what they’d say if
they were you. Don’t lose your cool if your teacher looks sarcastic.10
While Sollers castigates humanist views of love and bourgeois bore-
dom and despair (a reference to high modernist aesthetics) and advocates
using the “vivid” and “popular” language of the proletariat in writing, the
Chinese avant-gardist Yu Hua embraces a humanism of life and love as his
ultimate goal of writing:
I write because I cannot give up writing at all. Writing has become an integral
part of my life, since I began writing some fifteen years ago. I know that writ-
ing can change a person, turning a strong-willed, resolute person into a tearful
and wavering kind, a real lively person into a writer. I don’t mean to devaluate
writing. On the contrary, I want to stress the importance of writing for indi-
viduals, because the ultimate power of literature is to soften one’s heart, and to
make people who love literature love each other, after they are parted [by]
thousands of miles and [have] experienced life and death.11
The obvious difference between Philippe Sollers and Yu Hua seems to
extend to politics and ideology. Sollers may represent what Renato Poggioli
defines as the fourfold topology of the avant-garde: activism, antagonism,
nihilism, and agonism.12 Yu Hua, on the other hand, embodies a modernist
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and humanist view of arts and life. The French avant-gardists, such as
Philippe Sollers, show a double engagement with political ideologies and
aesthetic means of form and language. While the latter are common fea-
tures of modernist movements, political and ideological radicalism is often
seen as the principal distinction between the avant-garde and modernism.
As Matei Calinescu points out, the avant-garde displayed a far more radical
and overtly political orientation than do aesthetically and formally inclined
modernist movements.13 However, since the relationship between avant-
garde art and modernist art is extremely complex, it is unwise to di-
chotomize the two on the basis of the political radicalism of the avant-
garde or the hermeticism of high modernism.
The Chinese avant-garde is a case in point. Yu Hua, Su Tong, Ge Fei,
and others acquired the labels of “avant-garde” and “postmodernism” si-
multaneously and interchangeably; they had been so anointed by the self-
styled postmodernist critics, who are of the same age (born in the early to
mid-1960s) and are often their personal friends. Chinese critics by and
large view the Chinese avant-garde as an integral part of international
avant-garde movements, influenced by Euro-American and Latin
American trends. Meanwhile, the Chinese critics acknowledge that the tar-
gets of assault and deconstruction in China were different from those of the
European precursors: not bourgeois values and norms but revolutionary
ideologies and discourses that dominated Mao’s China.
One U.S. critic argues that Chinese avant-garde fiction is primarily
“depoliticized” and “dehistoricized,” but it is not difficult to detect the po-
litical message from the “depoliticization of language,” which is said to
have been the Chinese avant-garde’s “greatest achievement.”14 In the
Chinese context, depoliticization constitutes a counterrevolutionary politi-
cal move, diametrically opposed to whatever the propaganda cadres of the
Chinese Communist Party represent. But such an interpretation may re-
flect the critics’ own political agenda, rather than clarifying the concerns of
the Chinese writers.
As Philippe Sollers and the Tel Quel group show, their politics and ide-
ologies are deeply ingrained in radical, revolutionary traditions that in-
clude, among other things, a Chinese version known as Maoism. Though
much revised and reinterpreted, Maoism is not simply a geopolitical
misrepresentation of Stalinism or a radical version of orientalism; it offers
an alternative vision of modernity through cultural revolution. Now that
the Chinese avant-garde is seen as a revolt against precisely the Maoist rev-
olutionary hegemony that inspired in no small measure the Western Euro-
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pean avant-garde or neo-avant-garde of the 1960s, there is certainly a bitter
historical irony. The Chinese avant-garde has confronted the dilemma of
relinquishing Maoist politicization of culture by radical means of subver-
sion. Thus the legacy of radicalism returns to haunt the Chinese avant-
garde despite its self-conscious endeavor to end it once and for all. The
Chinese avant-gardists detested political radicalism and were ambivalent
about aesthetic radicalism as well. Eventually, they were compelled to aban-
don radical and subversive modes. Unlike their Western European counter-
parts (or at least the French avant-garde group associated with Tel Quel),
the Chinese avant-garde showed a strong sense of ambiguity and ambiva-
lence about politics and radicalism.
A Collective Movement or Individual Experiments?
Modernism in Euro-American societies first vehemently defended aesthetic
autonomy and independence to safeguard individual sensibilities and psy-
chic realms from the intervention of, and from erosion at the hands of,
state bureaucracy and commercialism. Then modernism developed into an
autonomous institution in bourgeois societies, which constituted a “free”
space for isolated, private artists at the expense of social impact. In Peter
Bürger’s seminal study, however, social institutions are considered the cen-
tral issue of the avant-garde. Bürger argues that Western European avant-
garde movements challenge the modernist institution of aesthetic auton-
omy and self-consciously strive to reintegrate arts into life, making the
avant-garde at once a social institution and a counterinstitution.15
Bürger sees the western European avant-garde as radical and revolu-
tionary. It challenges the social institutions of cultural markets (the pub-
lishing and entertainment industries, museums, art education, and so on)
and the conceptual or epistemological institutions as embodied by mod-
ernist aesthetics and presuppositions. But Bürger also maintains that the
historical avant-garde failed to dissolve the institutional boundaries that
separated arts from social life. The neo-avant-garde, represented by Andy
Warhol, among others, is seen as “institutionaliz[ing] the avant-garde as art
and thus negat[ing] genuinely avant-gardist intentions.” Despite a certain
ambivalence that Bürger himself displays over the issue of aesthetic auton-
omy, he is unrelenting in critiquing the eventual institutionalization of the
avant-garde, of its assimilation into bourgeois society, and the loss of its
revolutionary edge.16
The institutional view of the avant-garde affords a historically situated,
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dialectical perspective from which to examine the Chinese avant-garde.
Although Bürger’s view draws on the visual arts of the European avant-
garde, his theoretical thrust lies in a general conceptualization of avant-
garde aesthetics and politics across artistic media and across linguistic and
cultural boundaries. In this respect, his theoretical framework serves as a
point of departure for unraveling the Chinese avant-garde as a specific case
of the general and historical dialectics of the international avant-garde. Of
course, Bürger’s viewpoint, like any other theoretical viewpoint, is con-
stantly challenged by the dialectics of the avant-garde and a living and
evolving history. If the Chinese avant-garde is seen primarily as individual
revolts against social collectives in the name of aesthetic experiments, and
as essentially inward explorations of the unconscious, then the label
“avant-garde” becomes problematic. Despite the differences between the
Chinese and the Western avant-gardes, young writers such as Yu Hua, Ge
Fei, and Su Tong indeed brought to China a collective literary movement.
Its important, though short, history should be examined from within the
concrete historical contexts of institutional transformation.
The Chinese avant-garde emerged in the late 1980s, when Mao and the
Cultural Revolution had been discredited by the Chinese Communist Party
leadership under Deng Xiaoping and the intellectuals. But the widespread
corruption of state bureaucracy and the widening gap between rich and
poor undermined the public support for Deng’s reforms. This period of
disillusionment was labeled the “post–New Era” by some Chinese critics.
The so-called Culture Fever—the intense debates about culture, aesthetics,
and history in the mid-1980s—became politicized, culminating in the
Tiananmen tragedy of 1989.17 It is no coincidence that Western postmod-
ernism aroused considerable interest in China’s literary and then intellec-
tual circles as essentially a critique of the ideologies of modernity.
Thus the Chinese avant-garde appeared at a transitional moment. The
first short stories by Ma Yuan, Yu Hua, Ge Fei, Su Tong, and Sun Ganlu
were published in 1987. They gained much critical attention and recogni-
tion in late 1989, when Chen Xiaoming and Zhang Yiwu, two self-styled
“postmodern” critics in Beijing, began to label freely the writings of Yu
Hua’s group as “postmodern” and “avant-garde.” That marked the inter-
regnum of intellectual activities, for Culture Fever was halted abruptly by
the post-Tiananmen crackdown, and many writers and critics fled China.
But Chen, Zhang, and a host of younger critics in Beijing had little to do ei-
ther with the feverish pre-Tiananmen attacks against “tradition” or with
the post-Tiananmen exodus of the Culture Feverists.
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To Chen and Zhang, the vacuum left by the Culture Feverists was an
opportunity. Contrary to what the exiled Culture Feverists believed,
China’s cultural scene had not suffered a complete blackout. To be sure, the
dominant themes of the Culture Fever were enlightenment and modernity,
against the double traditions of imperial China and Mao’s legacy. But there
were other concerns besides these “master narratives.” For example, the
younger writers, born in the 1960s, wrote many short stories that only mar-
ginally related to the boiling politics of the day. In fact, they deliberately
avoided sensitive and sensational political topics, such as the persecution of
intellectuals and other horrors of the Mao era, which had filled the literary
writings of the 1980s. In Yu Hua’s group, Chen and his allies recognized a
kindred scorn for the Culture Feverist hyperbole and yearning for alterna-
tive modes of expression. Then they all found in postmodernism a critical
and theoretical discourse on which to base a new intellectual alliance. This
discourse was introduced primarily by Fredric Jameson’s lectures at Beijing
University in 1987. Jameson’s highly complex theoretical discourse ap-
pealed greatly to the younger Chinese intellectuals, who had been reared on
Hegelian-Marxian dialectics and metaphysics. Unlike their older siblings
and parents, these intellectuals were too young to be either Red Guards or
victims of Mao’s “red terror”; thus they cared little about the “horrors” of
Marx and Mao. Jameson’s Hegelian-Marxian version of postmodernism
then became a powerful symbolic capital for the young critics who were es-
tablishing a Chinese postmodernism and avant-garde.18
From the outset the Chinese avant-garde was self-conscious and self-
reflexive. Both writers and critics were avid readers of Western postmodern
and avant-garde theories and literary works, and they wrote with a strong
awareness of “international” trends and fashions. Apart from the works of
Fredric Jameson, works by Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, Jean
Baudrillard, Jean-François Lyotard, Jorge Luis Borges, Alain Robbe-Grillet,
Gabriel García Marquez, and others were often quoted by critics and writ-
ers alike in support of their own writings. Yu Hua published a collection,
Warm Journey—Ten Short Stories That Influenced Me the Most, in which the
only Chinese work is Lu Xun’s “Kong Yiji,” a bitter satire of traditional
scholars. The collection includes a wide-ranging variety of writers from
Isaac Bashevis Singer and Franz Kaf ka to Yasunari Kawabata and García
Marquez. Yu Hua reserves his highest praise for Lu Xun and Borges, “the
embodiments of clear and swift minds in the literary world.”19 Lu Xun rep-
resents “a trembling daylight,” and Borges “a mind-boggling darkness of
night.”20 Like other Chinese avant-garde writers, Yu Hua is fascinated by
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Borges’ narrative style: “As a dreamer, Borges seems deeply submerged in
unknown romanticism. His clean and succinct narration is dominated ac-
tually by an uncertainty of reasoning. He really loves such an uncertainty,
so that the characters he pens are often clear-minded but ambiguous about
their fate.”21 This comment tells us as much about Yu Hua’s own mind as
about Borges’ narrative discourse. Indeed, Yu Hua and others, such as Ge
Fei and Su Tong, are equally fascinated by themes of fantasy, daydreaming,
uncertainty of reason, and ambiguity of fate.
“Clear-mindedness” is another essential issue that Yu Hua’s group
grappled with, to delineate a contour of literary innovation aiming at the
dominant discourses. Their rational choice of linguistic and stylistic exper-
imentation nonetheless rested on a shaky foundation of uncertainty and
ambiguity. Such a paradox was not merely an assertion of poststructuralist
playfulness that the Chinese learned from the Western precursors. It re-
flected the dilemma of the Chinese avant-garde caught in the historical in-
terregnum. Chinese avant-garde writers aspired to deconstruct the old and
create the new in the realm of the cultural imaginary. In fewer than ten
years (that is, by the mid-1990s), most of the avant-garde writers gave up
their formal experimentation and opted for either nostalgic/orientalist
rewriting of China’s past or, in the case of Yu Hua, a return to popular and
critical realism.
Chinese avant-garde literature thus embodies the cultural contradic-
tions and predicament of China in its struggle to establish new cultural and
ideological formations and institutions. The Chinese avant-garde scored a
moderate success in the Chinese cultural arena by introducing radically ex-
perimental styles and discourses. Avant-garde short stories were published
mostly by major literary magazines with large circulations, such as
Shouhuo (Harvest) in Shanghai, Zhongshan (Purple Mountain) in Nanjing,
and Dangdai (Contemporary) in Beijing.22 Thanks to critics such as Chen
Xiaoming and Zhang Yiwu, who have held academic appointments at the
prestigious Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Beijing University and
have published in China’s mainstream literary and academic journals such
as Wenxue pinlun (Literature review) and Wenyi yanjiu (Studies of arts and
literature), the avant-garde gained widespread recognition.
In addition, two developments helped the Chinese avant-garde to
reach a broad audience—film, and China studies in the West. Zhang
Yimou, one of the most celebrated Fifth Generation filmmakers, first
adapted Su Tong’s novella Wives and Concubines into an internationally ac-
claimed film, Raise the Red Lantern, which achieved commercial success in
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the West. A series of films produced by Zhang Yimou, Chen Kaige, and a
few others have won international film festival awards and have created a
phenomenon of “new Chinese film” in the global cultural market. Western
academic circles are as thrilled as the import and export divisions of
Western show business are, for a new subfield of “Chinese film studies”
suddenly bloomed in the U.S. academy. This subfield claims certain inter-
disciplinarity in the expanding global “cultural studies” field and has also
given a boost to declining area studies, such as China studies. Likewise,
China studies quickly recognized the value of Chinese avant-garde fiction,
on which many successful Fifth Generation films are based. In 1994, Zhang
Yimou produced To Live, based on Yu Hua’s novel, and it, too, was success-
ful in the U.S. market, where box office sales jumped after a ban was im-
posed on the film by the propaganda bureaucracy in China. Meanwhile,
scholars in China studies have explored new postmodern and postcolonial
angles in their analyses of the Chinese avant-garde. In the current global
cultural and intellectual marketplace, the Chinese avant-garde has firmly
established its place. This has had a considerable impact on China too.
Insofar as integration into the capitalist world-system or globalization is
China’s overarching project, the recognition of the Chinese avant-garde by
“global showbiz” and by the Western media and academia represents a sig-
nificant success. Whether deliberately or unwittingly, Yu Hua, Su Tong, and
other once active avant-gardists have joined hands with the Fifth
Generation filmmakers and academic critics alike to explore a new niche
for their products in the global cultural market.
Consequently, in a few years the once subversive Chinese avant-garde
became an innocuous label largely celebrated as elitist kitsch, neither chal-
lenging Mao’s and Deng’s cultural institutions any longer nor establishing
itself as an autonomous institution in China. In other words, it no longer
functioned as a counterinstitutional force or as a new institution, to follow
Peter Bürger’s model. In 1991, Yu Hua wrote his first and last avant-garde
novel, Crying in the Drizzle.23 Shortly after the publication of this novel, his
style shifted dramatically to a “plain” realism. Others, like Su Tong and Ge
Fei, also wrote experimental novels, but they drew little attention. Su Tong
then began to write in a manner of “nostalgic realism,” telling sentimental
stories of the imaginary small town or about village life during the early
Republican periods (1910s–1930s). Ge Fei ceased to write fiction. Critics,
too, shifted their attention to a still younger generation of writers born in
the 1970s, such as He Dun, Zhu Wen, Lin Bai, and Chen Ran, who write in
the manner of Wang Shuo’s “hooligan literature,” which blends “pulp-
114 Chapter 4
fictional” defiance with the commercial sensationalism of sex and violence.
A group of middle-aged writers, such as Liang Xiaosheng, Lu Tianming,
and Liu Xinglong, wrote more serious “critical realist” novels that exposed
the current social ills and moral crisis.24 Books featuring martial arts and
imperial romances, particularly those of the last Qing dynasty, became
best-sellers and were readily adaptable to film and to lengthy series of soap
operas or television drama. In fact, Su Tong and quite a few experimental
writers turned to these profitable enterprises of soap opera production and
filmmaking.
Many blamed the rise of commercial popular culture for the rapid de-
cline of “serious” literature and arts. Some charged that the “failure” of the
Chinese avant-garde to become an autonomous institution resulted from
China’s lack of a bourgeois civil society or public sphere comparable to
modern Euro-American societies, which nurtured the Western avant-
garde. Although that “failure” and that lack are lamentable only to a cohort
of pro-Western liberal intellectuals, the impetuous rise and fall of the
Chinese avant-garde movements (in the visual arts and music as well as in
literature) suggest a historical dialectic of aesthetic and political relations
and formations not yet fully comprehended.25 One cannot ignore the in-
herent dilemma of the Chinese avant-garde in its ambivalence about politi-
cal radicalism and the legacy of Maoism. Xudong Zhang’s analysis reveals,
moreover, that avant-garde fiction (or metafiction, to borrow his own
term) became a “social-symbolic shelter” in its search for an “autonomous
discourse,” or “an ongoing construction of Chinese modernism.” Such a
shelter, Zhang continues, “turns out to be a restoration of a dim, fragmen-
tary domain of individual memory or life experience,” fraught with “anxi-
ety and restlessness.”26 The anxiety of the avant-gardists is vividly drama-
tized by the symbolic discourses of their fiction, whereas the project of
constructing a modernist edifice in China’s cultural scene seems endlessly
deferred.
From Metafiction to “Plain” Realism: Yu Hua’s “Predestination”
Modernist narrative techniques and strategies are readily discernible in the
writings of the Chinese avant-garde: multiple narrative perspectives; non-
synchronic, disruptive, and fragmentary narrative sequences; hybrid or
polyphonic narrative discourses; and so on.27 The prevailing themes of the
writings are private and idiosyncratic, deliberately eradicating the bound-
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aries of reality and illusion, of past and present, and focusing on the horri-
fying, violent, and mysterious experiences in everyday life. The language is
often abstract, obscure, and hysterical, with hallucinations, daydreams, and
word games that sever signified from signifier. Can Xue (1953–), though
she began writing before most of the avant-gardists, displays perhaps the
most extreme of modernist aesthetic sensibilities in her fictional accounts
of nightmares and insanity.28 Can Xue’s grim narrative perspective unques-
tionably scandalizes realist literary conventions and their cognitive under-
pinnings, problematizing fundamental notions of referentiality to which
even many modernists subscribed.
Chinese avant-gardists rejected both the humanist “critical realism” of
the period prior to the People’s Republic (1919–1949) and the “revolution-
ary realism” of Mao’s era (1949–1979). Scar literature or revived critical re-
alism (1979–1987) seemed too melodramatic and sentimental, and its con-
fidence in universal humanism lacked credibility after the Cultural
Revolution. Western realism and modernism share the mimetic notion of
representation and are the historical products of a growing bourgeois cul-
ture and society. Fredric Jameson argues that realism can be grasped as a
demystification of preconceived idealist notions and illusions through “de-
coding,” in keeping with the rational thinking of the Enlightenment.
Modernist works, by contrast, represent disillusion with Enlightenment ra-
tionality and an attempt at “remystification” through the “recoding” of re-
ality. Paradoxically, modernist texts (and their interpretations) tend to re-
inforce the bourgeois secularist ideologies inherent in realism.29
In China, however, demystification took a different turn. As scar liter-
ature exhausted its appeal, Wang Meng, the veteran writer who had been a
staunch advocate of humanist critical realism (for which he was persecuted
as a “rightist” in the 1957 anti-rightist campaigns), became a fervent mod-
ernist by writing the first “stream-of-consciousness” fiction in the early
1980s. A significant number of writers, including the fiction writer Can
Xue, and many poets in the famous “menglong shi” (obscure poetry) group,
such as Shu Ting and Bei Dao, embraced Western high modernism to vent
their anger and despair over Mao’s revolution. They rejected Mao’s revolu-
tionary myth by “recoding” reality through Western modernist techniques.
They hardly questioned the fundamental myths of modernity—that is, lin-
ear progression of history and developmentalism—and they firmly be-
lieved that the more they employed modern literary devices, the more
closely they would represent the real. (Can Xue is perhaps the only excep-
tion, in that her emphatic denial and disruption of any rational order in her
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narratives comes close to a dismantling of the perceptibility and referen-
tiality of reality.)
As Richard Murphy puts it, the avant-garde challenged the premises of
representation underlying realism and modernism. It is argued that the Eu-
ropean avant-garde and the expressionist precursors of the avant-garde de-
constructed the rationalist epistemology of referentiality and representa-
tion on which both realist “decoding” and modernist “recoding” are based.
This is achieved by forming an endless circuit of self-reflexive interpreta-
tions that alerts the reader to the limits of knowledge and experience and
the broader social discourses by which the real is organized and repre-
sented.30 Chinese avant-garde writers were also skeptical of modernism’s
master narratives. Yu Hua’s group tried to maximize the possibilities of
narrative perspectives and voice in an attempt to denaturalize the “objec-
tive” narrative points of view of realism. They unabashedly experimented
with the Chinese language itself by inventing lengthy, fragmented, and
twisted sentences and by using excessive metaphors and poetic imagery in
fictional narrative. Parody-travesty of revolutionary discourses and clichés
are often mixed with arcane metaphors and allusions to classical Chinese
literature. To be sure, Western modernist and postmodernist aesthetic the-
ories and literary practices constitute the preeminent resource for the
Chinese avant-garde.
The tensions and contradictions that modernist and postmodernist
aesthetics generated in the Chinese avant-garde are well illustrated in Yu
Hua’s writings. Unlike Su Tong and Ge Fei, who tend to set their narratives
in the first half of the twentieth century, before they were born, Yu Hua
writes primarily about his own time and often about the small towns and
villages of his own southeastern China. “Life,” his main theme, is a phe-
nomenological Lebenswelt in which experience is at once the central locus
and the hollowed labyrinth, waiting to be disentangled. Since Yu Hua con-
siders the imaginary life of writing and real lived experiences as one, the
boundary between reality and its literary representations is often blurred.
In the earlier stories, he apparently favors the imaginary representation, or
rather an imagined symbolic construction of memories and past experi-
ences; contemporary real life always haunts him in his deliberately con-
torted textual reconstruction, which disavows any single, monolithic truth.
The first cluster of stories Yu Hua published from 1987 to 1989 not
only shows unusual sophisticated technique and careful narrative design
for a novice but also displays his avant-gardism quite fully: he weaves a
complex, multilayered textual web out of discrete, unrelated events, and he
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crafts narrative discourses in ostensible defiance of realist and modernist
norms of fictional narration. One critic asserts that Yu Hua had almost no
period of apprenticeship; he showed “an excellent caliber” from the very
beginning.31 “On the Road to Eighteen” (1987), a brief but poignant mock-
ery of the picaresque, recounts the disastrous adventure of an eighteen-
year-old who wants to stop a robbery but gets badly beaten up by the rob-
bers.32 The intended victim, the truck driver, stands by, indifferent to the
robbery and the beating; he laughs heartily at the protagonist, refusing to
recognize him as a hero. The story blends detailed descriptions of events
with intriguing symbols, such as the red backpack and the truck on which
the protagonist “I” begins his “life’s journey.” Although the narrative dis-
course is unmistakably mimetic representation aimed at maximum
verisimilitude, the metaphors and symbols are highly evasive. The open-
ended, hybrid narrative structure invites multiple interpretations in a mod-
ernist manner, canceling out the realist effect that the bulk of narration
tends to create. During the same years, Yu Hua published “The Event on 3
April” (1987), “1986” (1987), “World Like Mist” (1988), and “Inexorable
Doom” (1988), regarded by many as his most representative works.33 All
have specific temporal and spatial references, and their predominant narra-
tive discourse is unsentimental, unobtrusive realism, even “clinically objec-
tive” naturalism. From the beginning of his career, Yu Hua wrote in a real-
istic or naturalistic mode without succumbing to its ideological and
epistemological presuppositions.
The style of “The Event on 3 April” is remarkably similar in style to
Robbe-Grillet’s work, especially in its minute, repetitive descriptions of ob-
jects. Deprived of allegorical and “metaphysical depths,” Robbe-Grillet’s
dense descriptions of the sights—that is, of the experiences of the sheer
presence of things—acquire a phenomenological meaning of “being-
thereness” beyond which anything becomes questionable. As Roland
Barthes puts it, in Robbe-Grillet’s writings, the object is “rigorously con-
fined to the order of its components, and refusing with all the stubborn-
ness of its there-ness to involve the reader in an elsewhere, whether func-
tional or substantial. ‘The human condition,’ Heidegger said, ‘is to be
there.’ ”34 Barthes then makes it clear that “Robbe-Grillet is important be-
cause he has attacked the last bastion of the traditional art of writing: the
organization of literary space.” Barthes adds, “His struggles parallel in sig-
nificance those of surrealism with rationalism, of the avant-garde theater
(Beckett, Ionesco, and Adamov) with the convention of middle-class
stage.”35
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Like Robbe-Grillet, Yu Hua presents a minute account of bodily sensa-
tions—a vivid sense of the feel, smell, sound, and sight of objects and ges-
tures, movements, human bodies, and voices:
At eight o’clock in the morning he was standing by the window. He seemed to
have seen a lot, but nothing went into his mind. He only felt a warm yellow
color outside. “That’s sunlight,” he thought. Then he put his hand into the
pocket, feeling cold metal there. He was a bit shocked, and his fingers trembled
slightly. He was surprised at his excitement. As his fingers gradually reached
the metal, the strange feeling froze there, and his hand stopped moving, too. It
then began warming up like the warmth of a lip. Yet this warmth suddenly
vanished. He thought it became one with his fingers, and then it became noth-
ing. Its touching glory became a form of the past. It was a key. Its color resem-
bled the sunlight outside. Its irregular teeth reminded him abruptly of some
difficult path; perhaps he would step on this path?36
It is not the object—the key—but the sensations of and feelings about
the object that are minutely recorded. In Jealousy, for instance, Robbe-
Grillet always describes in great detail the sight and sound of things. The
dark spot on the wall (a squashed centipede), the famous shadow of the
column, and the wardrobe of the protagonist (A . . . ) are described repeti-
tively and thoroughly through a scrutinizing eye or camera lens, yet they
stubbornly refuse to bear any symbolic and allegorical meaning beyond
their presence. Instead, the experiences of the beholder, in both Robbe-
Grillet’s and Yu Hua’s narratives, are highlighted. Yet the very experiences
of the observers in their narratives are subjects of suspicion; the percep-
tions of the protagonists or of the absent narrator-observer are often ques-
tioned. In Jealousy, the two lovers, A . . . and Frank, read a novel together to
kill time, and their comments self-reflexively dismiss their own subjective
experiences:
They also sometimes deplore the coincidences of the plot, saying that “things
don’t happen that way,” and then they construct a different probable outcome
starting from a new supposition. . . . They seem to enjoy multiplying these
choices, exchanging smiles, carried away by their enthusiasm, probably a little
intoxicated by this proliferation. . . . [Then] Frank sweeps away in a single ges-
ture all the suppositions they had just constructed together. It’s no use making
up contrary possibilities, since things are the way they are: reality stays the
same.37
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In “The Event on 3 April,” the protagonist “he” is suspicious of a mur-
der conspiracy in which his girlfriend, Bai Xue (Snow White), is probably
involved, but in the end he becomes distrustful of his own judgment of re-
ality and illusion:
[He] felt his hypothesis was so close to reality, and his uneasiness of his judg-
ment became more real. . . . [H]e was thinking whether he should enter the
shop and walk toward her, then begin the conversation as he hypothesized just
now. But he was by no means as firm and calm as in his hypothesis, and she
was apparently not as nice and softhearted. So he lost confidence in such an
absolutely real and nonimaginary conversation.38
Although Robbe-Grillet and Yu Hua may deconstruct the reality made by
literary conventions, they then have to rely on infinite transgressions of the
borders of the real and imaginary in their narratives in order to maintain a
sustainable deconstructive posture. In the end it leads to a more abstract,
complex construction of narrative discourse that further defers access to
concrete time and space and to everyday events. Moreover, the human
players and their subjectivities become more fragmented and are thus de-
nied self-conscious, participatory roles in the events of real life.
In “World Like Mist,” human characters are reduced to abstract num-
bers 2, 4, 6, 7, and so on. Typical of Yu Hua’s stories from this period, which
deal with murder, death, other kinds of violence, and conspiracies, this
short story revolves around a car accident and a suspected suicide. These
stories are dominated by disconnected pieces of dreams, hallucinations,
and memories concerning enigmatic characters such as the “driver,” the
“woman in gray,” and 2, 6, 7, and others. One is struck not only by Yu
Hua’s grotesque images and metaphors of bloodshed, death, and weird and
absurd dreams but also by his narrative design, which emphatically dis-
rupts the logical and rational order of things. Obsessed with the high mod-
ernist techniques of abstract, psychoanalytical discourses, Yu Hua grapples
with the polyphonic structure of narrative, trying to present as many
“voices” as possible, but then he rejects such efforts in pessimistic, stream-
of-consciousness, and interior monologues:
He [the blind man] sat as scores of different voices, rising and falling in uni-
son, emerged from the school like orderly columns marching in his direction.
The blind man knew that 4’s voice was concealed somewhere within the col-
umn, but, try as he might, he was unable to isolate her voice from the rest. . . .
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Suddenly, the blind man heard 4’s voice. 4 was quite clearly standing to recite
a passage from a textbook. Her voice was like a breeze blowing across his face,
and in its timbre he could detect the aroma of fragrant herbs. . . . And once 4’s
voice was isolated from all the rest, the blind man was able to sense the sadness
with which it was suffused. It was a lonely kind of sadness, the sadness of
empty places, of wilderness.39
The blind man’s sense of the sadness and loneliness in 4’s voice is
symptomatic of the incommensurability of heteroglossia and excessively
psychologized interior monologues in some modernist novels. In Bakhtin’s
view, the resolution is to bring sharply conflicting social discourses into in-
tense debate.40 Yet in Yu Hua’s story the debate is not heard. There is only
the loneliness of the blind man as he makes monologic utterances, without
much of a context.
Allegory and symbolism are common to modernist, avant-garde, and
postmodernist writings, but for different purposes. Some avant-garde writ-
ers use them to underscore the linguistic medium by which reality and illu-
sion are constructed. Although the real and the imaginary may both be
taken as indispensable aspects of the live experience, the literary modes
chosen to represent experience betray the author’s predisposition. Yu Hua
employs allegory and symbolism in “ “Inexorable Doom,” “The Past and
Punishment,” and “Predestination” to show how complex and difficult the
meaning of lived experiences can be.41 The dominant allegorical style of
these stories, especially the latter two, has received wide acclaim in the
West, and they have been translated into several languages as representative
works of Yu Hua’s avant-gardism. The Kaf kaesque theme of the absurdity
of law and judgment in “Past and Punishment” is conveyed through ob-
scure, esoteric conversations between the “stranger” and the “punishment
expert” and through a series of dates such as 5 March 1965 and 9 January
1958. Yet any attempt to decipher secret meanings of the conversations and
dates is futile, because death, suicide, crime, and punishment all depend on
the narration of the expert. However, the expert’s lapse of memory or ne-
glect of a crucial punishment—death by hanging—constitutes the alibi of
meaning: “In an effort to escape from the suffocating grip of these recollec-
tions, the stranger deployed the tactic of reminding the expert of his over-
sight on certain punishment. He hoped that the expert’s superb description
of this punishment might help him escape from the past. But the expert was
infuriated. He announced that he hadn’t neglected it, but he was just
ashamed to mention it.”42 The repetitive sentences that the expert says to
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the stranger, “I haven’t cut you off from your past. . . . I am your past,” ac-
quire an ironic meaning concerning the unreliability and indeterminacy of
the utterances.
Even though Yu Hua casts a skeptical glimpse at the narrative dis-
courses and legal discourses in “The Past and Punishment” by exposing the
serious loopholes and absences in various “master narratives,” the allegori-
cal framework of the story itself is not problematized but reinforced. An al-
legorical decoding and recoding seems to be a viable interpretative strategy,
and the narrative structure of the story invites such a poststructuralist read-
ing game.
In “Predestination,” however, Yu Hua unwittingly betrays exhaustion
and impatience with the allegorical game of indeterminacy. “Predestination,”
a very short piece, is nonetheless divided into two sections, “Now” and
“Thirty Years Ago.” What happens now—that is, the 1980s—is the murder of
Chen Lei, the “vulgar upstart” (tu caizhu) and millionaire.43 The story of the
murder and funeral arrangements is told from the perspective of Liu
Dongsheng, Chen’s childhood friend, whose only narrative motivation seems
to lie in his recollection of childhood experiences some thirty years earlier,
which leads to the second section of the story. These experiences are nothing
extraordinary. One day while playing, Liu and Chen, then six years old, wit-
ness a sudden bloody fight between adults apparently unrelated to either boy.
In the next event of significance, the two boys are playing in the family house
of Old Wang (where Chen Lei, some twenty-five years later, has rebuilt some
apartment buildings and where, in another five years, he finally dies—which
brings the narrative back to the first section). They then throw rocks at swal-
lows and think that “they [hear] a child’s scream for help.” Liu, perhaps hal-
lucinating, thinks that the scream has come from Chen. Chen, of course, de-
nies it, and the frightened boys run away as they hear a second scream for
help. The story ends there.
The story’s allegorical overtones are highlighted by enigmatic symbols
and images of the family house of Old Wang, the swallows, the sudden per-
vasive violence, and the illusory and terrifying scream for help, which, like
the violent mood, dominates the narrative. The absurd and frightening im-
plication of a murder foretold some thirty years earlier reinforces the sense
of “predestination.” On the other hand, the unmistakable reference to the
atmosphere of animosity and terror of the townspeople at the news of mur-
der directs the reader’s expectations to the real events now. The first-section
“present” then cancels out the second-section “past” with its ineradicable
cruelty. The esoteric, enigmatic allegory of the past “predestination” is
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translated into a down-to-earth, plain reality in which the townspeople had
to live with the torment even though the “richest vulgar upstart in town” is
murdered:
The flurry of three or four hundred posters [funereal notices made by the
friends of the deceased] had blanketed the dull provincial town like a layer of
snow. . . . The indignation and alarm of the townspeople had naturally bub-
bled over into action. The night after they had been posted, every single one of
the memorial notices had been torn down. But the people’s torment wasn’t
over yet. On the day of the funeral, a sound truck snaked slowly through town,
broadcasting funereal music at an appalling volume. The sound truck seemed
more like it was advancing into battle than making its way toward the crema-
torium outside of town.44
The absurdity of the murder and funereal scenes becomes more urgent
and immediate in the showdown between the friends of the dead upstart
and the townspeople, which indicates a clear turn in focus from “imagi-
nary” to “real” events. The narrative split between the story’s two sections
is thus more accentuated than the allegorical design, which the author may
have posited to preempt any mimetic expectation arising from the realist
mode of representation. In other words, the avant-garde impulses to unset-
tle any “hidden meaning” grudgingly give way to an “indignation” that Yu
Hua had tried very hard to transfigure into phenomenological and allegor-
ical modes of writing. The aphorism “Actions speak louder than words” is
reaffirmed, as it were, in a quite uncharacteristic move toward the everyday
events of the “townspeople.”
Yu Hua’s first full-length novel, Crying in the Drizzle (1991), further
demonstrates the dilemma that “Predestination” illustrates. In the early
period, Yu Hua cultivated narrative skill in presenting experiences and
events with high intensity in the short story and the novella. But he did
not yet have the skill to manage the much larger narrative scale of the
novel. Crying in the Drizzle, written mainly in the mode that he himself
had developed, blends illusory and allegorical narration of dreams, hallu-
cinations, and mysterious metaphors and symbols with minute, “objec-
tive” details and descriptions of conversations. Primarily an autobio-
graphical novel, it recounts Yu Hua’s childhood in a small town in
southeastern Zhejiang Province. The protagonist “I” reminisces about a
past dominated by his gripping fear of darkness at night in the drizzle
characteristic of that place. The life thus recollected is composed pri-
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marily of unhappy events undergone by his estranged family and is re-
flective of the aberrant lifestyles of his stepparents, accompanied by his
own adolescent yearnings and repressed sexual desires. The novel disap-
pointed both the author and his audience. Yu Hua wants to express his
desire “to return to the real life” in the autobiographical novel, but he felt
confined by the narrative techniques with which he had been able to cre-
ate an intense avant-garde style in his short stories.45 Chen Xiaoming
points out that “because Yu Hua places too much emphasis on unique,
personal experience and private psychology, the novel appears to suffer a
narrative foreclosure that narrows the representation of life and historical
reality.”46 As a self-styled spokesperson for the Chinese avant-garde, even
Chen acknowledges “the ultimate limits of formal experimentation of the
avant-garde.”47
Undeterred by the novel’s negative reception, Yu Hua continued to
write fiction prolifically, and the publication of the novel To Live (1992)
brought him huge popularity and commercial success. He became known
as a popular realist writer, for the novel had soon sold hundreds of thou-
sands of copies. To Live marks the end of Yu Hua’s avant-gardism and the
beginning of his plain realism. This transition occurred at the time when
other avant-garde writers—Su Tong, Ge Fei, Sun Ganlu, Ye Zhaoyan, and
others—began to change their styles or simply stopped writing. In 1994, To
Live was adapted by the internationally acclaimed director Zhang Yimou
into a film that won international awards and achieved commercial success
in the United States and in European markets. Yu Hua and Su Tong quickly
became new celebrities in popular culture and the entertainment industry.
In 1995, Yu Hua published Xu Sanguan Selling His Blood, which again drew
widespread critical and popular acclaim.
The success of these works owes much to their thematic seriousness
and their accessibility to a wide range of readers. Both deal with everyday
life in contemporary China, concentrating on oppressed and poor farmers,
laborers, and other rural and small-town people, and presenting lived expe-
riences in a straightforward, if sometimes melodramatic manner. To Live
portrays the hardships of an old peasant, Fugui (Fortune), through his own
stories. Fugui’s life has been anything but fortunate: the son of a rich land-
lord, he has lost his inheritance to gambling, and his loved ones—wife, son,
daughter, son-in-law, and grandson—have died in a series of accidents. His
family tragedy stretches from the 1940s to the 1980s, epitomizing a turbu-
lent half-century in China. Xu Sanguan Selling His Blood, on the other
hand, is a heartbreaking melodrama about the poor peasant Xu Sanguan,
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whose life revolves around a single event—the selling of his own blood—in
his struggle for survival.
Yu Hua displays astounding skills of realistic storytelling in these
works. The central theme of both can be summed up as “to live”—the most
fundamental, instinctual, “primitive” desire. Fugui, who has survived
everyone else in his family and has witnessed a tumultuous history, from
Nationalist rule to the People’s Republic, the Cultural Revolution, and
Deng’s economic reforms, calls his “the life of an ordinary man”:
When I was young, I had days of wealth and leisure, and then I was broke and
getting poorer and poorer. But that’s for the better. Just look at the guys
around me, like Long’er and Chunsheng. They also had their great days, but all
lost their lives. It’s better to be an ordinary man. You fight for this and fight for
that, and in the end you pay the price with your life. As people say, life is get-
ting worse and worse for me, but I’ve lived a long life. And I’m still living,
when the people I know have all died, one after another.48
In Xu Sanguan Selling His Blood, the protagonist laments his age, after
dedicating more than forty years to his family’s survival, only when he real-
izes that his blood can no longer sustain the family: “He thought that this
was the first time in forty years that he wouldn’t be able to sell his blood.
For forty years his family survived every disaster by his selling blood.
Nobody wants his blood any more. What will he do when disaster comes?
Xu Sanguan began to cry.”49 Still, Yu Hua ends the novel on an optimistic
note, registered in Xu’s vulgarity when he attacks the young man at the
plasma center who has refused to buy his blood. After Xu’s wife calls the
young fellow—who is much younger than their youngest son—a “bastard,”
Xu tells her: “You know, even though the hairs of someone’s penis come out
much later, they still grow much longer than his eyebrow—isn’t that the
younger, the better?”50
Yu Hua achieves plain realism by allowing the mimetic or figural mode
of dialogue and the character’s reported speech to dominate the narrative
and by restricting the narration to the minimum report of their outward
movements: walking, eating, speaking, crying, and laughing. That is, he re-
frains from guiding the reader’s comprehension of the events. Yet the fig-
ural discourse and reported speech tend toward melodrama in their raw-
ness and exaggeration. Some Chinese critics hail this as Yu Hua’s
“rediscovery of the folk culture and of folkloric narrative tradition.”51 It
may also be seen as an effort to recuperate lost values in the everyday lives
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of the “common folks” through melodrama, which “starts from and ex-
presses the anxiety brought by a frightening new world in which the tradi-
tional patterns of moral order no longer provide the necessary social
glue.”52 Melodrama, however, is not the only prominent feature of Xu
Sanguan Selling His Blood. The narrative style is controlled, unsentimental,
and matter-of-fact, reminiscent of such short stories as “The Event on 3
April.” The sharp contrast between this restrained, orderly reporting and
the vivid reported speeches of the novel’s characters still betrays Yu Hua’s
avant-gardist consciousness of the linguistic medium and the literary con-
ventions with which he has grappled ever since he began writing.
Nonetheless, Yu Hua’s determination to shift from imaginary writing
to “reality itself” is unmistakable in his popular novels and in the plain re-
alism of his short stories. It is perhaps his “predestination” to come back
from the construction of multiple, mysterious layers of meaning to the de-
piction of “real,” lived experiences. Granted, such a shift is replete with
contradictions and even confusion. It is problematic to conclude that Yu
Hua has completely abandoned avant-garde experimentalism and has res-
urrected the “grand tradition of realism.” It can only be said that he has not
given up the efforts to bridge writing and reality that he and other Chinese
avant-garde writers have undertaken from the beginning. As Yu Hua ac-
knowledges in the afterword of Xu Sanguan Selling His Blood, “Reality in
my early writings tended to be imaginary, and it now becomes closer to real
life itself. The more substantively you can write, the more capable you are
as a writer. You cannot always provide your readers with false works and
you must at least present to your readers something you understand your-
self.”53 This statement may seem like a reaffirmation of the perennial ob-
session with the representation of the real. But in Yu Hua’s case, life means,
first and foremost, lived experience in China at its most intense moment of
transformation.
The problems of writing, reality, and imagination with which the
Chinese avant-garde writers are centrally concerned are by no means ab-
stract and dehistoricized. They arose from China’s postrevolutionary trans-
formation, in which the meanings and practices of radicalism, subversive-
ness, and political activism changed dramatically. Chinese avant-garde
radical experimentation bogged down quickly, before it had any significant
impact on China’s cultural institutions. While the avant-garde as a collec-
tive literary movement in China had limited success, Yu Hua, Su Tong, and
others are still looking for innovative ways to write, to imagine, and to live
out their experiences in the age of globalization, during which human
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modes of perception, representation, and communication are altered daily.
One wonders whether the avant-garde radicalism and counterinstitutional
or counterhegemonic postures can or should be revived. Or, as Yu Hua’s
case illustrates, may a rekindled commitment to the lived experiences of the
lower classes reinscribe the perpetual avant-garde spirit of activism and
radicalism into literary writings today?
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The Internet in China
Emergent Cultural Formations 
and Contradictions 5
Since the mid-1990s, hundreds of thousands of Chinese-languageInternet websites have emerged in China, and the number of Internetusers has increased dramatically. The Internet has become a dynamic
force in China’s cultural landscape today. It is an important aspect of glob-
alization, and it plays an active role in China’s transformation from its
Maoist past to a postrevolutionary, postsocialist society. Globalization not
only brings China closer to the capitalist world economic system and mar-
ket but also generates new forms of culture and social interaction. The
Internet has provided a new impetus to this process of transformation.
Internet communication and global media have become central compo-
nents of globalization processes. Given that the United States and western
Europe now dominate both technological means and contents in global
communications, the flow of information on the Internet promotes tri-
umphant ideologies and the values of capitalism across the world. China
has confronted these ideologies daily as it irreversibly moves toward global-
ization. It has sought new values and beliefs that can provide social cohe-
sion and identities to its diversifying population. The state, of course, des-
perately needs an ideology, whether explicit or implicit, to ensure its
legitimacy.
The Internet emerges in the midst of serious political and ideological
changes. Can the Internet open up a new public sphere to foster democracy
for the Chinese people? To what extent will Internet communication erode
the social and cultural fabrics and affect Chinese society negatively? Along
with the technological and economic promises it brings, the Internet will
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surely subject China to the ideologies of global capitalism under the various
guises of “cultural imperialism,” postcolonialism, and consumerism. What
are the ideological impacts of global capitalism on Chinese culture and so-
ciety? These questions cannot be answered with certainty; around the
world, people have been scrambling to find explanations for the sea
changes in social life under globalization. But what the Internet can do in
China is of critical importance to both those aspiring to build a more
democratic public life and those determined to amass unimaginable profit
and power.
Communication technologies today elicit both hope and anxiety, pri-
marily in the economic and technological sectors. In China, a self-styled
“largest developing country,” the highest priority is technological and eco-
nomic development. Ironically, however, rather than in economic sectors,
the Internet has ignited a social engine in China mainly in the political, ide-
ological, and cultural arenas. This chapter examines three distinct aspects
of Internet development in China. First, the Internet creates a new press,
which links to the global communication network. It trespasses the bound-
aries between the state-owned, centralized press and the commercially ori-
ented local press, and between international press and national press. This
new press inevitably affects Chinese media structures and practice and will
have profound implications not only on the Chinese media but also on
China’s ideological state apparatuses (ISAs). Second, the Internet provides
an alternative public forum for political and intellectual debates that are
rarely allowed in state-owned media. It appears as a virtual public sphere
where the most politically sensitive issues—such as the reform of the one-
party system, fallacies of the past and present state, and the communist bu-
reaucracies—have been heatedly debated. As the Internet has become a site
of fierce ideological and political contention, what will eventually transpire
remains unknown. But the Internet political forum will undoubtedly alter
the structure of public discourse in the political and ideological arenas and
will significantly affect China’s political future. Third, an Internet literature
has emerged, serving as the aesthetic representation of the urban youth
generation, largely born in the 1970s and 1980s. Because today’s new urban
youth culture has been largely shaped by television and other digitally
based communication systems, young Chinese urbanites find the Internet a
favorite channel for voicing their concerns and yearnings. Thriving literary
activities in cyberspace have become a notable trend, while public interest
in “serious” literature has been eroded by the entertainment industry and
consumer popular culture. The Internet literary expressions of the urban
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youth are diverse and sharply divided. While consumerism nurtures sensu-
ous indulgence and pleasure seeking, some new experimental theaters are
using the Internet to revive an idealism and heroism reminiscent of the rev-
olutionary past.
Globalization, the Internet, and New Media
Globalization coincides with China’s gaige kaifang, which constitutes the
historical condition for the appearance of a new media. The Internet not
only provides technological means to the new media but also brings to
China ideologies and values from the newly developing global media sys-
tem. The Internet stems largely from the U.S.-based media conglomerates
and transnational corporations and, according to Edward Herman and
Robert McChesney, serves as a “new missionary of global capitalism” to
spread the gospel of free market and unbridled expansion of capital.1 Such
an ideological mission and “thoroughgoing commercialism” of the global
media, Herman and McChesney continue, threatens to undermine demo-
cratic participation of citizens and to endanger the public sphere in the
West. Meanwhile Herman and McChesney concede that “media globaliza-
tion” has its positive effects, by “carrying across borders some of the funda-
mental values of the West, such as individualism, skepticism of authority,
and, to a degree, the rights of women and minorities,” which can “help
serve humane causes and disturb authoritarian governments and repressive
traditional rules.”2 However, this self-contradictory view reflects a deep-
seated conceptual dichotomy, as if the “evils” are different—commercial-
ism in the democratic West and authoritarianism in the undemocratic
non-West.3
By abandoning the revolutionary tradition that was adamantly op-
posed to capitalist ideologies and embracing a developmentalism to build a
free market, capitalist economy, China’s case defies those simple West/East
dichotomies. Deng Xiaoping’s developmentalism is premised on economic
marketization and corporatization, whereas the political order still rests on
the ideological legitimation of socialism. The ideology of socialism still
promises socioeconomic equality to all citizens, and as such, it is funda-
mentally at odds with the objective of global capitalism to maximize profit
at all costs. The paramount problem that China faces, as I have argued in
this book, is the incommensurability between socialist ideologies and eco-
nomic capitalism, which inevitably results in a legitimation crisis.
The media and press are at the forefront of political and ideological
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change. The media in Mao’s era served as the mouthpiece of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), which was instrumental in the formation and
dissemination of revolutionary ideologies. Since the reform, the media, on
the one hand, have followed the directives of the CCP to propagate the po-
litical policies of the reform and, on the other hand, have been increasingly
compelled to adapt to marketization, which demands a service-oriented,
pragmatic press independent of the state bureaucracy. But the issue of press
freedom has always been irksome. Whereas the CCP apparatchiks fear the
consequences of political chaos that unregulated news media may bring,
liberal intellectuals strongly resent the state censorship and monopoly of
the Chinese press. The American ideology of freedom has inevitably played
a role in the complex U.S.-China relationship. The American media, par-
ticularly their China watchers, often accuse China of having no free press
and even no freedom to think.4 But they usually gloss over the problematic
role of American ideologies and values in the intense power games between
the United States and China under the conditions of globalization. The
Chinese media are caught between the compelling demand for press free-
dom and a nationalist agenda to fend off American penetration. As the
clamor for an independent, free press grows louder and louder, nationalist
sentiment among the Chinese public becomes stronger and stronger, pri-
marily as a result of the current U.S.-China relationship. Hence it becomes
imperative that understanding China’s freedom of press, political reform,
and nationalism must take into account the U.S.-China relationship as a
central component of China’s “domestic” issues. Nothing remains purely
“internal affairs” in China without the “interferences” or influences of the
United States.
Amid conflicting forces from different interest groups, the Chinese
media have nonetheless grown more and more pluralistic. Jaime A.
FlorCruz, Time magazine’s Beijing bureau chief, observes: “The vibrancy,
diversity, and enterprise of newspapers, magazines and television shows re-
flect growing pluralism—and Beijing’s inability to control it.”5
The Internet has dramatically accelerated the pluralization of the
media in China since the mid-1990s. China began to develop the Internet in
1994, as the U.S. federal government announced its agenda of constructing
information superhighway. On 20 December 1995, China Trade Daily be-
came the first Chinese news medium to have an online version on the
Internet. By the end of 1995 only seven Chinese news media had an online
service. Beginning in 1996, however, China’s Internet development soared.
By the end of that year, there were only 100,000 Internet users, but by the
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end of 1998 the number of Internet users reached 2.1 million. One year
later, that figure doubled, reaching more than 4 million in December 1999.6
According to statistics issued by the China Internet Information Center in
December 2000, the number of Internet users in China leapfrogged to
more than 20 million, a phenomenal growth by any standard.7
China has continued to boost the development of information tech-
nologies aggressively. In a survey released in April 2002, Nielsen Net
Ratings, a U.S. media research firm, states that “China has taken second
place in the race for the world’s largest at-home Internet population,” as
China becomes “the largest Internet population in the Asia Pacific region,
and the second largest worldwide after the U.S.” According to the survey,
by March 2002 there were “56.6 million people living in households with
Internet connections, amounting to just over five per cent of homes in
China.” The Internet household penetration rate in the United States is ap-
proximately 50 percent now, and the survey predicts that “a 25 per cent
penetration rate in China would amount to a potential 257 million peo-
ple. . . . The potential is staggering, and it’s a not-too-distant reality.
According to the Chinese Ministry of Information, new Internet subscrip-
tion rates in China are growing 5–6 per cent monthly. At these kinds of
growth rates, 25 per cent Internet penetration in China is only three or four
years off.”8
The news media were among the first in China to develop websites. By
mid-1999, of 2,053 newspapers about 300 newspapers and presses had online
publications, or about 14.6 percent. Major national newspapers began to set
up online news centers. The Chinese government allocated substantial funds
to the five major websites of the state presses: People’s Daily, Xinhua News
Agency, the English-language China Daily, China International Broadcasting
Service, and China International News Center of the Internet.9 China Central
Television (CCTV), the national television network with eleven channels,
also has a website compatible to these five presses in terms of its resources
and audience. These websites have apparently learned formal and technical
aspects from the major global media’s websites, such as CNN, the New York
Times, and Reuters, and have integrated the latest multimedia technology in
online news reporting.
Although the contents of these websites remain largely identical to
their print or electronic counterparts, changes have gradually taken place.
First, the online international news coverage is quicker and more open to
the global media system than the print and electronic media. Online news
is an around-the-clock, fast-tracking operation, which makes censorship
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by higher authorities much more cumbersome and often impossible, par-
ticularly when live reporting is called for. Chinese media today still must
submit any news report on significant and politically sensitive events (such
as U.S. Congress votes on China-related issues, U.S. air strikes against Iraq,
and the like) to censorship agencies before it can be aired.10 This normally
causes a considerable delay in hours, even in days. Live television news cov-
erage is still a rarity in China. However, on the CCTV and People’s Daily
websites, international news now appears almost simultaneously with re-
ports from CNN, Reuters, and so on. The CCTV online news is often
broadcast faster than its television news programs. The censorship bureau-
cracy apparently cannot catch up with the online news programs striving
for ever faster headlines. Although for years the ineffectual bureaucracy has
been the focal point of resentment, there has been hardly any sign of re-
form. The censorship bureaucracy, under the control of Ding Guan’gen,
the notorious minister of the CCP Propaganda Department, is among the
last bastions of bureaucratic resistance to change.11 But the fast-paced on-
line news of the CCTV and People’s Daily websites is updated hourly, and it
often skirts the censorship mechanism by quoting secondary reports from
international media. However, when it comes to major news coverage, sto-
ries from the news websites have shown few differences from their print
and electronic forms, indicating that censorship is maintained at the high-
impact levels.12
China’s censorship bureaucracy is under great pressure for reform in
order to cope with the online news media and the demand of the general
public for faster and broader news coverage. It is highly unlikely that the
state agencies of news censorship will be replaced by a different mecha-
nism, but their ineffectiveness is especially accentuated by the way they deal
with the Internet news media.13 Of course, it is politically naive to suggest a
“censorship-free” condition in any country, even in the United States, the
most staunch crusader of media freedom, where the self-censorship after
the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the blatant interference with the
media by federal and military agencies signal an uphill battle for American
media. Both the censorship bureaucracy and the media of China, however,
face a different dilemma: the censorship bureaucracy, established during
the revolutionary era, has become totally ineffective in handling the media
in a market economy in a society open to all kinds of information.
A significant change is the online interactive journalism and commen-
taries that major presses have experimented with in a variety of forms, such
as bulletin boards, chat rooms, online polls, online opinion columns, and
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so on. The most important is the People’s Daily online chat room,
Qiangguo Luntan (Strong power forum; literally, “strengthening the na-
tion forum”). The chat room was set up in the wake of NATO’s bombing of
the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999. It has since grown into one of the
hottest public political forums, allowing a blend of public debates, news
stories, and opinion letters that cover a wide range of issues. Some are so
politically contentious and sensitive that the print and electronic media can
hardly publish them. The creation of a chat room for public political de-
bates in the most important mouthpiece of the ruling Communist Party
signals the significance of the Internet. The U.S. media, of course, rushed to
describe it as an avenue for political dissent in the cracks of the Communist
authoritarian rule. The American media’s sensationalizing penchant aside,
the creation of Strong Power Forum shows that the press is caught between
its traditional role as the mouthpiece of the revolutionary ideology and its
current role to serve the CCP, which now promotes economic, technologi-
cal development.
Many local presses, especially in the more open and economically de-
veloped areas, such as Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen, have set up
their own online chat rooms, too. These interactive news forums resemble
Strong Power Forum, but they arose less sensationally, partly because they
are not central and national presses and partly because some of their print
counterparts already have a reputation for critical and independent voices.
Nanfang zhoumo (Southern weekend) is a weekend newspaper that belongs
to the state-owned Guangdong provincial news network. The newspaper
has been known for its outspoken, investigative news that often exposes the
corruption of the state bureaucracies outside Guangdong Province (a tactic
catering to the local protectionism). It also publishes a good deal of editori-
als and commentaries authored by China’s leading liberal intellectuals, who
are often critical of the official policies. It is one of the most popular news-
papers in China today and has survived several serious crises of shutdown
by the higher authorities.14
In the meantime, the major Internet portal companies such as
Sina.com, Netease.com, and Sohu.com all established online news web-
sites, with news stories written by their own news crews rather than by the
official Xinhua News Agency or other state-owned media. This caused
considerable alarm to the government. Since 1949, the Chinese media
have been controlled by the state, and all editorial members and journal-
ists have been selected and trained through an established process that en-
sures conformity to the standard of journalism in its communist role.
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Even the semi-independent press of the China Evening News Network,
Provincial Evening News Exchange Net, and Inter-city TV News Exchange
Center that appeared in the late 1990s maintain the established standards
of journalist practices. The news crews of the commercial websites, how-
ever, have no institutional bond to the state-owned press and thus are
under no obligation to conform to the state criteria. They emulate either
Western (mainly American) journalism or journalism from Taiwan and
Hong Kong, which is largely an adaptation of Western journalism in the
Chinese language. Lacking Western-style professional training, and free
from the Chinese-style media control, the online novices, mostly in their
twenties, face daunting difficulties in news reporting: they have yet to
learn how to tell rumors and libel from real news and how to verify the
news sources and report firsthand news rather than relying on indirect
news reports. Relatively independent from the state censorship bureau-
cracy, they often express viewpoints deemed politically incorrect to the of-
ficial lines. Their amateurish, daring news reports are welcomed by many
as bold and refreshing and are scolded by others as no better than tabloid
sensationalism.
Although the government remains ambivalent about online public de-
bates and loose censorship on the websites of state-owned and semi-state-
owned presses, the emergence of new media outside the existing media in-
stitutions and organizations was viewed as reaching over the limit. The
National People’s Congress (China’s legislative body) in November 2000 is-
sued a regulation concerning the Internet and information security. The
regulation is comprehensive, covering the potential Internet infringement
of national security, as well as Internet violations and crimes in commercial
and technological sectors and the news media. It prohibits Internet portal
companies from using news reports written by unauthorized press sources
and requires general portal sites to obtain permission to use news from for-
eign media and to meet strict editorial conditions when using their own
crew’s news reports.15
The U.S. media reacted with scorn for the “Chinese communist
regime’s dilemma,” asserting: “Chinese leaders have been ambivalent about
the Internet since its first explosive growth in China in the mid-1990s. They
want to harness it for business and education while preventing it from be-
coming a tool of political discontent. The difficulty over managing bulletin
boards is one of many dilemmas China faces in its effort to police the
Internet, which the communist leadership has accepted as a necessary but
awkward tool for modernizing the economy.”16 It is true that the Chinese
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government is wary of the “political discontent” that the Internet might
bring, a worry that U.S. media often reinforce by celebrating the political
and ideological empowerment that the global media system can effect in
China. Thomas Friedman, a New York Times neoliberal media pundit, pre-
scribes an emancipatory mission for the Internet in China: “Yes, it’s true
that the Chinese government has tried to block access [to the Internet], but
it’s not working. Come with me here in Nanjing and I will show you how to
view online Tibet.com—the official Web site of the Tibetan government in
exile—or NYTimes.com. No problem. Deep down, the leadership here
knows that you can’t have the knowledge that China needs from the
Internet without letting all sorts of other information into the country, and
without empowering more and more Chinese to communicate horizontally
and create political communities. In the long run this will only give more
tools to the forces here pushing for political pluralism.”17
Friedman and his cohorts hope that the Internet will push for the kind
of “political communities” that they preach every day to the “authoritar-
ian” countries via the New York Times, CNN, USA Today, and so on. Their
discourse reflects the dilemma that China faces, but not in the way they de-
scribe. The political communities and pluralism that the global media try
to help create in China may serve a variety of purposes that are not neces-
sarily democratic or inherently good to China’s socioeconomic develop-
ment. Recent critical reassessments of “civil society” caution us not to au-
tomatically associate “civil society” and “pluralism” with democracy and
equality in political and economic life. A civil society of democratic partic-
ipation depends much on the state, which provides legal protection and re-
sources and which implements an economic policy that aims at equality
and justice for the majority.18 China in its transition from a highly central-
ized political system and a planned economy to a market-oriented society
faces a dilemma: on the one hand there is an imperative to further the pro-
cess of decentralization; on the other, there is a danger of total social disin-
tegration and fragmentation. Hence, some critics argue that what China
needs now, first and foremost, is a state rebuilding to reestablish an effec-
tive government system, in order to implement and reinforce law and to
oversee democratic political participation.19 Ideological legitimation is a
crucial aspect of state rebuilding and social reconstruction.
The media play a central role in the reconstitution of ideological legiti-
mation. The ambivalence of the Chinese state toward the Internet and new
media is symptomatic of the profound contradictions of China’s gaige
kaifang. In the process of reform, China must cope with state-building, so-
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cietal reconstruction, ideological legitimation, and economic development
all at once. It is now true that China’s woes stem from Deng Xiaoping’s ar-
bitrary agenda for reform that pushes economic development and sup-
presses political change; yet one cannot ignore that historic changes have
taken place at all levels and all sectors in spite of Deng’s policies and prac-
tices. By issuing a series of laws on Internet media, the Chinese government
has tried to establish new normative regulations and rules in cultural and
ideological domains. Meanwhile, it faces an ever-increasing challenge from
the pluralization and diversification of information channels brought
about by the Internet and the global media system. The consequences of
these changes are uncertain, yet they are significant to China’s gaige kaifang.
The Chinese government, however, has taken no initiative thus far to
launch a bold reform of the media and the press, for it is deadlocked in po-
litical and ideological issues.
As always, changes occurred in spite of the state’s indeterminacy and
ineffectiveness. The Internet news media have attracted a growing audience
in China, especially among the young and well-educated population. A
June 2000 study shows that in the United States, daily Internet news con-
sumers consist largely of males (61 percent), less than fifty years old (75
percent), and having a college education (47 percent).20 In comparison, an
April 1999 survey of Beijing residents indicated that 25 percent of the
Beijing residents, who are among the most educated in all Chinese cities,
got international news from the Internet, whereas 48.6 percent of them re-
lied on CCTV’s National Evening News.21 To be sure, China depends
largely on the generations younger than age 50 to achieve its preliminary
goals of modernization in the first quarter of the twenty-first century. The
younger Chinese undoubtedly are attuned to the Internet and global media
for information and news. Although media pluralism and diversity may
spawn more and more fragmentation and specialization of audiences, the
sheer number of the Chinese population to be affected by the Internet news
media poses formidable problems for building social cohesion and consen-
sus. Diversity without basic societal consensus and cohesion means not
democracy but chaos, especially when each of the fragmented, segregated
groups amounts to tens of millions of disenfranchised individuals. But with
the collapse of the revolutionary hegemony that once held together—by
both ruthless coercion and mass consent—800 million people in Mao’s era,
the compelling need to rebuild a social consensus clashes with the impera-
tive of pluralization. This contradiction is especially visible on websites
dedicated to political debates.
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Internet Political Forums: A Virtual Public Sphere 
or a Hotbed for Antagonism?
It can be said that the Internet has served as a political forum for the
Chinese since its inception. The development of the Internet in its earlier
forms (the ARPAnet, NSFnet, Usenet, Bitnet, and so on) and e-mail, in the
late 1980s, coincided with a period of political and social unrest across the
world, especially in the “really existing socialist countries,” including
China. Apart from the fall of the Berlin Wall, which signaled the demise of
communism in the Soviet bloc, the events at Tiananmen Square in 1989 are
generally perceived by Western media as a turning point in China’s political
life (a perception that is nonetheless sharply disputed among the Chinese).
Inasmuch as the Tiananmen events are inextricably related to global (read:
Western) media, the post-Tiananmen image of China has ever since been
caught in an endless spin of politicization, demonization by Western
media, and angry denials and counterattacks by the Chinese. It should be
noted that Western media were instrumental in the making of the
Tiananmen events, a fact that has been long ignored in the West.22
The Chinese-language Internet was involved from the very beginning
with the “Tiananmen and post-Tiananmen media war.” The media war
was fought not merely between Western and Chinese media. By 1989 there
was a large contingent of Chinese students (more than 100,000) in the
United States who studied primarily natural sciences and engineering.
These students by and large were sympathetic with the demonstrators in
Beijing and were outraged at the bloody crackdown by the Chinese govern-
ment. After many prominent Tiananmen activists fled to the United States,
a new alliance of political dissent was forged between the newly arrived and
the existing Chinese students, thanks to the fast, convenient links of e-mail.
For a while in 1990 “the Chinese democracy lobbyists” dominated the po-
litical landscape of Washington, D.C., resulting in a flurry of condemna-
tions by the U.S. Congress, embargoes against China, and President George
H. W. Bush’s executive order in 1990 that granted permanent U.S. resi-
dence to hundreds of thousands of Chinese. E-mail was the principal
means of communication that mobilized this remarkable “international
lobbyist” feat in U.S. politics. The exiled Tiananmen activists then joined
hands with other political dissident groups in the West under the banner of
“democracy movement” and “human rights movement.”
The first Internet magazine in both English and Chinese, China News
Digest (CND) <www.cnd.org> and Huaxia Wenzhai (China digest)
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<www.cnd.org/hxwz>, appeared at that same moment. China News Digest,
an English-language Web magazine, was created in March 1989 in Canada
by two Chinese students. They claimed that their purpose was to serve the
“need for information exchange on the network among Chinese students
and scholars” and “to evade the pressure from the Chinese consulate in
Canada, which had a higher degree of control on Chinese students than
their U.S. counterparts.”23 At first, according to its producers, the CND
had about four hundred readers in Canada. The Tiananmen events gave the
magazine a huge boost. By September 1989 it had set up Listserv accounts
at Arizona State University and Kent State University, with about four
thousand subscribers in the United States and Canada. Then the CND be-
came a full-fledged daily electronic newspaper, with several sections and
services, including book reviews, a stock market watch, and special sections
concerning the Olympic Games, the Most Favored Nation trade status, and
Chinese students’ permanent residency status. In 1991 the first electronic
Chinese-language weekly magazine, Huaxia Wenzhai, was published by the
CND. The CND’s initial publication in March 1989 was less than two years
after the publication of the first online newspaper, San Jose Mercury News
in California, which was launched in 1987. With the introduction of the
World Wide Web in the mid-1990s, the CND rapidly expanded its service
and audience. By March 1998, CND asserted that its homepage “receives
about 17,000 visits a day, while the Huaxia Wenzhai’s sub-homepage is vis-
ited by an average of 18,000 times a day.” In 1995, CND moved to Mary-
land and was “officially registered as a non-profit organization, as China
News Digest International, Inc.” And on 9 May 1996 the IRS approved
CND’s tax exemption status, according to the same account.24
One may wonder, however, what kind of status (taxational, legal, and
financial) the CND had actually had during those years. One may also
question its purported nature of “community-based, free news and infor-
mation service provided by volunteers.”25 But its enormous popularity
among the Chinese student communities in North America and in western
European countries was beyond any doubt, especially before the World
Wide Web was launched in the mid-1990s. There are a number of Chinese-
language newspapers in North America. Shijie Ribao (World journal), a
New York–based newspaper, was sponsored by the Nationalist government
of Taiwan (it still favors a pro-Nationalist editorial policy now, after
Taiwan’s ruling party changed hands to the pro-independent Democratic
Progressive Party). World Journal’s audience mainly consists of overseas
Chinese from Taiwan. The pro-PRC Qiao Bao (China express), also based
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in New York, is read primarily by those from mainland China. In addition,
there was a free circulation, for many years, of People’s Daily (Overseas edi-
tion). It now charges only a nominal fee to its subscribers, who are mainly
students and scholars from the PRC. From the early 1980s, there were sev-
eral Chinese-language journals run by the exiled political dissidents, such
as the New York–based Zhongguo zhichun (China spring), which was pub-
lished by the first political dissident group, China Alliance for Democracy,
established in 1983. All these publications targeted the large Chinese stu-
dent body in the United States and Canada. But none of these print publi-
cations was competitive with the electronic CND and Huaxia Wenzhai in
popularity or circulation.
CND was popular among Chinese students first because it was free and
convenient. It was readily available to Chinese graduate students, who
spent days and nights at laboratories toiling over projects assigned by their
American academic advisers and lab supervisors. Browsing over CND on-
line was an easy way to relax at the lab and to obtain information about
China. It also offered practical assistance (concerning visa status, immigra-
tion, taxes, and other legal matters) to tens of thousands of Chinese stu-
dents who in the post-Tiananmen period felt deeply estranged from the
Chinese government and who usually preferred to stay permanently in the
West. Students were particularly enamored of Huaxia Wenzhai because it
published anecdotes, personal memoirs, short stories, prose essays, and in-
vestigative reports, free from political clichés that ran in every page of
People’s Daily, China Spring, and World Journal. Huaxia Wenzhai was for a
long while an indispensable resource for tens of thousands of Chinese stu-
dents in the United States, providing news, useful practical information,
and entertainment.
The foremost objective of the CND and Huaxia Wenzhai, however, is
not information service or entertainment but political, ideological advo-
cacy, despite its editorial disclaimer to the contrary. Its editorial policy
echoes the mainstream Western media, which aims to produce “indepen-
dent,” “impartial,” “balanced,” and “unbiased” news and analysis. It also
resembles mainstream Western news media in its coverage and commen-
tary of China. CND’s editorial policy largely represents exiled Chinese po-
litical dissidents who reside mostly in the United States. Take issue 507 of
Huaxia Wenzhai, from 15 December 2000, as an example of an average
issue. No particularly “newsworthy” events occurred, and no special mem-
orable dates were marked during the week of December 15. The issue con-
sists of nine sections. It begins with the weekly news summary and ends
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with a table of contents for its special issues on the Cultural Revolution.
The other seven sections are journalistic and literary essays. The news sec-
tion is divided into Chinese news and international news. The Chinese
news section contains sixteen brief news items, of which five items are
about “human rights abuses” (the alleged “government persecution of the
Falun Gong members,” U.S. accusations of China’s “worsening human
rights conditions,” and the like). Of the remaining nine news stories, four
are about disasters and crimes, two about Hong Kong’s legal battle with
mainland illegal residents, and two about Taiwan independence. The rest of
the news reports deal with China’s negotiations with the World Trade Or-
ganization, China president Jiang Zemin’s congratulations to George W.
Bush for his election to the U.S. presidency, China’s corruption trials, and
so on. These news briefs are either translations from the mainstream U.S.
media or headlines taken from Taiwan media. The news categories of
Huaxia Wenzhai correspond to the ratio of U.S. media coverage of China,
too: “human rights” news reports, about 25 to 35 percent; crimes and dis-
asters, about 25 percent; and the Sino-U.S. relationship, 10 to 15 percent;
Taiwan and Hong Kong, about 20%; and the rest (China’s politics, eco-
nomics, science and technology, social and cultural events, and so on)
about 10 to 15 percent.26
News categories frame worldly events according to certain themes and
agenda setting. In the early 1990s, when most overseas Chinese students
were still caught in the “post-Tiananmen syndrome” of anger and frustra-
tion, Huaxia Wenzhai’s agenda setting was in tune with this general mood.
However, as China’s reality has evolved in the mid-1990s beyond the poli-
tics of Tiananmen, and, in the meantime, the tension between China and
the United States has steadily risen, the mood of the overseas Chinese com-
munities changed significantly. By the end of the 1990s, CND and Huaxia
Wenzhai no longer enjoyed overwhelming popularity among the overseas
Chinese student communities, due in part to an increasing number of
Chinese-language websites offered more options. The main reason, how-
ever, is that CND refused to move beyond the “post-Tiananmen syn-
drome” and modify accordingly its position of advocacy for the exiled po-
litical dissidents, who have become quickly marginalized in the course of
China’s development.
Apart from the news reports, other sections and columns in the 15
December issue of Huaxia Wenzhai carry essays and reportage that invari-
ably condemn the corruption and tyranny of China’s communist rule. The
essays share the mood of overseas political dissident groups such as China
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Watch, Human Rights in China, and so on, attributing all problems to the
absence of a multiparty political system. For example, the essay
“Unemployment in China” offers the author’s investigation of a local tex-
tile factory’s layoffs of workers. Although the author cautions that his inves-
tigation “has only a small scale and cannot be representative,” he nonethe-
less asks: “Can we imagine the astonishingly high unemployment under the
‘xiao kang’ [moderate affluence] society that we hoped for twenty years ago
and the tormented life of ‘masters of the country’ [the working class] below
poverty lines? When the People’s Daily blares that the objective of tripling
China’s GDP has been achieved three years in advance, does it mean any-
thing to us at all?”27 The author of another prose essay, “Mourning over the
Silence,” asserts that he has visited many European cities and is amazed by
their preservation of tradition under modernity, then mourns in an im-
pressionistic way the “ills of Chinese modernity.” The mourning ends with
a rather hackneyed diatribe against Mao: “Mao left us not only the legacy of
the notorious Cultural Revolution. . . . The sons of the old revolutionaries
now become national leaders; the former Red Guards are now county and
provincial governors and mayors. . . . Chinese civilization will be com-
pletely lost in their hands.”28 Although Huaxia Wenzhai comments on cur-
rent issues, the discourses and perspectives that it takes are apparently out
of touch with the Chinese audience, except for a shrinking coterie of politi-
cal dissidents. Furthermore, CND and Huaxia Wenzhai’s adherence to
non-interactive journalistic style is outdated, too. Web users are now eager
to voice their own opinions on everything, taking full advantage of the in-
teractive chat rooms, bulletin boards, and online forums.
In the late 1990s, new online Chinese-language forums and chat rooms
began to boom. The most dramatic of them is unquestionably the Strong
Power Forum, or Qiangguo Luntan, the online chatroom of People’s Daily
<www.peopledaily.com.cn>. The New York Times asserts: “For the
[Chinese] government, the Internet has been, at times, a useful tool: after
the embassy bombing in Belgrade, for example, chat rooms gave Chinese
an outlet for their anger. But it is clearly a double-edged sword.”29 The re-
port continues: “In early May, for example, most of the entries were attacks
on the United States, NATO and President Clinton, reflecting the wide-
spread view that the Chinese Embassy had been deliberately chosen as a
target. But by the end of the month, the anniversary of the June 4, 1989,
crackdown in Tiananmen Square was fast approaching. Along with thou-
sands of patriotic entries, a few more controversial thoughts occasionally
made their way online—if only for a few minutes. On the chat room
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Netease, which was devoted to the embassy bombing, one person ventured:
‘June 4 is coming. What do you think?’ The events of June 1989, when
tanks moved into central Beijing, killing hundreds of civilians, are among
China’s ultimate political taboos.”30
The New York Times report catches the obvious timing of the tenth an-
niversary of the 4 June 1989 Tiananmen events, which by coincidence was
only one month from the 7 May 1999 embassy bombing that led to the
opening of Strong Power Forum. But the Times report misses the irony. In
ten years, icons about China have changed from a universal symbol—the
Goddess of Democracy at Tiananmen Square in 1989—to a set of particular-
istic images in the spring of 1999 in Beijing. There were the crying mothers
of the victims of NATO’s embassy bombing, which appeared only in
Chinese media. By contrast, the predominant image in the U.S. media was
the sullen face of James Sasser, the U.S. ambassador to China, looking out
from the broken window of the American Embassy in Beijing, damaged by
angry student demonstrators. Deliberately or unwittingly, the U.S. media
create (or exclude) these images to reaffirm certain ideological messages.
But the irony is that the discourses that American journalists used to tell the
story of Beijing student demonstrations that took place in 1989 and 1999,
respectively, had to effect a thorough about-face. In 1989, at the tri-
umphant moment of globalizing, universalizing ideologies of freedom and
democracy, the U.S. media touted the Chinese students as young heroes
and heroines, embracing the pro-American symbol of white-woman-as-
liberty. Only a decade later, the same kinds of Chinese students from the
same universities were portrayed by the same U.S. media as mobsters, mo-
bilized by the Communist regime for an anti-American, ultranationalistic,
and xenophobic cause. What are absent in the U.S. media’s discourse in
1999, though, are the universal and idealist claims of freedom and democ-
racy, as well as the particular, individual plights of the bombing victims and
the emotional reactions of the Chinese public. Much accentuated, instead,
are the equally particularistic and nationalistic assertions made by U.S.
media of the “threat to American interests by Chinese mobsters” and the
“rising tide of Chinese nationalism.” In hindsight, one can now discern in
the universalizing 1989 discourse of freedom and democracy the particu-
laristic, cold war ideological agenda to end communism and to bring China
under the geopolitical order set forth by the United States as the only re-
maining superpower.
Under the universalizing symbolism of freedom and democracy, the
particular geopolitical objectives of the United States to end communism
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were largely concealed in the news coverage of the Tiananmen events in
1989. Once again, the yearnings of the Chinese public for an equal, demo-
cratic society were submerged in the clamorous, nationalist rhetoric in
1999. The upsurge of nationalist sentiment at the turn of the century, how-
ever, has resulted from the convergence of complex forces. I have argued in
this book that nationalism is always a very complex question. I would like
to reiterate here that to understand the rising nationalism in China today, it
is imperative both to historicize and to contextualize. We need to rigor-
ously historicize the rise of nationalism as an ideological formation in
modern China at different historical moments and in the hands of different
rival political forces. Nationalism had undoubtedly served different politi-
cal and ideological functions for the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek
and for the CCP under Mao. Even in the course of the CCP’s history, na-
tionalism has had a variety of facets and functions. It once served as a revo-
lutionary ideology for national liberation from imperialism and colonial-
ism and then, after the establishment of the PRC, as a state ideology for
legitimating the modern nation-state. The state endorsement of national-
ism in recent years is apparently part of the effort to find an ideological
substitute for communism, as well as recognition by the state of the rising
nationalist sentiments among the Chinese public.31
To assess the current wave of nationalism in China, we need to attend
not only to the context of globalization, in which nationalism is often a
local response to the dominant forces of global capital, but also, more
specifically, to the context of the United States, where most of the censures
against Chinese nationalism are generated. In the world of realpolitik, the
naked show of force, as expressed in George W. Bush’s “preemptive strikes
against terrorism” or U.S. unilateralism, is routinely justified by the U.S.
media as “defense of freedom and democracy” and “American patriotism.”
Under these circumstances, academic critics in the United States often find
it hard to resist the temptation to stigmatize a Chinese nationalism, an
Arabic nationalism, or a Russian nationalism, despite their self-conscious,
critical stance. It is intellectually counterproductive, however, not to ques-
tion intensely the “preemptive strikes against nationalism,” as it were, as a
habitual mode of thinking that inhibits, rather than encourages, unfettered
inquiries for truth.
Apart from nationalism, the dialectic twists and turns constitute the
context in which the Strong Power Forum emerged. Topics in the forum
encompass the full complexity and contradictions of China’s historical mo-
ment: issues of globalization, nationalism, regionalism, ethnic tensions and
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conflicts; China’s domestic politics and Sino-U.S. relations; China’s eco-
nomic marketization and political impasse; China’s state-building, social
and cultural reconstruction; global geopolitics and China’s role, are heat-
edly debated. Debates attract a great many participants. On 9 May 1999,
the Strong Power Forum’s opening day and just one day after NATO war-
planes bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, the forum had fifty thou-
sand visitors within twenty-four hours. It now averages seventy thousand
visitors a day, primarily people ages nineteen to thirty-five.
In addition to its regular chat room or bulletin board, which posts
hundreds and thousands of messages daily, the forum has several special
sections. One is the interactive live forum, which invites scholars, special-
ists, government officials, and celebrities to “chat” online with the audience
on certain topics. The other is a section of in-depth discussions, where
messages are screened by editors for more focused discussions. The third
section is called the Forum Digest, in which messages are selected by the
editors and then posted and reposted. It has about eighty to ninety cate-
gories, from “Taiwan Strait Issues,” “Political Democracy and Political
Reform,” and “China’s Military Buildup” to “Anti-corruption,”
“Sovereignty and Human Rights,” “China and Olympic Games,” “Humor
and Jokes,” “Stock Market,” and “Marriage and Law.” The digest section re-
sembles a U.S. Sunday newspaper in size, but without advertisements.
A random browsing of one day’s contents will illustrate the diversity of
messages. The selective section of “In-depth Discussion” on 21 December
2000 (an uneventful, “normal” day) contains 114 messages. The first 10
messages are as follows: (1) “Jiang Zemin spoke out!!!!!” (2) “In 15 years,
Japan’s status of the second economic power in the world will be replaced
by China and India—if we believe this, we’ll be utterly fooled.” (3) “This
morning China launched its last satellite in the 20th century.” (4) “Frauds
at national college entry examination reflect China’s social reality—what
kinds of ‘stability’ do we need?” (5) “Attention to our peasant brothers (I):
Who treats peasants as human beings?” (6) “Attention to our peasant
brothers (II): How are the ‘rogues’ singled out among peasants?” (7)
“Attention to our peasant brothers (III): Peasant problem is China’s central
problem.” (8) “China’s old friends are vampires sucking Chinese blood!”
(9) “The key to China’s economic problems is political reform.” (10) “On
advantages of public ownership of property.”
Not only do the issues vary a great deal; so does the form and content.
Some messages are news stories quoted from news media. Message 3 above,
on the satellite launch, is a report from the China News Agency (a state-
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owned media service catering to the international community). News from
American, western European, Taiwanese, and Hong Kong media often
sneak in as messages attached with comments. These kinds of news reports
or analyses do not appear even in Cankao xiaoxi (Reference news), China’s
largest-circulation newspaper that carries translations of news from for-
eign presses, as edited by the Xinhua News Agency. Although Chinese read-
ers usually can manage to view websites of the New York Times and other
Western presses by dodging the official Internet blockade, the news stories
that appear in the Strong Power Forum in Chinese translation give readers
a more direct access. Apart from the news, there are long essays in several
segments of the “In-depth Discussion,” such as messages 5 to 7 on “peasant
problems,” which are written in serious academic style, backed by research
with extensive footnotes. Some are brief, perfunctory remarks, such as
message 2 on Japan’s economic power and message 8 on China’s “vampire”
friends.
A long essay (about seven thousand words), posted on 2 December
2000 by Zhou Xincheng and Chen Xiankui, both from the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences, warns of the ideological and cultural infiltra-
tion of the “Western antagonistic forces.” To emphasize their seriousness,
the authors use their real names rather than nicknames, as do most chat
room participants, and they identify their institutional affiliation. The essay
lists seven major ways by which the “Western antagonistic forces” infiltrate
Chinese cultural and ideological domains, which include “forcing China to
accept ‘international and global standards’ set up primarily by the United
States, dismembering socialist China through globalization, and spreading
Western ideologies and values through high-tech means, such as the
Internet and the information superhighway.” The authors then call for “op-
position to both ‘leftist’ and ‘rightist’ trends,” asserting that “under the cur-
rent condition of globalization, we should remain vigilant primarily against
rightist trends, for we must fight peaceful evolution and ideological infiltra-
tion in dealing with Western countries.”32 The essay reflects the views of the
conservative, communist old guard. These old leftist ideologues have lost
most of their political power during gaige kaifang, but nonetheless they still
retain a certain influence in the ideological domain, because institutionally
that domain has been, and still is, the least touched estate.
Not only does People’s Daily have to pay some tribute to the old guard
of communism in Strong Power Forum; important state media, such as the
newspaper of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Jiefangjun bao (PLA
daily), also echo the concerns of the old guard in their editorials. PLA Daily
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warns that “information colonialism” is a real threat to the national secu-
rity and the cultural, ideological values of many developing countries, be-
cause the majority of information in the global information network—the
Internet in particular—comes from English-speaking countries, primarily
the United States. The editorial demands that China must establish its own
information network by technological innovations and by “studying rigor-
ously the strategies of the people’s war in the information era.”33
On the one hand, the concern for national security and “information
colonialism” is not unwarranted, given U.S. domination of the global in-
formation network and its expansion in the cultural and ideological do-
mains. Joseph Nye, former U.S. assistant secretary of defense and dean of
the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, argues in major U.S. media
that exercising “soft power” in ideological and cultural arenas is critical to
consolidating U.S. interests globally.34 On the other hand, vigilance for se-
curity can readily become an excuse for suppressing free exchange of ideas
on the Internet. Moreover, the slightest sign of the Chinese state’s interfer-
ence in the ideological and cultural domains will inevitably invoke a sharp
rebuke from the United States, given that the issues of “human rights viola-
tions” and “suppression of freedom and democracy” have become the pri-
mary political instruments in the U.S. policy of China. This in turn will
give the Chinese leftist old guard more ammunition to assault America-
backed “bourgeois liberalization” and “peaceful evolution.” The vicious
circle spins from there, and the Chinese government cannot stop it. Lest it
affect the strategic Sino-U.S. relationship deemed most critical by Jiang
Zemin’s leadership, the Chinese government has adopted a low-key, am-
biguous tactic when tensions between the Left and the Right are on the rise,
by allowing both camps to air their grudges against each other without tip-
ping the balance in the Internet forum.
The contents of the Strong Power Forum indicate the extent to which
the Chinese Communist leaders are willing to tolerate, if not endorse, this
free flow of ideas in cyberspace. Yet the existence of the forum itself cannot
testify as to whether it is a true public sphere for democratic participation
or simply a hotbed for antagonistic ideas spawning more cleavages. A Time
magazine report describes the unprecedented openness and freedom in the
chat room and comments: “[T]he passion reminds some Chinese of the
dazibao (big-character poster) writing of the Cultural Revolution, when
people openly criticized one other. Again Jiang Yaping [the editor of the
forum] stresses how times have changed. ‘The big-character posters were
full of abuse and personal attacks,’ he says. ‘The key is to have a standard so
The Internet in China 147
that our users know what they can and cannot do on the Web.’ ”35
However, the foul language may be weeded out, but the heated arguments
over so many highly divisive issues, often without any consensus, cannot be
handled easily, as the reader’s opinions are edited in newspapers. Despite
the careful “management” of the chat room by Jiang Yaping and his edito-
rial group as they try to bring some order into the free flow of information,
some highly contentious disputes often erupt in the chat room. Under the
present circumstances, when laws and regulations concerning media and
the press are incomplete and arbitrary and the state censorship bureau-
cracy is ineffective, no one knows where the Internet forums in the state-
owned media are heading.
The state-owned media, of course, no longer have the monopoly in
China today. Many independent websites dedicated to social and political
debates have sprung up in recent years. Some websites gained popularity in
intellectual circles by their controversial standpoints, and some by exten-
sive coverage of debates. Sixiang de Jingjie (Visions and thoughts;
<www.sunchina.net/sixiang/index.htm>) was a website produced by Li
Yonggang, a lecturer at Nanjing University’s Department of Political
Science and Administration, which included essays authored by some fifty
scholars, covering the major issues of intellectual debates. The scholars rep-
resented a broad spectrum of views, from neoliberal and New Left to neo-
conservative, and debated on a wide range of issues, such as China’s
modernity, political reform, economic developments, social problems, and
so on. Among the authors were some exiled intellectuals known for their
dissident politics, such as the journalist Dai Qing. The website was created
in September 1999. One year later in October 2000, it closed down, which
caused considerable stir in the media outside China. Some overseas
Chinese media were quick to accuse the state of coercing the website to
shut down, stating that “it again showed that there is no legitimate space in
China for moderate, rational, gradualist, and open debates about reform as
long as political issues are touched.”36 Inundated by hundreds of inquiries
right after the website shutdown was announced, Li Yonggang, the owner of
the website, issued a long public statement, saying that his decision to close
it down “has nothing to do with the government and politics” and that “it’s
entirely my personal decision, for private reasons.”37 The essays from the
website, however, reappear on many other websites as Internet forums and
journals continue to grow.
These semi-independent or independent Internet forums are quite ex-
plicit in their political and ideological orientations, and they are sharply di-
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vided. Wenhua Zhongguo (Culture China; <www.202.106.168.89/
~culturechina>) is owned by Yu Shicun (however, the website no longer
functions, and no new Web address is available at the time of this writing).
Yu is editor in chief of Zhanlue yu guangli (Strategy and management), a
well-known journal in Beijing that is backed by the Chinese army and often
publishes controversial articles in the social sciences and humanities. Yu’s
website is not, however, an online version of the journal. It carries poignant
articles that critique social ills and the moral and ethical problems that
China faces from “secular and humanistic viewpoints.” Recently, a few web-
sites with strong New Left inclinations have attracted a lot of attention.
Shibai Luntan (Shibai forum; <www.pen123.net.cn>) carries mostly articles
authored by scholars affiliated with the New Left or nationalist camps, and it
also has a section of articles by neoliberals, debating with them the issues of
free market, liberalism, socialism, economic inequality and injustice, and
authoritarianism. Most authors that publish in Internet forums and journals
are well-known activists in China’s intellectual debates now, and some are
Chinese scholars residing in the United States and western Europe. They
take an active part in the Internet forums and journals and are eager to dis-
seminate their views first through the Internet. Apart from the China-based
websites, there are a good deal of Chinese-language websites originating in
North America and elsewhere that also participate in heated online debates.
Huayue Luntan (Huayue forum; <http://huayue.org>) is a popular U.S.-
based forum and chat room that resembles the Strong Power Forum in its
format and content, with many fewer editorial constraints. Zhongguo yu
Shijie (China and the world; <www.chinabulletin.com>, no longer avail-
able) is a well-known U.S.-based website divided into an online journal, a
historical archive, and a chat room. The website has an obvious leftist orien-
tation, criticizing the neoliberal, free market ideologies and Deng Xiaoping’s
developmentalism.
The Internet offers a major venue for China’s political, ideological, and
intellectual debates, with little and largely ineffective censorship or official
interference. Hence it can be viewed as a rare space for almost unrestrained
free speech that hardly exists in China’s mainland. Despite the sporadic
tightening up and crackdowns, and contrary to the reports of the Western
media, the Chinese state in general has kept a low profile and an ambiguous
attitude toward the Internet forums, tolerating their growth as long as no
one publicly advocates the overthrow of the current regime. Since the
1990s, China’s publishing industry has become primarily market-driven,
and the market for “serious” journals, magazines about intellectual issues,
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literature, and arts has rapidly shrunk. In the meantime, Chinese academic
journals of social sciences and humanities, mostly run by university
presses, are under the double pressure of censorship and professionaliza-
tion and have become largely the venues for professional and career ad-
vancement of the Chinese academics, who usually avoid any politically sen-
sitive topics in their writings for these journals. The Internet thus provides
a low-cost, efficient, and relatively censorship-free forum for intellectual
debates. It is safe to predict that the Internet political forums in China will
continue to grow and to play more significant roles in China’s social life.
But what remains to be seen is whether the Internet political forums will
lead to a democratic public sphere or a nursery for social antagonism, be-
cause normative, regulative, and legal criteria and institutional infrastruc-
tures in China’s cultural and ideological domain are singularly wanting.
The absence of rules and normative institutions in China has not consti-
tuted an environment for free speech and democratic social life for all citi-
zens. There is a long way to go to a democratic public sphere, and the
Internet alone cannot create a miracle.
Literature in Cyberspace: Urban Youth’s Search 
for Aesthetic Expressions
In addition to serving as alternative news media and political forum, online
literature, or online literary self-expression, has become another major at-
traction to the Chinese Internet users, particularly to the urban youth.
According to the Internet Information Center of China, 80 percent of
China’s Internet users live in urban areas and have a high school education
or above. A significant portion (about 45 percent) of these urban Internet
users are between twenty and thirty years old—that is, they were born in
the 1970s or later.38 This generation in a way is the main beneficiary of the
reform in terms of material and economic prosperity, but it also bears the
brunt of the social transition: confusion and the loss of values and ethical
norms, as the revolutionary idealism of Mao’s era has been rapidly replaced
by consumerism and egotism. The beginning of the twenty-first century
marks the coming of age of the new generation. A distinct urban youth cul-
ture is taking shape, nurtured largely by an electronically based consumer
culture. As such, this youth culture is the embodiment of globalization: it
draws its icons, styles, images, and values mainly from the “global” (read:
Western) consumer cultural production and entertainment industry. In
the meantime, the young generation has a much stronger desire for a dis-
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tinct cultural identity, marking their individual differences, when com-
pared with their parents, who were “Mao’s children” born in the 1950s.
Compared with their parents or their older siblings, members of the
urban youth generation are much less interested in political and social
issues, and they care more about personal, individual wish fulfillments. 
In a social ambience of commercialism, they are much more inclined to
pleasure-seeking, sensuous, or aesthetically pleasing lifestyles and self-
expressions. The Internet hence provides the techno-savvy youth with a
much freer and trendier (or “cooler”) venue for self-expression in artistic
and literary forms. The recent proliferation of e-fiction sites and the rise of
several “e-fiction star writers,” whose writings were published first as
Internet literature and then turned into best-selling printed books, have
constituted a thriving cyberspace literary field. Not surprisingly, Internet
literature arouses both suspicion and enthusiasm from established writers
and literary critics, but it would be too simplistic to brush it aside as merely
a high-tech offspring of consumer culture. Although the dominant mode
of Internet literature is that of pleasure-seeking romance and libidinous
fantasies, one also witnesses of late a surge of interest in revolutionary ide-
alism in new experimental theaters and their websites, particularly the play
Che Guevara (2000), which has toured China with remarkable success. The
Internet has been most active in disseminating information and debates
about the play, creating an interface between theatrical performances and
online discussions.
Generally speaking, the Internet serves also as an interface of the self-
identities of urban youth, consumer culture, global fashions, and cultural
trends. Urban youth often identify themselves as “Xin renlei” (new human-
ity) or, lately, “Xin xin renlei” (newer new humanity). The term was coined
first in Taiwan in the mid-1990s and reached mainland China quickly.
Members of the Newer New Humanity are described by one writer as hav-
ing the inclination to “chase anything new, fashionable, vanguard,” to
“love cartoons, tattoos, disco, etc.” and to be “crazy about new lifestyles,
new technology, and freedom.” The same writer adds: “They are the gener-
ation of information technology and the Internet. Their shared language is
a cryptic ‘digital slang’ and ‘Internet slang.’ ”39 A self-styled manifesto as-
serts that “the Newer New Humanity is born at the age of globalization and
technological innovation” and that its members “consist of the middle class
of the Internet and e-commerce specialists, cartoon-and-disco-loving gen-
eration, McDonald’s, Coca-Cola, telemarketing, independent workers, and
avant-garde artists.” The manifesto continues, “They are transforming the
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old values of life and relationships with their own lifestyles, in order to ful-
fill the goal of more humane and self-pleasing existence.”40 While the goal
of this generation is both vague (“more humane”) and pleasure oriented
(“self-pleasing existence”), it is clearly linked with the global (Western)
trend.
CCTV’s English channel produced a special program called “The
Yettie,” in which Sam Sifton, an American who wrote A Field Guide to the
Yettie: America’s Young, Entrepreneurial Technocrats, was interviewed.
Sifton preached to millions of the CCTV English channel’s young Chinese
audience. The introduction to the interview states that Yetties “have a dif-
ferent set of values from their predecessors—a kind of techno-
libertarianism.” In the interview, Sifton asserted: “Yetties are everywhere—
they exist across the spectrum of the American population. . . . [Their
values are] a kind of rape-and-pillage libertarianism. Privacy and freedom
are of the utmost importance to both his [the yettie’s] political beliefs and
to his bottom line.”41
The Chinese Newer New Humanity may not be the copycats of the
American Yetties in their values and beliefs, but they have more common-
alities than differences. When it comes to literary expressions on the
Internet, however, their differences seem more pronounced. American
Yetties show little interest in Internet literature, whereas the Chinese Newer
New Humanity embraces the Internet as the new literary starlet. A click on
Sohu.com and Chinese Yahoo.com, two major Chinese-language website
search engines, produces more than three hundred websites dedicated to
literature. Taking advantage of the absence of cyberspace copyright laws, a
majority of these websites simply copy online published literary works
from canonical classics to latest best-selling martial arts fiction (a popular
genre analogous in its status to science fiction in the United States) for free
download or browsing. Still, a significant host of websites is devoted to
original online literary writings, providing a venue for literary aspirants to
freely publish their writings without the editorial screening of the print
presses and magazines. The Newer New Humanity can experiment with all
sorts of writing styles and techniques, using interactive chat rooms to “col-
lectively” produce literary works and creating “Internet slang” as a “cool,”
special kind of self-expression among the group.
Although the bulk of Internet literature is largely like sophomoric
composition, outstanding works have emerged, and several Internet writers
have become the consumer culture’s new stars. In the fall of 1999,
Netease.com, a leading portal company, and Rongshuxia (Under the
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banyan; <www.rongshu.com>), a website dedicated to Internet literature,
each organized its own Internet literature contest. Rongshuxia received
seven thousand e-fiction and e-prose essay submissions, and fifty thousand
readers participated in the two-month contest. The contest committee,
composed of a host of China’s most famous writers such as Wang Anyi, Jia
Pingwa, Yu Hua, and Wang Shuo, selected eighteen pieces for awards.
Netease.com also asked such literary luminaries as Wang Meng and Liu
Xinwu to select thirty winners from among three thousand submissions.42
Notwithstanding the fanfare and pomp of these contests, which were moti-
vated mainly by commercial objectives, a number of e-fiction writers have
indeed gained widespread popularity.
In 1999 an e-fiction writer with the pen name of Long Yin (Dragon
Singing) produced a new genre of wenxia xiaoshuo (literary knight fiction)
as a parody-travesty of the popular, traditional genre of martial arts fic-
tion, or “knight-errant” fiction. He published a trilogy entitled Zhisheng
Dongfang Shuo (Wise sage Dongfang Shuo) on the literary website Da Tang
Zhongwen (Great Tang dynasty Chinese; <www.dtnets.com>). The trilogy
is based on the legends of Dongfang Shuo (154–93 b.c.), an offbeat hu-
morist and court entertainer during the Western Han dynasty. The hero’s
satirical discourse and quick wit are often described as a counterweight to
the stern, heavily didactic, moralistic Confucian literary canons in Chinese
literary history.
Wise Sage Dongfang Shuo is filled with satire and humor, parodying the
literary convention of martial arts fiction and its hackneyed character types
and stereotypes. The author is apparently well versed in martial arts fic-
tional styles and narrative techniques and is adaptable to the trend of
“rewriting/dramatizing history” in China in the 1990s. A deluge of popular
fiction, including television soap operas about emperors and their concu-
bines, as well as the mistresses and romantic affairs of politicians, warriors,
and writers in China’s imperial past, prevailed in China’s consumer culture
scene. The e-fiction Wise Sage Dongfang Shuo adroitly jumped on the band-
wagon of romanticizers of the imperial glory and won the sentiment of the
reading public instantaneously. The traditional print press immediately
took note. In the spring of 2000, Zuojia chubanshe (Writers press), one of
the most prestigious literary presses in China, decided to publish the tril-
ogy, and in less than a month about ten thousand copies had been sold,
making the trilogy the first best-seller of e-fiction. CCTV’s Television Series
Studio, China’s largest soap opera syndicate, bought the television adapta-
tion rights before the printed books were on the market.43 The commercial
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success of Wise Sage Dongfang Shuo in both cyberspace and traditional
print book form created a new literary market in China. Many traditional
presses followed suit, publishing popular e-novels and stories as best-
sellers. Under the Banyan claims that it has signed contracts with twenty-
three presses since the spring of 2000 and has published fifty-six books of
fiction, poetry, or prose essay, which were all first published online. The
print books of e-literature by March 2001 had already sold more than
1,240,000 copies.44 The “e-fiction” label adds much to the appeal of this
new popular genre. It has become a popular genre in consumer popular
culture, along with other popular genres, such as the fiction of “beauty-
baby authors.”
The “beauty-baby authors” are a group of young female writers, repre-
sented by Wei Hui, a Shanghai-based freelance Newer New Humanity
writer. (Other names of this group include Mian Mian [Cotton cotton],
Anni Baobei [Baby Annie], Hei Keke [Black Coco], Wang Maomao [Kitty-
cat Wang], and so on.) Wei Hui’s novel, Shanghai baobei (Shanghai baby,
2000), gained her popularity or notoriety, for its graphic and allegedly
“pornographic” depiction of sex, lust, and drugs of Shanghai young
women with leisure and money. These women of the Newer New
Humanity usually have high-paying jobs in transnational corporations in
Shanghai, and they frequent nightclubs with their Western bosses and other
foreign executives and businessmen.45 Not surprisingly, the Internet liter-
ary websites play an active role in promoting the “beauty-baby authors” by
publishing online all their works, some of which, including Shanghai Baby,
are banned publicly because of their alleged obscenity. These female writ-
ers, however, advocate unabashedly their literary style of shenti xiezuo (lit-
erally, “body writing,” which can mean “writing about body” or “writing
with body”), and the display of feminine bodies and private body parts in
their writings take up a considerable portion, along with flashy colored
self-portraits on book covers and plates that graphically illustrate their
bodies. The commercial success of the “beauty-baby authors” has spawned
a flurry of teenage writers, female and male, since the end of the 1990s. In
the spring of 2002, a novel authored by Chun Shu, a seventeen-year-old
girl, caused quite a stir in China. The novel, Beijing wawa (Beijing doll), os-
tensibly imitating the title of Shanghai Baby, attracted a great deal of atten-
tion first on the Internet and then among China’s reading public.46 Beijing
Doll is hailed by some critics as China’s first novel of the “cruelty of the
young,” for it boldly describes the experiences of urban teenage girls filled
with deceit, desire, and despair.47 The “cruelty of the young” alludes obvi-
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ously to the works of Murakami Haruki, a Japanese popular writer whose
novels, such as Norwegian Wood, have been enormously popular among
Chinese young readers.48 Chun Shu, the author of Beijing Doll, chose her
pen name after Murakami’s name in kanji (Chinese characters), meaning
“spring tree.” From Shanghai Baby to Beijing Doll, the Internet has played a
very active role in promoting young women’s shenti xiezuo (body writing),
which draws on the global or postmodern vogue of feminine defiance and
bodily display.49
Despite the warnings of parents and moralists, the Newer New Hu-
manity is determined to pursue its happiness in romantic adventures and
sensuous experiences. E-fiction writers who are the most audacious and
trendy, as it were, capture the emotions of the pleasure-seeking, desire-
driven youth in their works and thereby are made into stars by both the
Internet and the publishing industry. Of a dozen or so e-literary stars, Bum
Cai (Pizi Cai) is arguably the best known. Bum Cai is the pen name of Cai
Zhiheng, a 30-year-old Taiwanese who was still working on his doctoral de-
gree in hydraulic engineering in Taiwan in the spring of 2001 (no informa-
tion concerning Cai’s doctoral studies was available as of 2003). As a grad-
uate student, Bum Cai is said to play at the keyboard of his computer hour
after hour, surfing the net and chatting, while working in the engineering
lab, like most of the other “Net worms” (wangchong—a nickname coined
by Net users) of his age. Then he is said to begin writing down his fantasies
about romantic adventures through the Internet—thus the first novel about
Internet love, Di yici qinmi jiechu (The first intimate touch), was written.50
The impact that The First Intimate Touch has on mainland readers is
phenomenal. Sina.com, which published the e-novel on the mainland for
the first time, asserts that the novel is the first landmark Internet novel in
Chinese and that it “makes the underground Internet literature emerge
above the ground.”51 Lest any political connotations with “underground”
be invoked, the novel actually has nothing to do with politics, literally or
metaphorically. It is a cyberspace romance populated by the Newer New
Humanity, embodied by the first-person narrator-protagonist Bum Cai—
identical to the pen name of the author. And the protagonist Bum Cai him-
self resembles Bum Cai the author in the real world. The hero Bum Cai is
an engineering graduate student in Taiwan, who buries himself in endless
lab work and mathematical calculations in front of his computer. Often
bored by the mechanical and repetitive work, he fantasizes about romantic
encounters with beautiful girls and finds the Internet chat room the best
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venue to share his fantasies with other Net users who use pseudonyms and
make up their gender and age at will. It is a unique way of fantasizing sex-
ual encounters by remaining anonymous and sharing one’s private, inti-
mate thoughts and desires with an equally anonymous other.
What makes the novel so attractive to the Newer New Humanity are
obviously not the psychological (or psychoanalytical) intricacies of the
Self/Other or absence/presence binary oppositions. On the contrary, in the
novel there is hardly any sign of the kind of intellectual and language games
that inhabit much postmodern or neo-avant-garde fiction. Yet the novel’s
primary appeal lies in its language. The narrative discourse is simple,
straightforward, casual, and conversational, akin to that of drugstore pop-
ular fiction. However, it freely creates cyberslang and neologism out of
Mandarin Chinese, and it mixes English acronyms with Chinese short-
hands, swear words, and even obscenity with high-tech jargon. The profuse
usage and coinage of new slang in depicting cyberspace romance—anony-
mous “Internet lovers” who use very graphic and intimate languages to
each other in reference to their bodies, innermost desires, and sexual fan-
tasies and habits—tend to have a liberating effect not only on the subject of
the novel—that is, romantic love and sexual anxiety—but also on the dis-
course itself. In other words, the Newer New Humanity finds Bum Cai’s cy-
berslang to be a new, exciting discourse for articulating their “liberated” ex-
perience (or in Sam Sifton’s term, “rape-and-pillage libertarianism”). Bum
Cai’s slang and stock phrases such as “beautiful brow” for “girls” (a homo-
nym for “sister,” or meimei), “dinosaur” (konglong) for “man in cyber-
space,” and “I love you ten thousand years” have created a mesmerizing ap-
peal to the members of the Newer New Humanity, who have been nurtured
by television commercials and MTV culture and are accustomed to the
shorthand, yet “cute” and “cool” phrases articulated by MTV and other
television starlets.52
The liberating effect of Bum Cai’s Internet slang can be seen by con-
trasting it with the language of two best-seller novelists in China today:
first, that of Hong Kong–based Jin Yong, China’s foremost martial arts nov-
elist; and, second, that of Wang Shuo, whose Beijing-dialect novels have
won him the title “master of hooligan literature.” Unlike Jin Yong, who in-
sists on a rather elegant literary style, and Wang Shuo, who relies for much
of his appeal on his superb reproduction of contemporary Beijing dialect
and slang, Bum Cai’s discourse neutralizes the vernacular, dialectal aspects
of Chinese language and simultaneously globalizes, as it were, the Chinese
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language, by mixing the “coolest” American English slang with the idioms
of Chinese techno-savvy urbanites. It is an online linguistic hybridity, an
incipient “globalized” Chinese, favored by the Newer New Humanity.
The literary devices and techniques that Bum Cai uses in his e-novels,
however, are nothing innovative. The novel largely adopts rather worn-out
formulas of melodramatic plots and “comedy of errors.” Furthermore, its
carefree way of depicting and conversing about love, sex, and human rela-
tionships is couched in technological and scientific jargon in order to give
its naked pursuit of sensual gratification an educated and high-tech facade.
Yet it can hardly conceal its uncritical endorsement of pleasure-oriented,
egotistic values and beliefs. It is hence disturbing to see that the Chinese
urban youth culture is grounded on such an ideology of global con-
sumerism and egotism. The consumer culture’s tireless promotion of un-
bridled individualism and consumerism severely obfuscates the social con-
ditions of China today and is detrimental to its social reconstruction,
which calls for social commitment and dedication from its citizenry.
The alliance of consumer culture with the Internet has expanded
prodigiously in recent years, and there seems to be hardly any force, gener-
ated either by the general public or by the state, to effectively monitor and
check it. It has mobilized the film industry, television, mass media, elec-
tronic game manufacturers, show business, and so on to produce an inte-
gral network of manufacturing, marketing, sales, and services in the cul-
tural and ideological domain. Intense conflicts have often surfaced in this
arena, which is highly volatile, mobile, and unregulated but nevertheless
backed up by a powerful network of the culture industry. The Internet café
in China is a case in point. Known in China as wangba, or “e-bars,”
Internet cafés mushroomed in China in recent years, and by a 2001 ac-
count, at least 15 percent of children, both elementary schoolers and
teenagers, frequent them in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou.53
In the summer of 2002, I visited about thirty Internet cafés in Nanjing,
about a dozen in Beijing, and three in Shanghai, as an ordinary customer.
My purpose was both pragmatic and research-oriented: to use the Internet
there for faster communication (all Internet cafés have Ethernet, broad-
band connections) and to “feel” the environment firsthand. The Internet
cafés are dotted widely throughout these cities—along small back alleys, on
main boulevards, and in business districts. Most of the Internet cafés were
crowded, with twenty to thirty computers in rooms with an average size of
30 to 40 square meters (about 300 to 360 square feet). Lighting and ventila-
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tion of these rooms are usually poor. Nanjing’s summer is hot, with high
humidity (average temperature is 33°C, or 91.4°F). The crowded Internet
cafés, even though equipped with window-unit air conditioners or electric
fans, were very uncomfortable. But the fare was cheap: in Nanjing, it cost
only 2 yuan RMB (about U.S.$0.30) per hour; in Beijing and Shanghai, 3 to
3.5 yuan RMB. Customers are almost exclusively teenagers. Each time, I
browsed over their screens quickly to see what they were doing. I then jot-
ted down the numbers and findings and tallied them back home. Among
the 100 customers I spotted in the Internet cafés, 61 played computer
games; 25 surfed popular Chinese websites on MTV, pop music, and the
like; 14 read and wrote e-mails. All of them seemed to be chatting in a chat
room, on ICQ, or by instant messengers simultaneously. I did not see any-
one browsing indecent or pornographic websites, nor did I notice anyone
reading any news websites or checking websites in English or other lan-
guages. The Internet cafés apparently are not the place where teenagers do
such “secretive” or “serious” things.
My field research in the Internet cafés, albeit somewhat informal, helps
me understand the concerns of the general public over the uses and abuses
of these Internet cafés, concerns that are well captured in local news media.
Local newspapers and television channels express the serious concerns of
the parents of teenage children obsessed with the illegal Internet cafes, and
they call for strict regulations and management.54 When a fire broke out in
an Internet café in suburban Beijing in June 2002, killing twenty-four peo-
ple and injuring thirteen, the event sparked a chain reaction by the state,
which tightened up controls and banned many illegal Internet cafés.
According to the Chinese Ministry of Culture, only 46,000 of China’s
200,000 Internet cafes were registered in the summer of 2002. The Western
media immediately seized this opportunity to attack China’s suppression
of free speech in cyberspace.55 The Chinese state, as usual, remained deadly
silent on these charges. Yet underneath the furies and frustrations of the
people involved—quite a large number if most parents of urban teenage
children are included—is a deep, unexplained anxiety and uncertainty over
the direction of the urban youth culture, and of Chinese culture in general,
as though the new information technology of the Internet had plunged
China dangerously into uncharted waters without any navigator. After all,
technology by itself should not be at fault. But who is to blame? And where
are guideposts and alternatives to be found?
The Internet does offer opportunities to alternative and radical aes-
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thetic and literary expressions. Many websites sprang up in the late 1990s
that are dedicated to literary and artistic experiments for reviving radical
revolutionary idealism. These websites often collaborate with groups—
such as artists, musicians, dramatists, historians, and literary critics—who
contribute frequently to the websites or who are website makers them-
selves. Together with the political and intellectual online forums and chat
rooms, these literary and artistic websites have constituted a New Left pres-
ence with many constituents among the Net users. A noticeable case is the
interactive website discussion and dissemination and theatrical experimen-
tation of the play Che Guevara.56
Che Guevara is collectively scripted and directed by Zhang Guangtian,
a Beijing-based musician. In the spring of 2000, it debuted as a small-
theater, experimental play in Beijing. The play’s crew is not affiliated with
any state-owned dramatic troupe or institutes and is financially self-
supporting and artistically independent, although it is made up of profes-
sionals who work for the play part-time. Except for Zhang Guangtian, who
was born in 1966, the other members of the Che Guevara team were born
mostly in the 1970s. In other words, they belong to the Newer New
Humanity generation. The Che Guevara team runs in a similar way to
China’s rock star Cui Jian and his team, who are largely independent of the
state institutions. Yet the underlying ideologies of the Che Guevara team
and Cui Jian’s rock band are visibly different. Whereas Cui Jian draws on
the protest songs of the 1960s and the rock-and-roll tradition in the United
States as a way to renounce and satirize China’s revolutionary legacy, the
Che Guevara team wants to reinvigorate the revolutionary spirit, as incar-
nated by the legendary Argentina guerrilla leader, in order to wage new
campaigns against social injustice and corruption in contemporary China
and the world.
The play is a medley of music, dance, mime, drama, poetry recitation,
and chorus singing. It is an experimental, nonrealistic play with few stage
settings and props; this style apparently draws on the Chinese experimental
theater of the 1980s, which was influenced by Brecht and Beckett. In the
play, Che Guevara, the protagonist, has no stage appearance; only his voice
is heard offstage. The plot has two parallel lines. The first traces Che’s revo-
lutionary journey from the Cuban revolution to his final destiny in the
guerrilla wars in Bolivia in 1967. The second line presents reflections—de-
bates among a group of young Chinese in the post-cold-war, post-
revolutionary era—on the meaning of revolution and on new forms of cor-
ruption, injustice, and exploitation in China and the world today. The two
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story lines are juxtaposed and intertwined, punctuated by sometimes
solemn and sometimes rueful songs and dances. The message of the play is
fairly explicit: a call for a revival of revolutionary idealism to right the
wrongs in this materialistic, consumer-oriented, yet unjust and undemo-
cratic world. The play is also a strong satire and critique of social ills in
China today and of the lopsided state policy of economic determinism and
developmentalism.
After the Beijing debut, the play toured across the country, from
Kaifeng and Zhengzhou (medium-sized cities in central China) to
Guangzhou; then, in December 2000, it returned to Beijing, where the play
had a second run with a full-capacity audience. It had drawn huge audi-
ences in all the cities it toured, and it aroused heated debates among China’s
theater and literary critics. The crew then planned a cross-country tour in
2001 from Shanghai. From the outset, the Internet has played a crucial role
in spreading the news and debates about the play. Websites such as
Heibanbao Wenyi (Blackboard of literature and arts—a reference to the
Maoist practice of “culture of the masses”; <www.heibanbao.com>),
Yinyue Dazibao (Music big-character posters—a reference to the Cultural
Revolution’s “big-character posters”; <www.person.zj.cninfo.net/
~dazibao>), and Sina.com have covered the news report of the play exten-
sively and launched a continuous publicity campaign. Zhang Guangtian,
the director of the play, and Huan Jisu, an influential avant-garde play-
wright who is a major member of the script-writing team, have posted on
those websites a number of essays to expound their views. Several online
discussion panels about the play have been organized by those websites,
too. To a significant extent, the play owes its success to the dissemination of
information and publicity by the websites as an alternative medium (the
state-owned media have had little coverage of the play, because its explicit
criticism and satire of the state ideology and policy have drawn rebuttal
from various authorities). The websites involved in the promotion of the
play in turn received a big boost to their popularity, thanks to the success of
the play.
Yang Fan, an economist in Beijing known for his sharply critical views
of the state economic policy, in January 2001 devoted a whole session of his
popular seminar on current Chinese thinking to the play Che Guevara.
Yang invited Zhang Guangtian and a host of neoliberals in Beijing for a
spirited debate.57 China’s neoliberals have been furious about the play and
have waged counterattacks against Che’s “revolutionary terrorism” and the
“specter of the Cultural Revolution” that the play is said to invoke. Zhang
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argued in the debate that idealism is always necessary for humanity and
that revolution is not opposed to individual freedom. He voiced a strong
critique of globalization and of the U.S. role in globalization in particular.
Yang, Zhang, and others also questioned the motives of neoliberals in
China today. The neoliberals charged that Zhang and the play were merely
staging a self-promoting show with pretentiousness and that their messages
were largely irrelevant to China’s reality. The debate in Yang’s seminar was
then widely publicized in Internet forums and chat rooms.
The play Che Guevara and its controversy ultimately bring the mem-
bers of the Newer New Humanity to China’s political forum, confronting a
complex set of circumstances in which the residual, the dominant, and the
emergent cultural and ideological forces vie for space. Yet does the radical
revolutionary rhetoric of the play Che Guevara reawaken a sense of social
commitment among the young generation? Or does it only reproduce a
nostalgia that valorizes the aesthetic dimension of the past revolution?
Che’s decision to sacrifice himself in guerrilla battlefields may elicit a quasi-
religious sense of the sublime among the postrevolutionary urban youth,
but it hardly constitutes a viable alternative to the hegemony of global cap-
italism and its ideologies. Zhang Guangtian and his crew publicly admit
that they never shy away from commercial gains, and the play and its by-
products, such as CDs, DVDs, T-shirts, toys, electronic games, and so on,
have indeed created a Che Guevara fad as a display of masculinity.
China’s revolutionary legacy has always been used as cultural capital by
both the state and the consumer popular culture for different purposes, and
the Che Guevara phenomenon is just one example of the role that inte-
grated electronic media have played in reinventing revolutionary culture.
In 2002 a chuanmei lianjie xiaoshuo (cyberlink novel) appeared in the liter-
ary magazine Dajia (Masters). The novel, Baimaonü zai 1970 (The white-
haired girl in 1970), written by Lin Yan, is a parody of the revolutionary
“Red classic” The White-Haired Girl.58 The novel has only an outline of a
plot, with many episodes and characters that are linked to websites that
bear the name “White-Haired Girl.” The websites connected then affect the
development of the plot and the characterization, and because there are
more than 13,400 websites related to White-Haired Girl, the possible plot
developments are numerous. The novel, hailed by critics as “revolutionary
in cyberliterature,”59 obviously has the technical ingenuity and imagina-
tion for constructing an elaborate cybertext that integrates various media,
including music, graphics, verbal texts, and so on. The revolutionary cul-
ture as the subtext of the novel, however, is relentlessly dismembered and
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deconstructed. As an integral part of China’s modernity, revolutionary cul-
ture is ineradicable, while its future role in China remains unpredictable.
The Internet embodies the dialectic tension and contradiction of globaliza-
tion, with both democratic potentials for the disempowered majority and
service capability for global capitalism. This is shown clearly in China
today. China’s specific issue, however, lies in the tension between needs for
normative regulation and for democratic participation of its vast popula-
tion. In the domains of ideology and values—especially in the news media,
the public political forum, and literature and the arts—the Internet has be-
come perhaps the most dynamic force. It has been active in dismantling the
discursive, institutional infrastructures of the state inherited from the Mao
era. In the meantime, it serves effectively to disseminate global consumer
culture to the Chinese urban youth. However, it has yet to vindicate itself in
its constructive potential for the reinvention of social consensus, conducive
to China’s reconstruction. This reinvention entails not only local (Chinese)
restructuring and reinvention but also resistance to both global consumer
culture and the political and economic hegemony of global capitalism.
The Internet holds out the promise of a new democracy and equality
by nurturing a creative and constructive literacy and egalitarian social con-
sciousness. Yet the promise can be delivered only by ceaseless, concerted ef-
forts of the state and individual citizens. The Internet’s constructive role in
China depends on social and cultural reconstruction, and therefore the
Internet is also an integral and constitutive part of that reconstruction.
Under the condition of globalization, there are equally concerted but much
more powerful efforts of global capitalism and its agencies—IBM,
Microsoft, Hollywood, Disney, CNN, and so forth, in addition to the po-
litical powers of various nation-states in which the transnational, global
capital is based—to consolidate its global domination. The Internet is a
critical arena in which new forms of domination, inequality, and exclusion
fight with forces for democracy and justice. Such a battle is thoroughly de-
territorialized, and China is no exception. The Internet in China, in short,
is symptomatic of a culture and society in transition that seeks to redefine
its identities, subjectivities, temporalities, and spaces in a vastly complex,
deeply entangled global network dominated by global capitalism.
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modernization, see Zhongguo gongchandang di ba ci quanguo daibiao dahui
wenjian (Documents of the Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist
Party).
17. Renmin ribao (People’s daily), 6 October and 8 October 1994, overseas edi-
tion.
18. Ibid., 6 September 1994, overseas edition.
19. The revival of Confucianism or new Confucianism, started in Hong Kong
and Taiwan and then extended to Singapore and South Korea and finally the
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United States, where it finds perhaps its strongest advocates, such as Tu
Wei-ming from Harvard and Yu Ying-shih from Princeton. This revival is
intimately related to the “East Asian economic miracle” and the success of
capitalist developments based on the “East Asian model.” This “global
Confucianism,” as Arif Dirlik puts it, “has been rendered into a prime
mover of capitalist development and has also found quite a sympathetic ear
among First World ideologues who now look to a Confucian ethic to relieve
the crisis of capitalism” (“Postcolonial Aura,” p. 341).
20. Anthony Giddens, among others, has observed the “rise of local national-
ism” in the context of capitalist globalization. See his Consequences of
Modernity, especially pp. 63–78.
21. Wallerstein differentiates between “nationalism of resistance” and “nation-
alism of domination” in Politics of the World-Economy, 130. For a more re-
cent discussion, but essentially the same argument, see Wallerstein,
Geopolitics and Geoculture.
22. The paradigm of tradition/modernity was promoted by a group of young
scholars associated with the journal Wenhuan: Zhongguo yu shijie (Culture:
China and the world) and the translation project Twentieth Century
Western Scholarly Classics. Not counting the influence of the same para-
digm of modern China studies in the West, the purpose of the Chinese crit-
ics of the 1980s was to replace the older opposition of “Western
culture/Chinese culture” with “tradition/modernity” in their reinterpreta-
tion of modern Chinese cultural and intellectual history. Although they did
not purposefully elide and suppress the revolutionary legacy, these critics
took the problematic of modernity as their guiding episteme without ques-
tioning its historical specificity. See Gan, ed., Zhongguo dangdai wenhua
yishi (Contemporary Chinese cultural consciousness).
23. Chen Pingyuan, “Qiushi yu zhiyong” (Seek truth and put to use), 148.
24. Liu Mengxi, “ ‘Wenhua tuo ming’ ” (“Cultural will-passing”), 107.
25. Williams, Problems in Materialism and Culture, 8.
26. Chen Lai, “Ershi shiji wenhua yundong zhong de jijin zhuyi” (Radicalism in
the twentieth-century cultural movements). It is worth noting that Chen, a
professor of philosophy at Beijing University and a major figure of national
learning, was once an active member of the 1980s hermeneutic group asso-
ciated with the journal Culture: China and the World. See note 22, above.
27. For a contemporary controversy on the question of “radicalism,” see Ershi yi
shiji (Twenty-first century), nos. 10 and 11 (both 1992). In these two issues
of the highly influential Hong Kong journal, Yu Ying-shih, a leading
American advocate of neo-Confucianism teaching at Princeton, debates
with Chinese historians concerning radicalism in modern Chinese intellec-
tual history. Yu denounces “radicalism,” singling out Marxism specifically, as
the true villain in Chinese modernization. See Yu Ying-shih, “Zai lun
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Zhongguo xiandai sixiang zhong de jijin yu baoshou” (Further thoughts on
radicalism and conservatism in modern Chinese intellectual history) 147. In
his rebuttal, Jiang Yihua, a Chinese historian, argues that Yu’s attack on radi-
calism “has spawned a new wave of neo-conservatism and anti-radicalism in
academic inquiries as well as in political practices” (Jiang Yihua, “Jijin yu
baoshou” [Radicalism and conservatism] 134). Xudong Zhang’s discussion
of the debate over “radicalism” and “conservatism” throughout the 1990s is
insightful, particularly on the diatribe exchanged between Yu and Jiang; see
Zhang, “Making of the Post-Tiananmen Intellectual Field.”
28. Gao Ruiquan, “Zouchu Hou jingxue shidai” (Moving beyond the era of
postscholasticism).
29. An analysis of the funding activities by major American, Japanese, and west-
ern European foundations, such as the Ford Foundation, the Mellon
Foundation, and the like, to support the Chinese national learning and neo-
liberal intellectuals and their projects in the recent decades is urgently
needed. For a recent reference on transnational funding for “semi-indepen-
dent” scholarly journals in China, see note 31 of Wang Hui’s translated arti-
cle “Contemporary Chinese Thought and the Question of Modernity,” 197.
This indirect reference to the involvement of transnational capital in China’s
academic activities does not appear in Wang Hui’s article in its original
Chinese version in Tianya (Frontiers) 5 (1997). There has been until now a
peculiar silence in the academic communities both inside and outside China
on the relationship of transnational capital, its foundations, and its research
institutions to Chinese intellectual and academic activities, despite the obvi-
ous fact that such a relationship has been enormously influential in China’s
intellectual politics. Except for the passing reference in Wang Hui’s footnote,
Whither China?, the most recent English-language volume on China’s intel-
lectual life, has no other discussion of this phenomenon.
30. Bakhtin, Dialogic Imagination, 371.
31. For discussions of Li Zehou’s works in the 1980s, see Liu Kang,
“Subjectivity, Marxism, and Culture Theory”; and Min Lin, “Search for
Modernity.”
32. Jameson’s China lectures of 1985 were translated and published in Chinese
as Houxiandai zhuyi yu wenhua lilun (Postmodernism and cultural theory).
The author of the introduction to Jameson’s lectures likens them to
Bertrand Russell’s speeches at Beijing University in 1921 during the period
of early cultural ferment known as the May Fourth Era (circa 1919–1927).
The term “post-New Era criticism” was coined by Zhang Yiwu to refer to
some avant-garde critical discourse that has emerged since 1990, vis-à-vis
the cultural and literary criticism of the “New Era” (1979–1989). See, for ex-
ample, Zhang Yiwu, Wang, and Liu, “Houxinshiqi de wenxue piping”
(Post–New Era literary criticism).
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33. Wang Ning, for example, proposes that postmodernism may serve as the
point at which “a real dialogue with our Western colleagues” can start
(“Constructing Postmodernism,” 60).
34. A case in point is that I was involved in a controversy inadvertently in 1993,
when I submitted an essay to Modern China, criticizing some practices of
China studies of the West and drawing on some postmodernist notions.
Several leading American experts of China studies sharply rejected my view-
points as following blindly the Western new theory while ignoring China’s
“difference”; see Liu Kang et al., “Symposium.” The American Sinologists
involved in the debate are Perry Link and Michael Duke; the other critic,
Zhang Longxi, has a personal background similar to my own: he came to the
United States from China about a decade ago, received a doctorate in litera-
ture, and now teaches at an American university. Zhang, unlike Link and
Duke, capitalizes on his unique, personal “Chinese experience” to refute my
“distortion” of “Chinese reality.” But the kind of “experience” and its ideo-
logical mediation are precisely what is at stake in the debate. It is thus illog-
ical for Zhang to insist on his own unique possession of “Chinese experi-
ence” as a case of pure “difference.”
35. Representative works of post–New Era criticism include Zhang Yiwu, Zai
bianyuan chu zhuisuo (Search at the margin), and Chen Xiaoming, Wubian
de tiaozhan (Challenges without borders).
36. Zhang Fa, Zhang, and Wang, “Cong ‘xiangdaixing’ dao ‘Zhonghuaxing’ ”
(From modernity to Chineseness).
37. For a critique of Zhang Yiwu’s “Chineseness,” see Wang Hui, “Contemporary
Chinese Thought.” In this essay, published originally in China in 1997, Wang
Hui, himself a significant player in the intellectual debates of the late 1990s,
charges that Chinese postmodernists such as Zhang Yiwu and others tend to
“attack other intellectuals” and use postmodernism “as a legitimation of mar-
ket ideology and consumerism” (p. 181). Wang’s critique appears in fact far
more radical and postmodern than that of the Chinese postmodernists, in
that Wang’s sweeping repudiation of contemporary Chinese intellectual dis-
course is based on the judgment that almost all intellectual trends in modern
and contemporary China, from Maoism and “humanist” Marxism to post-
modernism and postcolonialism, fall prey to outdated “modernist” and “de-
velopmentalist” logical booby traps. On the other hand, Zhang’s colleagues
argue that the “Chineseness” in the postmodern-postcolonial context refers
to “a dialectical negation and continuation of China’s classical culture and
modern Enlightenment tradition, and an effort to redefine a Chinese identity
in the age of globalization”; (Wang Yichuan, Zhang, and Liu, “Jiushi niandai
wenhua piping shitan” [A conversation on Chinese cultural criticism of the
1990s], 23). In the same conversation with these postmodern-postcolonial
scholars, I expressed a strong reservation that such a cultural identity as
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“Chineseness” may obfuscate the grave socioeconomic conflicts and inequal-
ities currently existing in China (p. 24).
38. Chen Sihe, “Daotong, xuetong, yu zhengtong” (Traditions of Dao, learning,
and politics), 52.
39. For the strategies of reterritorialization of the Western intellectual Left, see,
for example, Patton, “Marxism and Beyond.”
40. Gao Ruiquan et al., “Renwen jingshen xunzong.”
41. Zhang Rulun argues that in order to defend the universal values embedded
in the Western classics, Habermas and Gadamer are useful to “discard the
(historical) content and designate a set of universally acceptable discursive
rules.” See Zhang Rulun et al., “Renwen jingshen” (Humanist spirits), 7.
42. For an incisive analysis of American cultural conservatism, see Messer-
Davidow, “Manufacturing the Attack.” See also Hirsch, Cultural Literacy;
and Bloom, Closing of the American Mind. By drawing parallels between
the Chinese and the Americans, I do not mean to collapse their vast differ-
ences. There is, however, an undeniable and tangible link between intellec-
tual trends in an age of global communication, despite geopolitical differ-
ences.
43. The author and translator are given as follows in the book: “Dr.
Luoyiningger (Germany), (Wang Shan, Trans.).” Soon after the book was
published, Wang Meng, a renowned writer and former cultural minister,
questioned its authorship by identifying many obvious rhetorical features
that betray its forged “foreignness.” Wang Meng also strongly criticized the
book’s anti-intellectual stance. See Wang Meng, “ ‘Luoyiningger’ yu ta de
yanjing” (“Luoyiningger” and his eyes). It was later ascertained by the Hong
Kong magazine Asian Weekly that the “translator” was the real author him-
self. For related information, see Beijing zhizhun (Beijing spring) 10 (1994).
44. In “The Commitment to Theory,” Homi Bhabha defines the postcolonialist
“hybridity” as a “space . . . where the construction of a political object that
is new, neither the one or nor the Other, properly alienates our political ex-
pectations and changes.” Such an ambivalent “in-betweenness,” as many
critics have noted, only repositions Bhabha and his cohorts to a comfortably
esoteric and academic plane, irrelevant to real historical happenings and
events. In the Chinese case of Third Eye, however, its relationship to the re-
alpolitik is significant. It is said by overseas political commentators to have
the backing of top Chinese leaders, including the CCP general secretary and
the president of the People’s Republic of China, Jiang Zemin. For a tran-
scription of the Voice of America forum on the book, which was attended by
leading Chinese political dissidents Liu Binyan and Su Shaozhi, see the
Chinese dissident newspaper published in the United States, Xinwen ziyou
daobao (Herald of freedom of press), 14 October 1994.
45. Third Eye, 207–228 and 246: “The rulers often publicize unrealistic slogans
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of reform to please the public, and these deceptive objectives further stimu-
late the idealist fervor of the masses in a vicious circle, ultimately causing
catastrophic turns to the social reform and transformations.”
46. Ibid., 209.
47. Ibid., 259.
48. Ibid., 214.
49. Ibid., 217.
50. Ibid., 246.
51. See, for instance, Unger and Cui, “China in the Russian Mirror.” Issues 24
and 25 of Ershi yi shiji (Twenty-first century) include articles debating
Unger’s and Cui’s positions. See chapter 2 of the present book for additional
related references.
52. See Zhang Yiwu, “Chanshi Zhongguo de jialu” (The anxiety of interpreting
China) and “Zai shuo chanshi Zhongguo de jialu” (The anxiety of inter-
preting China revisited), which have also been collected in Wang Hui and
Yu, eds., 90 Niandai de “houxue” lunzheng (Debates about “postisms” of
the 1990s), 43–56, 57–67. See also Jin and Tao, Chanshi Zhongguo de jialu
(The anxiety of interpreting China), for an elaboration on “intellectual
aphasia.”
Chapter 2 What Is “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”?
1. Marx and Engels, German Ideology, 37.
2. Marx, Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 15.
3. Dirlik, “Revolutionary Hegemony,” 28.
4. Ibid., 27.
5. Liu Kang, Aesthetics and Marxism.
6. Tso, “Final Letter to Friends.”
7. Mao, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 1, 336.
8. Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 15–16.
9. Deng, Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, 1978–1982 (Selected works of Deng
Xiaoping, 1978–1982), 232.
10. Deng, Deng Xiaoping wenxuan (Selected works of Deng Xiaoping), vol. 3,
105.
11. Ibid.
12. Deng, Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, 1978–1982 (Selected works of Deng
Xiaoping, 1978–1982), 48.
13. Eagleton, Ideology, 1–5.
14. Hall et al., eds., Modernity, 396–420.
15. Ideology as “false consciousness” is George Lukacs’ formulation. For a dis-
cussion, see Seliger, Marxist Conception of Ideology.
16. Althusser, “On Ideology.”
17. See Eagleton, Ideology, 33–61.
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18. Maurice Meisner states that Deng Xiaoping’s reform is “deradicalized so-
cialism.” See Meisner, “Deradicalization of Chinese Socialism.”
19. Marx, Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 15–16.
20. Zhonggong zhongyang dang’an yanjiu shi (Office of Archives and Research
of the CCP Central Committee), “Weida de qizhi, guanghui de lilun” (Great
banner, glorious theories).
21. Ibid.
22. Baktin, “Discourse in the Novel.”
23. “Fang Liu Ji.”
24. Yang, “Weiji yu fan weiji” (Crisis and anti-crisis).
25. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks.
26. Mao, “Lun xin jieduan” (On new periods), 260–261; translation is mine.
For an edited and altered version in English translation, see Mao, Selected
Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 1, 209–210.
27. For a discussion of the “culture of the masses,” see Liu Kang, “Popular
Culture.”
28. Pomfret, “Experts.”
29. Jiang Zemin, “Speech.”
30. Ibid., 15.
31. Smith, “China’s Leader Urges Opening”; and Pomfret, “New Deal for
China’s Capitalists.”
32. Pomfret, “China Allows Its Capitalists to Join Party,” 1.
33. Tam, “Mao, Style Guru.”
34. The cassette recoding of CCTV’s music video program, 22 July 1997.
35. Ibid.
36. Liu Kang and Li, Yaomohua Zhongguo de beihou (Backgrounds of demoniz-
ing China). For the abridged English translation, see Liu Kang and Li,
Demonizing China.
37. Liu Kang, “Is There an Alternative to (Capitalist) Globalization?” 169.
38. Berger, “In the Faculty Club.”
39. Liu Binyan and Link, “A Great Leap Backward?”
40. Ibid.
41. He Qinglian, Xiandaihua de xianjing (Pitfalls of modernization), 373.
42. Zhu, “Wusi yilai de liangge jingshen bingzao” (Two causes of mental sick-
ness since the May Fourth movement), 36.
43. Liu Junning, “Shichang jingji yu youxian zhengfu” (Market economy and
limited government), 50–51.
44. Ibid., 82.
45. Ibid., 53.
46. Ibid., 93.
47. Ma and Ling, Huhan (Outcry), 147.
48. Ni, “Jiang Zemin.”
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49. The series Qianyan wenhua lunzheng beiwanglu (Notes on debates at cul-
tural forefronts) consists of three volumes, all edited by Li Shitao:
Ziyouzhuyi zhi zheng yu Zhongguo sixiangjie de fenhua (Debates over “liber-
alism” and fragmentation of Chinese intellectual circles), Jijin yu baoshou
zhijian de dongdang (Hurricanes between radicals and conservatives), and
Minzuzhuyi yu zhuanxing qi Zhongguo de mingyun (Nationalism and the
fate of China in transition).
50. Wang Hui and Yu, eds., 90 Niandai de “houxue” lunzheng (Debates about
“postisms” of the 1990s).
51. Ren Jiantao, a Harvard-based visiting scholar, for instance, charges that the
Chinese new leftists commit the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness” by cri-
tiquing free market economy and capitalism in China and “only serve to de-
fend a self-explained, implicit socialism”; see his “Jiedu xin zuopai”
(Interpreting the New Left). Luo Gang, a Shanghai scholar, charges that
“when Liu Kang the neo-Marxist addresses Chinese issues his neo-Marxist
position interestingly turns into an unconditional defense of the ruling
power blocs in China.” He adds that the “Chinese New Left now still face the
dilemma Liu Kang faced: how to deal with the Chinese socialist legacy and
the official Marxism when you want to emphasize the legitimacy of social-
ism and Marxism?” See Xu Jilin et al., “Xunqiu ‘di santia lu’ ” (Seeking the
“Third Way”), 328. Although I take any critique of my work as intellectually
challenging and rewarding, I find that adding labels and brands is hardly a
fruitful way to engage in serious debates.
52. Cui Zhiyuan, “Zai disan shijie chaoyue xifang zhongxin lun yu wenhua xi-
angdui lun” (Transcending Eurocentrism and cultural relativism in the
Third World).
53. Huang, “Cong xiandai xing dao di san tiao lu” (From modernity to the
“Third Way”).
54. Wallerstein, “Eurocentrism and Its Avatars.”
55. Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus.
Chapter 3 The Rise of Commercial Popular Culture and the Legacy of
the Revolutionary Culture of the Masses
1. Reuters, cited from CND (China News Digest, an Internet news service), 14
December 1996, <www.cnd.org>.
2. Sheler, “In Search of Christmas,” 56.
3. Ibid., 58, 62.
4. Yi He and Li, “Xiadu pang de ‘quanyi’ ” (“Armchairs” of the summer
palace), 145; my translation.
5. Brown and Flavin, “China’s Challenge to the United States and to the Earth,”
10. World Watch, the magazine in which the article appeared, is published by
the U.S. environmental watchdog Worldwatch Institute in Washington, D.C.
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6. For a discussion of the ideological conflicts in contemporary China, see Liu
Kang, “Is There an Alternative to (Capitalist) Globalization?”
7. See “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jiaqiang shehuizhuyi jingshen wen-
ming jianshe ruogan zhongyao wenti de jueyi” (CCP Central Committee’s
resolution on strengthening the construction of socialist spiritual civiliza-
tion). Also see the front-page report on the celebration of the sixtieth an-
niversary of the Long March in Renmin ribao, 22 October 1996. The major
news in this otherwise routine Chinese media coverage, dominated by offi-
cial celebrations, meetings, and conferences, is the accompanying photo of
the art performance for the event in the Great Hall of the People, in which
gigantic portraits of the three leaders Mao, Deng, and Jiang are projected on
the huge background screen. It signals the complete takeover of Jiang as the
“third-generation” political leader.
8. See Chen Xiaoming, “The Miraculous Other,” 124.
9. Jiang Zemin, “Zai zhongguo wenlian zhongguo zuoxie di 6/5 ci quanguo
daibiao dahui shang de jianghua” (Speech at the Fifth/Sixth National
Congress of Writers and Artists), 4.
10. Ibid.
11. See Liu Kang, “Is There an Alternative to (Capitalist) Globalization?”
12. Associated Press newswire, 27 November 1996. The Voice of America
(VOA) also covered the Wang Shuo controversy and related events several
times. I was invited by VOA’s Chinese program as a panelist to discuss the
recent events in contemporary Chinese culture, media, and public opin-
ions, including Wang Shuo’s works and their reception in China, on 4
November and 1 December 1996. See Voice of America, “Wang Shuo con-
troversy.”
13. See, for instance, discussions in the mid-1990s about postmodernism in
China in the Hong Kong journal, Ershi yi shiji (The twenty-first century), in
which largely “liberal” critics from China and overseas Chinese attack post-
modern critics as “ultraconservatives” complicit with the Chinese
Communist regime.
14. Tao, “Cong wenhua ziben de zhengduo kan zhishi fenzi de fenhua” (Seeing
the dissolution of Chinese intellectuals through their contests for cultural
capital), 92.
15. For the distinctions of cultural “dominant,” “emergent,” and “residual,” see
Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature.
16. According to a recent study, China’s urban laborers in manufacturing sec-
tors (the traditional working class) and service sectors constitute 34.6 per-
cent of China’s population (22.6 percent in manufacturing and 12 percent
in service), and the peasants about 44 percent. See Lu Xueyi, ed., Dangdai
Zhongguo shehui jieceng yanjiu baogao (A report on the study of contempo-
rary Chinese social classes), 20–22. A 2002 study of Chinese television pro-
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grams and ratings shows that about 56 percent of the television audience is
urban and rural residents engaged in low-income, labor-intensive jobs in
manufacturing, service, and farming. The most popular type of television
program with the highest rating is soap operas, with 33 percent of the total
programs, followed by news (12 percent), special news features (9 percent),
movies (6 percent), and so on. See Wang Lanzhu and Liu, “2001 nian quan-
guo dianshi shoushi sichang fenxi” (An analysis of the national 2001 televi-
sion program ratings). See also CSM Research Group, ed., Zhongguo dianshi
shouzhong yanjiu (Study of the Chinese television audience); for an English
version, see CSM Research Group, ed., Television in China 2001 Overview.
17. See Dirlik, “Mao Zedong and ‘Chinese Marxism.’ ”
18. For a further discussion, see Liu Kang, Aesthetics and Marxism.
19. Mao, “Lun xin jieduan” (On new periods), 260–261. Translations are mine.
For an English translation of the text (in a different, heavily edited version),
see Mao, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 2, 209–210.
20. Qu Qiubai wenji (Collected essays of Qu Qiubai), vol. 2, 880.
21. Ibid., 913. For a study of the cultural popularization movement in modern
China, see Hung, Going to the People.
22. Mao, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 1, 308.
23. Associate Press newswire, 22 December 1996.
24. See Zhang Ping, “Jinnian lai Zhongguo dianshiju de fazhan qushi” (Recent
trends of Chinese television drama), 3. For a detailed and insightful analysis
in English of the consumer popular culture and television soap operas in the
1990s, see Sheldon Lu, China, Transnational Visuality, Global Postmodernity,
especially chapter 9, “Popular Culture: Toward a Historical and Dialectical
Method,” and chapter 10, “Soap Opera: The Transnational Politics of
Visuality, Sexuality, and Masculinity.” In these chapters, Lu diagnoses at
length the unleashing of nationalistic sentiments, libidinous desires, and
“transnational” fantasies of the “other” and “othering” amid the increasingly
transnational and mixed urban populations in Beijing and Shanghai in
China’s consumer popular culture, particularly in television drama and soap
operas in the late 1990s. Lu, however, constrained by the publication sched-
ule of his book, could not include the latest cultural productions at the be-
ginning of the 2000s and, probably as a matter of choice, paid no attention to
the reinvented revolutionary cultural products. For accounts in English, see
Zha, China Pop. Zha’s book, though informative, is largely a journalistic ac-
count, much in keeping with the U.S. popular media’s “agenda setting” about
how China should be portrayed to the American public. See also Lull, China
Turned On, which deals with the general development of China’s television
in the 1980s.
25. I have discussed at length the reinvention of the revolutionary Red classics
in China by the late 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s in “Reinventing
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the ‘Red Classics’ in the Age of Globalization.” In that paper, I suggest that
the state ideological apparatuses are revitalizing the Red classics in order to
create a “mummified” version of the historical legacy by effecting an emo-
tional attachment to the national past, whereas the commercial culture in-
dustry’s interest lies in bringing about a much commodified, nationalistic
nostalgia from the revolutionary past. The reactions and responses from
China’s diverse, highly stratified, and antagonistic social groups, however,
vary a great deal, ranging from nostalgic invocation of the memories of the
past and yearnings for the egalitarian fiction of the Mao era to outright
protests against social injustice and corruption.
26. Williams, Marxism and Literature, 132.
27. For a sample of the popular media’s review of The Years of Burning Passion,
see Yu Jian, “Xihuan jiqing ranshao de suiyue de jiu ge liyou” (Nine reasons
to like The Years of Burning Passion), Bejing wanbao (Beijing evening news),
July 6, 2002. It was reported that the cost of the drama was 7.5 million RMB
yuan (about U.S.$900,000, a small budget by Chinese standards), yet in nine
months it gained an income of more than 20 million RMB yuan (about
U.S.$2.5 million), for a profit of about 300 percent. See Gao Yu, “Jiqing ran-
shao de suiyue” (Years of burning passion).
28. Zhang Yiwu analyzes the nostalgic sentimentalism beneath the popularity of
contemporary soap operas such as Kewang (Yearning; CCTV Television
Drama Studio, 1990), chapter 4, 345–393. For a more recent and perceptive
study of the contradiction of revolutionary past and contemporary cultural
politics, see Zhou Xian, “Wenhua de zongtixing yu fenhua” (The totality of
culture and cultural diversity).
29. Adorno, Culture Industry, 34.
30. Jameson, Signatures of the Visible, 23.
31. Ibid., 24.
32. Liu Kang, “Hegemony and Cultural Revolution.” For earlier discussions of
the relationship between Gramsci and Mao, see Dirlik, “Predicament of
Marxist Revolutionary Consciousness.” See also Todd, “Ideological
Superstructure.”
33. Some Chinese critics argue that, in today’s age of consumerism, cultural
hegemony in China appears primarily in the form of “cultural imperialism”
or “Americanization” and that, to counter it, China must come up with a
new set of strategies for its cultural reconstruction. See Meng Fanhua,
Chuanmei yu wenhua lingdaoquan (Media and cultural hegemony), 5.
34. Lefebvre, “The Everyday and Everydayness,” 9.
35. Ibid., 10.
36. For a discussion of Mao’s utopianism, see Meisner, Marxism, Maoism, and
Utopianism.
37. See de Certeau, Practice of Everyday Life. For a “liberal-populist” view of pop-
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ular culture that draws on de Certeau, see Fiske, Understanding Popular
Culture. For a critique of such views, see Ang, “Culture and Communication.”
Chapter 4 The Short-Lived Avant-Garde Literary Movement 
and Its Transformation
1. Murphy, Theorizing the Avant-garde, 3.
2. Rosenburg, “Collective, Ideological, Combative,” 89.
3. Chen Xiaoming, Wubian de tiaozhan and Shengyu de xiangxiang.
4. Xudong Zhang, Chinese Modernism, 134.
5. Yu Hua, Houzhe (To live) and Xusanguan maixue ji (Xu Sanguan selling his
blood).
6. For a discussion of the politics of the Chinese avant-garde, see Jing Wang,
High Culture Fever. Wang’s view, however, relies essentially on the reduc-
tionist assumption that China’s politics is nothing more than irreconcilable
conflicts between the Communist authorities and dissenting intellectuals
and writers. For a more balanced and perceptive study that takes into ac-
count the context of complex political and social change in post-Mao
China, see Xudong Zhang, Chinese Modernism.
7. Yu Hua, Yu Hua xiaoshuo: shishi ruyan (Collected fiction of Yu Hua: world
like mist), 3.
8. Yu Hua and Huang, “Ba wen Yu Hua” (Eight questions to Yu Hua), 9.
9. Sollers, “From Laws,” 206.
10. Ibid., 208.
11. Yu Hua and Huang, “Ba wen Yu Hua” (Eight questions to Yu Hua), 10.
12. Poggioli, Theory of the Avant-garde, 14.
13. Calinescu, Faces of Modernity.
14. Jing Wang, “Introduction,” 11.
15. Bürger, Theory of the Avant-garde, 22.
16. Ibid., 90.
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